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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Definition of Systemic Risk
‘The term “Systemic Risk” belongs to the folklore of the discussion about banks
and banking supervision.’ Hellwig (1998, p. 123)1
During the last years, systemic risk has moved to the center stage of interest of
academics and practitioners, as well as politicians and regulators. This thesis aims
to be part of the progress in advancing the understanding of this specific type of
risk.
To date, no mutually accepted definition of systemic risk can be found in the
literature. Many authors mean different things when they write about systemic
risk. In this section, we give a brief overview of various possible definitions of
systemic risk and clarify our understanding of systemic risk.
Generally, systemic risk can be defined in a very broad way. One can think
about any threat that accrues from or that is transmitted via a system. Possible
examples are the threat of epidemic plagues, where diseases are transmitted via
the contact of human beings (which can be regarded as a system), or the threat of
a wide-area power blackout, originating from the failure of one transformer station,
1Original in German, translated by the author.
1
2with propagating capacity overloads through the power grid. Consequently,
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines
systemic risk as ‘a risk that affects the systems on which society depends – health,
transport, environment, telecommunications, etc.’, see OECD (2003, p. 9).
In this thesis, we are concerned with systemic risk in an economical or financial
context. Different definitions of systemic risk can be found in these fields as well.
Table 1.1 provides an overview of possible definitions of systemic risk. These
definitions vary mostly with respect to their generality. Kaufman and Scott (2003)
provide a quite general definition, not specifying exactly what is meant by a system.
Others, e.g. Hellwig (1998), focus their definition on the financial system, but are
general about the consequences of systemic risk. In contrast, Acharya (2001) is
quite precise about these consequences, as the joint failure of multiple banks is
explicitly mentioned. The list provided in Table 1.1 is by no means exhaustive
and is rather displayed to disclose the heterogeneity of definitions of systemic risk
in an economic or financial context across the literature.
In this thesis, we do not only consider systemic risk in the financial system but
also in other sectors. Thus, our understanding of systemic risk is best captured
by the definition of Kaufman and Scott (2003). This definition has the advantage
of including almost all of the definitions used in the relevant literature, while still
being economically driven compared with other general definitions such as the one
of Das and Uppal (2004), which is more of a statistical nature.
As outlined in the overview paper of de Bandt and Hartmann (2000), which has
become a standard reference paper in the systemic risk literature, it is useful to
fill a definition of systemic risk with more structure. Although these authors focus
on the financial sector or entire economies when discussing systemic risk, we can
adopt part of their classification scheme. Depending on the nature of the primary
shock, one can distinguish between systemic risk in the broad and systemic risk in
the narrow sense.
Systemic risk in the broad sense comprises simultaneous failures or adverse
behavior of a large number of companies due to a macroeconomic shock, e.g. a
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Table 1.1: Possible Definitions of Systemic Risk
This table contains various possible definitions of systemic risk or systemic crises.
Source Definition
Kaufman (1994, p. 123) ‘The risk of widespread failure contagion is referred
to as systemic risk.’
Rochet and Tirole (1996, p. 733) ‘Systemic risk refers to the propagation of a bank’s
economic distress to other economic agents linked
to that bank through financial transactions’
Hellwig (1998, p. 125)* ‘Systemic risk describes the problem that due to
interdependencies between banking institutions of
a financial system, difficulties at one bank put
the functional capability of the entire system into
question’
Staub (1999, p. 3)* ‘The possibility that due to mutual dependencies
between institutions of a financial system problems
of single banks or institution spread over the
system and challenge its functional capability.’
Acharya (2001, p. 1) ‘A financial crisis is “ systemic” in nature if
many banks fail together, or if one bank’s failure
propagates as a contagion causing the failure of
many banks’
Ergungor and Thomson (2005, p. 2) ‘In a systemic crisis, multiple banks fail simultane-
ously, and the collective failure impairs enough of
the banking system’s capital so that large economic
effects are likely to result and the government is
required to intervene.’
Kaufman and Scott (2003, p. 371) ‘Systemic risk refers to the risk or probability
of breakdowns in an entire system, as opposed
to breakdowns in individual parts or components,
[...].’
Das and Uppal (2004, p. 2810) ‘The risk from infrequent events that are highly
correlated across a large number of assets’
Gischer et al. (2005, p. 109)* ‘The risk that the financial system loses its func-
tional capability due too a massive crisis.’
Krahnen (2006, p. 58)* ‘Systemic risk is the risk of a joint default of legally
independent financial institutions.’
Nier et al. (2007, p. 2034) ‘Systemic risk arises when the failure or weakness
of multiple banks imposes costs on the financial
system and ultimately on the economy as a whole.’
* Original in German, translated by the author.
4sharp jump in the oil price or a strong decrease in overall consumer demand. This
type of systemic risk originates primarily from similar business models and joint
exposures to common risk factors.
Systemic risk in the narrow sense originates from microeconomic shocks, occurring
at one company and then propagating to other companies. This process is
commonly referred to as contagion in the literature.2 For this to happen,
it is necessary for the second key element of narrow systemic risk, namely a
transmission channel, to exist.
In general, one can distinguish two different ways a shock is transferred to
other companies. The first possible transmission channel is based on multilateral
exposures between the companies considered, i.e. the companies have economic
exposures against each other. Therefore, this effect, based on real exposures, is
frequently labeled real contagion, and consequently the associated transmission
channel is called the real channel. Notably, this channel is particularly relevant to
the banking sector, as the financial exposures between banks can reach high levels
through the interbank market.
The second way that shocks can spill over to other companies is by means
of information. Bad news about one company can reveal information about
the situation for related companies, and thus signal investors, creditors, and
other agents to update their beliefs with respect to these companies. This
type of contagion, based on the information channel, is commonly referred to
as information contagion. Figure 1.1 illustrates the distinct definitions of systemic
risk. Systemic risk in the narrow sense is shown in the upper part of the figure,
where a micro-shock occurring at Company A propagates via either the real or
the information channel to other related companies. Of course, this chain reaction
does not need to stop after hitting Company B and could be further transmitted
to other companies.
2The term contagion is used in at least as many ways as the term systemic risk in the literature.
We follow the definition of Kaufman (1994, p. 123): ‘Contagion is a term used to describe the
spillover effects of shocks from one or more firms to others’.
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Figure 1.1: Systemic Risk
This figure illustrates the two different concepts of systemic risk. The upper part shows
systemic risk in the narrow and the lower part systemic risk in the broad sense.
The lower part of Figure 1.1 illustrates systemic risk in the broad sense. Here,
an initial shock hits multiple companies simultaneously, also leading to possible
defaults. Empirically, it might be difficult to disentangle narrow and broad
systemic risk as they do not necessarily need to occur independently. For example,
one could imagine a situation where first, a macroeconomic shock weakens a system
of companies, and then a microeconomic shock propagates through the system,
causing the destabilized system to collapse.
61.2 Systemic Risk in the Banking Sector
Although we define systemic risk in a general economic context, not exclusively
focusing on the banking sector, this sector is still of special interest due to several
reasons. First, by providing financing services for corporate companies and for
private households, as well as for governmental institutions, the banking sector
plays a crucial role in every economy, and thus, deserves special attention. This
central role is also a standard argument for the need for banking regulation and
supervision.
Second, it is also often hypothesized that the banking sector is more vulnerable
to systemic risk. This seems to be especially true for systemic risk in the narrow
sense as banking institutions lend and borrow considerable amounts of money via
the interbank market. These short-term loans are usually without any collateral
or third-party guarantees. Banks having considerable exposures to each other
can lead to real contagion as the failure of one bank could cause it to fail on its
interbank liabilities, bringing other banking institutions into trouble. The induced
liquidity problems could force other banks to withhold repayments themselves,
propagating the shock through the interbank system, which may cause the failure
of several other banks that actually do not even have a direct business relationship
with the bank that experienced the shock in the first round. This process is often
illustrated using a picture of dominoes, one falling after the other. The former
governor of the Bank of England, Sir Edward George, illustrated real contagion in
the banking sector in a very lively way as the consequence of ‘... direct financial
exposures, which tie firms together like mountaineers, so that if one falls off the
rock face others are pulled off too’, George (1998).
However, the view that the interbank market increases the threat of systemic crises
is not undisputable. For instance, it can be argued that the interbank market
acts as a risk-sharing device, and thus actually reduces the threat of systemic
risk. In a recent network-based simulation study, Nier et al. (2007) show that the
degree of connectivity has a non-monotonic effect on the systemic risk of a banking
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system. First, an increase in connectivity within the system increases the systemic
risk due to contagion between banks. However, after reaching a sufficiently high
degree of connectivity, the systemic risk due to contagion effects actually decreases.
Similar results are obtained by Allen and Gale (2000), who build a microeconomic
equilibrium model. In their model, the banking system becomes more capable
of absorbing initial shocks if its members are sufficiently connected. Thinking
about the illustration of George (1998) this argument translates to the fact that
mountaineers secure each other by being tied together and thus prevent crashes.
A second argument for the higher systemic risk in the banking sector is based
on the similar business models of banks and highly correlated asset values. This
similarity could make the banking sector susceptible to information contagion. On
the individual level, banks are subject to the risk of experiencing a bank run a`
la Diamond and Dybvig (1983), if depositors are concerned about the solvability
of the banking institution. If negative information about one bank is revealed,
this could also lead to bank runs at other banks, as depositors question their
credit-worthiness due to similarities in their business models. One can distinguish
between the cases where the withdrawing of money is based on relevant information
or just rumors, where the default of the institutions becomes a self-fulfilling
prophecy.
Additionally, a mixture of the risks due to interbank exposures and bank runs,
namely an interbank run, might occur. Counterparty banks might question the
financial standing of the bank in trouble and withdraw their interbank credit
lines, creating liquidity problems at the considered bank. This effect is described
theoretically in the model of Flannery (1996), where banks have only imperfect
information on their counterparty banks.
One of the best and most well-known examples of such an interbank run actually
occurred in 1984, when Continental Illinois, at that time one of the top 10
banking institutions in the US, experienced massive liquidity problems. Rumors
regarding the solvency of the bank caused many other banks to withdraw
their interbank credit from Continental Illinois, enforcing Continental’s liquidity
8problems. Finally, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) intervened
and organized a bailout to rescue the bank.3
The case study of Continental Illinois provides an excellent example of the two
main measures commonly employed to reduce the risk of a systemic banking crisis,
namely the presence of a deposit insurance as well as the existence of a lender of last
resort (see e.g., Dewatripont and Tirole (1993)). The assistance of governmental
authorities in crisis situations is, however, not without controversy: empirical
studies on banking system stability such as Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache (2002)
or Barth et al. (2002) actually find that an explicit deposit insurance tends to
increase the likelihood of banking crises.
The need for a lender of last resort has a long history and dates back to Thornton
(1802) and Bagehot (1873). Its merit for the stability of financial markets was
questioned by Goodfriend and King (1988) and Kaufman (1991) among others.
Supporters of the existence of a lender of last resort include Freixas et al. (2000)
and Rochet and Vives (2004).
Furthermore, it is frequently questioned whether regulation of the banking sector
actually reduces systemic risk. On the one hand, Aghion et al. (2000) show in
a theoretical model that an unregulated banking system exhibits an increased
likelihood of contagious bank failures. On the other hand, Eichberger and Summer
(2005) show that capital adequacy regulation can increase systemic risk. In a
more practically oriented paper, Dan´ıelsson et al. (2001) criticize the new Basel
II regulation framework, arguing that, in total, the new regulatory framework is
destabilizing rather than stabilizing the global financial system.
Summarizing, compared with other industries lacking regulation, bank failure
contagion is hypothesized:4
• as more likely to occur,
3Details of the Continental Illinois crisis can be found in Wall and Peterson (1990), FDIC
(1997), and Hellwig (1998).
4See Kaufman (1994, p. 124).
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• to occur faster,
• to spread more broadly within the industry,
• to result in larger losses of failures,
• to result in larger losses to creditors (as banks hold lower capital ratios than
other firms),
• to spread more beyond the banking industry and cause substantial damage
to the financial system as a whole and the macroeconomy.
1.3 Costs of Systemic Bank Crises
A systemic banking crisis has the potential to cause substantial losses in the welfare
of the affected economy. In Figure 1.2, we present a list of historic banking crises
and the associated fiscal costs, i.e. costs covered by the taxpayer, as estimated by
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), (see Honohan and Klingebiel (2000) and
Caprio and Klingebiel (2003)). Note that the numbers in the figure include direct
costs covered by the governments only as other costs are very difficult to assess.
Most importantly, the numbers do not cover any indirect costs due to negative
consequences for the real economy as the slowdown of economic activity is likely
to be even more severe in many instances. Moreover, costs incurred by debtors
and creditors are not included. This list is led by the Indonesian, followed by the
Argentinean, Chilean, Thai, and Turkish bank crises.
One might have the impression that systemic risk is a major problem for emerging
countries only. In absolute terms, however, the biggest crisis is clearly the Japanese
banking crisis beginning in the 1990s, the costs of which are estimated by the
IMF to equal 120 trillion yen or 1 trillion US dollars.5 Furthermore, Hoggarth
5See Caprio and Klingebiel (2003); a detailed discussion on the Japanese banking crisis can
be found in Nakaso (2001).
10
et al. (2002) find in an empirical study that output losses incurred during banking
crisis periods in developed economies are on average higher than in less developed
countries. Hence, systemic risk is an important issue for both emerging as well as
developed nations, and is clearly worth studying.
1.4 Contribution and Organization of the Thesis
In this thesis, we contribute to the existing literature by shedding light on three
different aspects of systemic risk, organized in three self-contained chapters.
A detailed discussion of the contribution to the literature and of the relevant
literature will, therefore, be given at the beginning of each chapter. A short
summary of the most important contributions is given below, together with a
short overview of the topics treated.
In Chapter 2, we empirically investigate the degree of systemic risk in the banking
sector versus other industry sectors in the United States and in Germany. We
characterize the systemic risk in each sector by the lower tail dependence of stock
returns. Our study differs from the existing literature in three aspects. First, we
compare the degree of systemic risk in the banking sector with other sectors in
the economy. Second, we analyze how the systemic risk depends on the states
of the economy and of the stock market. Third, we investigate the problem of
systemic risk in an international context by comparing the US and the German
banking systems. Our study shows, in most cases considered, that the systemic
risk of the banking sector is significantly larger than in all other sectors. Moreover,
the degree of systemic risk is higher under adverse market conditions. Finally, we
find that the banking sector in Germany shows a lower systemic risk than the US
banking sector. This finding allows different interpretations. On the one hand, one
can argue that the US and German banking systems are quite different and, thus,
exhibit different degrees of systemic risk. On the other hand, one might argue that
the different results are due to the fact that the regulation in Germany is more
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Figure 1.2: Fiscal Cost of Systemic Crises
This figure shows the fiscal cost of past systemic banking crises. The unit is percentage of
GDP. The date is the estimated year of the origination of the crisis. Source: Honohan and
Klingebiel (2000) updated using information from Caprio and Klingebiel (2003).
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successful.
In Chapter 3, we investigate whether information contagion is present in the
banking sector by analyzing how banks are affected by negative earnings surprises
of their competitors. The banking sector is of crucial importance to the economy
and, thus, is highly regulated on an individual bank level. However, a high degree
of contagion risk should call for regulation of the financial network rather than
solely regulating on an individual level. To be able to make a judgement about
the significance of possible information contagion effects, we compare the results
of the banking sector with the results of the non-banking industries. We find that
earnings surprises cause significant contagion in the banking sector. In contrast,
we do not find this effect in the non-banking sectors, including the insurance sector.
Moreover, the magnitude of contagion in the banking sector is positively related
to the size of the bank reporting an earnings surprise, as well as the size of the
affected banks.
In Chapter 4, we empirically analyze the consequences of systemic risk for
stock market investors. To tackle this issue, we consider two different investment
strategies, one strategy being crisis conscious, i.e. taking the possibility of systemic
events into account, and the other one being crisis ignorant and thus disregarding
systemic risk. We compare the optimal portfolio choices and investment results
of these strategies in an historical simulation study, using almost three decades of
historical stock price data. Our main findings are as follows: the crisis conscious
investor tends to choose less extreme portfolio weights for individual stocks than
the crisis ignorant investor. The overall risky investment is, however, of a similar
size for both. By ignoring the possibility of systemic events, the crisis ignorant
strategy performs significantly worse from the viewpoints of expected return as
well as expected utility. Thus, the threat of systemic risk should be considered
during the portfolio choice process.
Chapter 5 contains concluding remarks.
Chapter 2
Systemic Risk: Is the Banking
Sector Special?
2.1 Introduction1
It is well known that the systemic risk in the banking sector is of the utmost
importance for the entire economy and, therefore, subject to extensive regulation.
In addition, systemic risk in the more general sense plays an important role
in portfolio management, as an increase in dependence of asset returns during
downside movements may spoil diversification effects when they are needed most.2
In this chapter, we empirically investigate the degree of systemic risk in the banking
sector versus other industry sectors in the United States and in Germany. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first study that compares the specific systemic
risk of different countries, different sectors in the economy, and different states of
the stock market and the business cycle.3
The empirical literature on systemic risk in the banking sector can be roughly
grouped into two main streams. The first analyzes the degree of systemic risk
1This chapter is based on a homonymous paper co-authored by Prof. W. Bu¨hler.
2This aspect is further analyzed in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
3As outlined in the previous chapter, we define systemic risk in the banking sector as the risk
of the failure of the financial system caused by the default of at least one banking institution.
This definition is analogously used for any other sector.
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in an economy arising from possible contagion effects through the interbank
market. These studies need information on the banking structure, especially on
the network of mutual exposures, and, therefore, are conducted on a domestic level
by researchers within central banks. The majority of these studies find that the
risk of contagion within the interbank system is low, but not negligible.4
The second stream of literature analyzes the systemic risk in the banking sector
through the use of stock market data. As pointed out by De Nicolo and Kwast
(2002), stock prices are very well suited to studying systemic risk as they reflect
the market participants’ collective evaluation of the respective companies and their
future potential. This stream of literature can be further divided into two groups.
The first group employs the event study methodology to examine the extent to
which adverse events for one bank have contagious effects on other banks’ equity.
Adverse events are either actual bank failures (e.g. Aharony and Swary (1983),
Wall and Peterson (1990), Saunders and Wilson (1996)) or global financial crises5
(e.g. Musumeci and Sinkey Jr. (1990), Kho et al. (2000), Bartram et al. (2005)).
The evidence of contagion in these studies is ambiguous.6
Our study is related to the second group. Typically, studies of this group use
time series of stock returns to measure the dependence structure between banking
institutions over time. For example, De Nicolo and Kwast (2002) find rising
correlations of bank stock returns in the US between 1988 and 1999, indicating
increasing systemic risk. Schu¨ler (2002) finds similar results for Europe using a
sample from 1980 to 2001.
It is well known that correlations differ for upside and downside movements of the
stock market (see e.g. Ang and Chen (2002)). Therefore, other studies focus on
4See e.g. for Switzerland (Sheldon and Maurer (1998)), for Italy (Angelini et al. (1996)), for
Sweden (Bl˚avarg and Nimander (2002)), for Denmark (Bech et al. (2002)), for the US (Furfine
(2003)), for the UK (Wells (2004)), for Germany (Upper and Worms (2004) and Memmel and
Stein (2008)), for Belgium (Degryse and Nguyen (2004)), for Austria (Elsinger et al. (2006)) and
for the Netherlands (van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006)).
5Typical crises considered are the Mexican crisis 1982, the Asian crisis 1997, the Russian crisis
1998, the LTCM crisis 1998, and 09/11 2001.
6In Chapter 3 of this thesis we also analyze contagion in the banking sector, employing the
event study methodology. We find that the banking sector exhibits negative contagion effects.
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the lower tail of the joint distribution, e.g. Gropp et al. (2006) who analyze the
joint co-exceedance of bank returns over a given quantile and also find increasing
dependence since the introduction of the euro. Hartmann et al. (2005) apply a tail
measure of extreme downside dependence to analyze the banking system stability
in Europe and the US. They find a higher degree of systemic risk in the US when
compared with Europe and again an increase in both regions since 1990.
Our study differs from the existing literature, especially from Hartmann et al.
(2005), in the following ways. First, we do not only analyze the banking industry,
but also compare the degree of systemic risk in this sector with other sectors in
the economy. This enables us to put the results into perspective and allows an
analysis of whether the systemic risk in the banking sector is effectively larger than
in other, regulated and non-regulated, sectors of the economy.
Second, we analyze how the systemic risk depends on the state of the economy in
general and the stock market specifically. Important state variables are the growth
rate of the economy, the growth rate of the stock market, and the volatility of stock
market returns.
Third, we investigate the problem of systemic risk in an international context by
comparing the results for the German and the US banking systems and relate the
results to the degree of systemic risk in other sectors in these two economies. This
approach allows us to study the consequences of different regulation systems on
the degree of systemic risk.7
Fourth, our definition of systemic risk is different from the one employed by
Hartmann et al. (2005) and is, in our opinion, more meaningful for capturing
systemic risk. Considering N companies, we measure the degree of systemic risk
as the conditional default probability of N companies, given that one of these N
companies defaults, whereas Hartmann et al. (2005) focus on the default of the
largest company (bank), given that the smaller N − 1 companies default.
We consider the systemic risk for 12 different sectors in the US and for 10 different
7Hartmann et al. (2005) compare the US and European banking systems.
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sectors in Germany using stock market data from 1990 to 2006. The systemic risk
of a sector is measured by the tail dependence of stock returns for firms operating in
the same industry. Economically, the tail dependence of stock returns characterizes
the probability that N companies in a sector default in the same period given that
one company defaults.
We use a two-parametric Archimedean copula that combines analytical tractability
with the flexibility of modeling different degrees of dependence in the lower and the
upper tails of the distribution. To detect changes in the dependence structure and
the crisis probability, we analyze and compare the level of systemic risk in different
economic conditions. First, we estimate the degree of risk within each sector during
bear and bull markets. Next, we analyze the changes between volatile and tranquil
stock market conditions, and, lastly, we estimate the joint default probability
during recession and boom periods. As a robustness check with respect to the
subsample selection, we specify a regime-switching copula model. The advantage
of this approach is an endogenous, purely data-driven determination of adverse
states. Furthermore we analyze the robustness of our results with respect to the
modeling of the marginal distributions and conduct a factor analysis.
Our study yields the following main results. First, in most cases considered, the
systemic risk of the banking sector is significantly larger than in all the other
sectors of the two considered economies. Interestingly, this is also true for the
insurance sectors, which do not exhibit significant degrees of systemic risk. Thus,
one can conclude that a system-based regulation should focus more on the banking
and less on the insurance sector.
Second, the degree of systemic risk differs most during adverse market conditions.
This result shows that the banking sector is more vulnerable to shocks than the
other sectors of the economy.
Third, under adverse market conditions, the systemic risk in the banking sector is
significantly higher than under non-adverse conditions for Germany as well as for
the US. This finding underpins the intuitive fact that the financial regulator should
be aware of possible contagion effects during these adverse market conditions.
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Fourth, the banking sector in Germany shows a lower degree of systemic risk than
the US banking sector. This result allows two possible explanations. First, the
different degree of systemic risk might be a result of the different banking systems
of the two considered economies. Second, one might argue that the regulation in
Germany is more successful in minimizing the risk of systemic crises.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces
the tail dependence coefficient as a measure of dependence and systemic risk
and discusses its estimation. In Section 2.3, we describe our data set and give
descriptive summary statistics. The results of our empirical study are reported
and discussed in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 presents the robustness checks with
respect to the sample selection and the marginal model. Further analysis with
respect to a sample of US investment banks as well as the recent financial crisis
are presented in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 summarizes and concludes this chapter.
2.2 Measuring and Estimating Systemic Risk
2.2.1 Measuring Systemic Risk
The degree of systemic risk is defined by the conditional probability of joint defaults
of several companies, given that one company defaults. Theoretically, in the case
of default, a company’s stock price is zero and its log stock return relative to the
last non-zero stock price is minus infinity. Under this assumption, the conditional
probabilities of joint extreme downward movements of N stock returns can be
characterized by the dependence in the lower tail of the joint distribution.
In the case of two companies with marginal distributions F1 and F2 of their stock
returns r1 and r2, their lower tail dependence can be defined by
λL = lim
u↓0
P [r1 < F
−1
1 (u)|r2 < F−12 (u)]. (2.1)
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Here, P [·|·] denotes the conditional probability. This coefficient measures the
probability that one random variable has a value in the lower tail of its distribution,
given that the other variable exhibits an analogous behavior. Compared with the
correlation coefficient, it has the advantage that ‘normal’ rates of returns have no
impact, and that it does not depend on the marginal distributions of the individual
stock returns. Empirical studies using stock returns find unanimously asymmetric
degrees of dependencies in the lower and upper tails of stock returns (see e.g. Ane´
and Kharoubi (2003) or Junker and May (2005)).
Using the notion of a two-dimensional copula C2, λL can also be characterized by
8
λL = lim
u↓0
C2(u, u)
u
. (2.2)
If λL > 0, r1 and r2 are defined as asymptotically dependent, otherwise they
are called asymptotically independent. The best-known example of a copula with
asymptotic independence is the Gaussian copula, which represents the dependence
structure of the multivariate Gaussian distribution.
Since we are interested in the multivariate case, we generalize (2.1) to N random
variables r1, ..., rN :
λNL = lim
u↓0
P [r1 < F
−1
1 (u) ∧ ... ∧ rN−1 < F−1N−1(u)|rN < F−1N (u)]. (2.3)
Analogous to the bivariate case, it is easily shown that (2.3) can be represented
by means of the underlying N -dimensional copula CN as
λNL = lim
u↓0
CN(u, u, ..., u)
u
. (2.4)
8For a rigorous definition of copulas, see e.g. Nelsen (1999); for applications in finance see
e.g. Cherubini et al. (2004).
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Given the assumption that log stock returns are minus infinity in the case of
default, λNL states the probability that N companies default, given that one of the
N companies defaults.
2.2.2 Estimation of the Tail Dependence Coefficient
Various ways to estimate the tail dependence coefficient have been proposed in
the literature.9 As our empirical study will be based on relatively small samples,
we follow a parametric approach and use the two-parametric Archimedean copula
BB7 (see Joe (1997), p.153).10 This copula is given by
CBB7(u1, ..., uN) = 1− [1− ((1− (1− u1)θ)−δ + ...
...+ (1− (1− uN)θ)−δ − (N − 1))−1/δ]1/θ, (2.5)
where θ ≥ 1 and δ > 0.
Using definition (2.4), we can directly derive the lower tail dependence coefficient
of the BB7 copula for various dimensions. We obtain
λNL = N
− 1
δ . (2.6)
The upper tail dependence coefficient has an analogous representation as a function
of N and θ. Since we only consider the lower tail dependence coefficient, we drop
the subscript L in the following to make the notation simpler.
The BB7 copula has several desirable properties for our application. First of all, it
9Schmidt and Stadtmu¨ller (2006) discuss nonparametric approaches. A semiparametric
approach can be found in Genest et al. (1995). Finally, Frahm et al. (2005) compare various
methods in a simulation study.
10The class of Archimedean copulas is characterized by the following representation:
C(u1, ..., uN ) = ϕ−1(ϕ(u1) + ...+ϕ(uN )), with ϕ : [0, 1]→ [0,∞], strictly monotonic decreasing,
and ϕ(1) = 0.
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is parsimoniously parameterized and analytically tractable, allowing us to compute
various derivatives in closed form, facilitating maximum likelihood estimation.
Second, it allows for different degrees of tail dependence in the lower and the
upper tails.11 Moreover, it follows from (2.6) that the coefficient of lower (upper)
tail dependence is a function of δ (θ) only, i.e. each parameter determines the
dependence in one of the two tails. This is an important property as it allows us
to identify the tail dependence in the lower tail independently from the upper tail.
For δ → 0 and θ = 1, the variables are asymptotically independent in the lower
and upper tails, respectively. The last important advantage of the BB7 copula,
which is shared with all Archimedean copulas, is the straightforward extension to
higher dimensions.
To estimate the copula parameters, we utilize the semi-parametric Canonical
Maximum Likelihood (CML) approach (see Joe and Xu (1996)). In the first step
of the CML method, we estimate for each firm i, (i = 1, ..., N), the empirical
distribution function Fˆi of stock returns. Fˆi is estimated in a standard way on the
basis of a time series of T observed consecutive log stock returns r = (ri,1, ..., ri,T ).
Next, the stock returns ri,t are transformed into the unit interval by
(uˆ1,t, ..., uˆN,t) = (Fˆ1(r1,t), ..., FˆN(rN,t)) , t = 1, ..., T. (2.7)
In the second step, we estimate the set of copula parameters Ψ = (δ, θ) by
maximizing the (log)-likelihood function
L(r; Ψ) =
T∑
t=1
log c(Fˆ1(r1,t), ..., FˆN(rN,t); Ψ), (2.8)
11This property makes it more suitable for our application than the Student-t copula, which
is extensively used in other studies and also risk management applications, especially credit risk,
see e.g. Hull and White (2006). The Student-t copula allows for positive tail dependence but is
symmetric and thus imposes equal degrees of dependence on downside and upside movements of
the considered stocks, making it impossible to disentangle these two effects.
Systemic Risk: Is the Banking Sector Special? 21
with respect to the two tail parameters. Here c(·) denotes the density of the copula
function.
The CML approach has two advantages. It is computationally faster than a
one-step estimation approach, and we do not have to make parametric assumptions
about the marginal distributions. This second fact reduces the likelihood of
misspecifications, which would bias our estimation of the dependence structure.
To compute standard errors, we apply a blocks bootstrap approach as our data
show significant intertemporal dependencies. An alternative approach to the
problem of non-iid data due to serial correlation in the first and also the second
moment of our time series would be to fit an ARMA-GARCH model for the
univariate processes and analyze the dependence structure of the residuals. While
being aware of the violation of the iid assumption, we decided not to filter our
data, due to the fact that filtering will also change the dependence structure of
the data.
Based on T observations, we use a moving blocks bootstrap with a blocklength
l = T 1/3 and T − l + 1 overlapping blocks.12
In summary, our estimation consists of the following steps:
1. Determine Fˆi nonparametrically as the empirical distribution functions.
2. Transform the observations ri,t with Fˆi into pseudo observations uˆi,t =
Fˆi(ri,t).
3. Estimate the copula parameters Ψ with maximum likelihood.
4. Compute λˆN by Equation (2.6).
5. Calculate σˆ(λˆN) with the blocks bootstrap as described above.
12See Hall et al. (1995) on the optimal choice of the block length in a blocks bootstrap.
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2.3 Data Selection
Data selection poses a major challenge for our study as the systemic crisis
coefficient introduced in the previous section needs to be estimated from a
multivariate time series of stock returns. Since we wish to analyze the systemic
risk in the banking as well as other sectors of the economy we need to select the
respective companies from each considered sector. Thus, we need to find several
companies operating in a common sector that have a long enough time series of
stock prices available to make our approach work. This issue is complicated by
the fact that companies list and delist at the stock exchange for various reasons,
such as mergers and acquisitions, spin-offs, etc.
We base our study on daily log returns for US and German stocks from January
1990 to December 2006. This period covers boom and recession subperiods, volatile
and tranquil, and baisse and boom subperiods of the stock market and is thus
long enough to cover many different regimes of the economies but not too long to
make the cross-sectional requirement of a multivariate time series of stock prices
infeasible.
To study systemic risk on a sectoral level, we classify all the companies using the
Industrial Classification Benchmark (ICB)13, which classifies all companies into
one of the following 10 industries: oil & gas, basic materials, industrials, consumer
goods, health care, consumer services, telecommunications, utilities, financials,
and technology. If one company operates in more than one industry the ICB
classification assigns it to the sector in which it generates the highest revenues.
As we are especially interested in the banking sector, we analyze the financial
industry on a more detailed level and split it into the sectors banks and insurance
companies. The consumer goods industry consists of the sectors automobiles &
parts, food & beverage, and personal & household goods. Due to the importance of
the automotive industry, especially in Germany, we also subdivide the consumer
13See www.icbenchmark.com.
Systemic Risk: Is the Banking Sector Special? 23
industry into these three sectors. Therefore, we consider 13 different sectors in
total.
For each of the 13 sectors, we select five major companies that can be considered
to be system relevant and homogeneous in their business activities. Regarding the
‘systemic relevance’, we rank the firms in each sector according to their market
value. All the firms with a free float below 25 % of issued stocks - due to potential
illiquidity problems14 - and a continuous time series of daily return data for less
than 10 years are excluded. Note that these requirements make it necessary to
exclude some major companies, such as Daimler and Chrysler, as their merger in
1997 makes their independent time series relatively short.
For the oil & gas sector, we are not able to find enough companies in both the
US and the German markets. For the telecommunications and the utilities sectors
there is sufficient data for the US market only. This leaves us with a final sample
of 12 sectors in the US and 10 sectors in Germany. All data is obtained from
Thomson Financial Datastream.
Tables 2.25 and 2.26 in the appendix report the selected companies from the United
States and Germany, respectively. For each company, we give a brief description
of their main activities. With one exception, the consumer services sector, we
consider the homogeneity of the business activities as sufficient in each sector. By
the nature of the consumer sector, it is rather inhomogeneous in the US as well
as in Germany. Among others, we have picked (by our selection rule) an airline
carrier and a publisher in Germany. In the US, we have selected a DIY store
company and a fast-food restaurant chain. Splitting up this sector would result in
fewer than five firms for possible subsectors.
Tables 2.27 and 2.28 in the Appendix present the time series characteristics of the
60 US and the 50 German firms. For all the US firms, the return series cover the
14We make one exception from this rule for the German banking companies and include the
Hypovereinsbank in our sample. The Hypovereinsbank was acquired by the Italian Unicredit in
November 2005, which today owns more than 90%. However, as we do not want to omit the
second largest bank in Germany from our sample we include the stock in our analysis.
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full period from from January 1990 to December 2006. In the German sample, 10
of the system-relevant firms went public later than 1990. The annualized average
of daily returns are positive for all the American and for 47 of the German firms.
The annualized standard deviation of daily returns varies between 20 % and 40 %
except for 20 of the 110 firms. Especially utility and technological firms exhibit
volatilities outside this interval.
As is typical of daily stock returns, all the samples fail to pass the Jarque-Bera
test of normality. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test of stationarity shows the
stationarity for every series at the 1% level of significance. The Q-Statistic of
Ljung and Box tests the null hypothesis of independence and must be rejected at
the 1% level in 29 out of 50 cases for the German data and in 39 out of 60 cases
for the US data. Due to this evidence of autocorrelation, we will use the blocks
bootstrap procedure to estimate the standard errors of our estimates as described
in the previous section, which will also control for possible autocorrelation of higher
moments.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Entire Sample Period
We first present the results for the estimates of the lower tail probabilities λˆN
for the entire sample period. The values λˆN are obtained by the estimation
method described in Section 2.2 of this chapter. They represent estimates for the
conditional probabilities that up to N = 5 firms default if one of these five firms
default. Obviously, for larger N , more firms default simultaneously and, therefore,
the λˆN values are better estimates of the probability of a systemic sector crisis for
higher values of N , i.e. N = 4 and N = 5.
The theoretical crisis probabilities λN decrease in N as the event that N + 1
companies default is a subset of the event that N firms default as long as the first
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Table 2.1: US: Systemic Risk in the Entire Period
This table reports the estimation results of the crisis coefficient for the entire sample
period and whether it is significantly different from zero. *** shows significance at
the 1 % level, ** at the 5 % level and * at the 10 % level.
λˆ2 λˆ3 λˆ4 λˆ5
Banks 0.3663*** 0.1969*** 0.0922*** 0.0552***
Automobiles & Parts 0.0794*** 0.0209** 0.0146*** 0.0042**
Basic Materials 0.3016*** 0.0815*** 0.0280*** 0.0042**
Consumer Services 0.3007*** 0.0542*** 0.0111** 0.0027**
Food & Beverage 0.2708*** 0.0407** 0.0048** 0.0018*
Healthcare 0.2968*** 0.1363*** 0.0355*** 0.0176***
Industrials 0.1789*** 0.0855*** 0.0273*** 0.0092**
Insurance 0.0185* 0.0184* 0.0060** 0.0029**
Pers. & Household 0.0697* 0.0303** 0.0099** 0.0013*
Technology 0.2197*** 0.1044*** 0.0451*** 0.0183***
Telecommunications 0.4133*** 0.0911*** 0.0233*** 0.0029**
Utilities 0.3064*** 0.1391*** 0.0614*** 0.0347***
N companies are identical in both sets. Thus, we expect that the estimates λˆN
exhibit a monotonous decreasing behavior.
Table 2.1 reports the estimated systemic crisis probabilities for the 12 US sectors.
In the banking sector, the crisis probability is 36.6 % in the bivariate case, falling
to 5.5 % when dealing with five banks. The crisis coefficient λN is significantly
different from zero in all cases.
In the other US industry sectors, the systemic crisis probabilities for the bivariate
case are mostly around 30 % and significant. However, these values decrease to
much lower levels than in the banking sector for N = 5. For most sectors, the
conditional default probability of five companies is lower than 1 %; only the crisis
probabilities in the healthcare, technology, and utilities sectors remain above this.
Interestingly, the insurance sector shows very low degrees of systemic risk; the crisis
coefficient decreases to 0.3 % when considering five insurance companies. Overall,
the banking sector shows the highest degrees of systemic risk.
To see whether this finding of a higher systemic risk in the banking sector is also
statistically significant, we perform a cross-sectional test with all the other sectors.
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Table 2.2: US: Cross-Sectional Differences
This table reports the cross sectional differences between the banking sector and the
other sectors for the entire sample period. *** shows significance at the 1 % level, **
at the 5 % level and * at the 10 % level.
∆(λˆ2cross) ∆(λˆ
3
cross) ∆(λˆ
4
cross) ∆(λˆ
5
cross)
Automobiles & Parts 0.2868*** 0.1760*** 0.0776*** 0.0510*
Basic Materials 0.0646*** 0.1154*** 0.0642** 0.0510**
Consumer Services 0.0656*** 0.1427*** 0.0811*** 0.0525**
Food & Beverage 0.0955*** 0.1562*** 0.0875*** 0.0533**
Healthcare 0.0695*** 0.0606** 0.0567* 0.0375*
Industrials 0.1874*** 0.1114*** 0.0649** 0.0460*
Insurance 0.3483*** 0.1785*** 0.0862*** 0.0522**
Pers. & Household 0.2966*** 0.1666*** 0.0823*** 0.0539*
Technology 0.1466*** 0.0925*** 0.0472* 0.0368
Telecommunications -0.0470 0.1058*** 0.0689** 0.0523**
Utilities 0.0599*** 0.0578** 0.0308 0.0204
The null hypothesis is a smaller crisis coefficient in the banking industry.
Performing this cross-sectional test of differences yields conclusive evidence of
higher systemic risk in the banking sector. As displayed in Table 2.2 for two
companies, 10 out of 11 sectors show significantly lower crisis probabilities than
the banking sector. At the five-firms level, we find significantly different values for
all but the technology and the utilities sectors.
The results for Germany are reported in Table 2.3. In the German banking sector,
the crisis probability is 44.4 % in the bivariate case, falling to 1.3 % when dealing
with five banks. The crisis coefficient λN is significantly different from zero in all
the cases.
In the other sectors, we can identify two different main groups. First, the
automotive, the basic materials and the industrials sectors also show significant
degrees of systemic risk. Compared with the banking sector, higher default
probabilities in the bivariate case for the automotive and basic materials sectors
are observed. However, the degree falls to values five to ten times smaller than
in the banking sector for the five-companies case. Second, the sectors consumer
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services, food & beverage, healthcare, and personal & household goods show only
weak or no signs of systemic risk. For the insurance and the technology sectors, the
results are inconclusive. The insurance sector shows a high crisis probability for low
dimensions but it falls to zero when increasing the number of companies involved.
This indicates a high dependence between the big players of the industry, but weak
connections to smaller insurance companies. The technology sector exhibits the
contrary case. For two companies, the crisis probability is 35.0 %; in the five-firms
case the second highest value in the sample of 1.2 % is observed, indicating a
constant degree of dependence among many firms in the sector.
Table 2.4 reports the differences in the default probabilities in the banking and the
other sectors and whether they are significantly different from zero. One sees that,
with up to four companies, most of the differences are significantly different from
zero. In the five-companies case, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, although
we have remarkably higher crisis probabilities in the banking sector.
Comparing the results for the US and Germany one can observe a systemic crisis
probability that is four times higher for the banking sector in the US. This might
be a result of the different banking structures in these two countries.
Comparing the other US industry sectors with their German counterparts, we
observe, as in the banking sector, smaller crisis probabilities for two companies
but higher ones for four or five companies for many sectors. This finding indicates
higher dependencies between the market leaders in Germany but a higher degree
of overall dependence in the US.
Regarding the insurance sector, we observe very low degrees of systemic risk in
both economies when considering several companies. This raises an interesting
policy implication. When considering the question of whether the insurance sector
should be regulated on a systemic level, this result indicates that, differently from
the banking sector, system-based regulation is not necessary for the insurance
sector.
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Table 2.3: Germany: Systemic Risk in the Entire Period
This table reports the estimation results of the crisis coefficient for the entire sample
period. *** shows significance at the 1 % level, ** at the 5 % level and * at the 10 %
level.
λˆ2 λˆ3 λˆ4 λˆ5
Banks 0.4440*** 0.2868*** 0.0624*** 0.0132**
Automobiles & Parts 0.4683*** 0.1664*** 0.0199** 0.0010*
Basic Materials 0.5509*** 0.2023*** 0.0143*** 0.0028**
Consumer Services 0.0166 0.0042 0.0000 0.0001
Food & Beverage 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Healthcare 0.0762** 0.0020 0.0003 0.0000
Industrials 0.3284*** 0.1064*** 0.0251** 0.0019*
Insurance 0.5156*** 0.1655*** 0.0020* 0.0000
Pers. & Household 0.0434*** 0.0070** 0.0011 0.0000
Technology 0.3502** 0.0819 0.0266* 0.0123*
2.4.2 Bull vs. Bear Markets
We expect the systemic risk to increase during adverse economic conditions, as
companies will be be more vulnerable to shocks during such times. Thus, we
estimate the systemic crisis probability during different economic phases. To do
so, we select subperiods from the whole sample period. First, we compare the risk
during bearish and bullish markets in each sector. To identify these periods, we
calculate the six months’ index returns for each sector using a rolling window over
the entire sample period. We single out the period with the lowest return as the
bear market period. As the bull market period, we use the subsample that has the
the highest index return.15
Table 2.5 presents the estimation results during bear and bull markets for the
US. It reports the systemic risk in each sector for two to five companies. For
each case, the third column gives the difference of the two values and whether
it is significantly different from zero. For two banks, we find a systemic crisis
probability of 67.0 % in bear markets, which is almost 100 % higher than in the
15Note that we consider the respective sector indices. Consequently, the bear and bull phases
differ across sectors.
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Table 2.4: Germany: Cross-Sectional Differences
This table reports the cross sectional differences between the banking sector and the
other sectors for the entire sample period. *** shows significance at the 1 % level, **
at the 5 % level and * at the 10 % level.
∆(λˆ2cross) ∆(λˆ
3
cross) ∆(λˆ
4
cross) ∆(λˆ
5
cross)
Automobiles & Parts -0.0243 0.1203*** 0.0425** 0.0122
Basic Materials -0.1069 0.0845*** 0.0481 0.0104
Consumer Services 0.4275*** 0.2825*** 0.0623*** 0.0131
Food & Beverage 0.4440*** 0.2868*** 0.0624*** 0.0132
Healthcare 0.3678*** 0.2847*** 0.0620*** 0.0132
Industrials 0.1156*** 0.1804*** 0.0372* 0.0113
Insurance -0.0715 0.1213*** 0.0604*** 0.0132
Pers. & Household 0.4006*** 0.2797*** 0.0612*** 0.0132
Technology 0.0938*** 0.2048*** 0.0358* 0.0009
entire sample period. For the bull market, the probability is less than half that of
the entire period and less than a quarter of the bear market value. This pattern
sustains while increasing the number of banks considered. For five banks, a crisis
probability of 22.3 % is estimated in bear markets (four times higher than in the
entire sample), whereas the probability for the bull market is only 0.7 % (seven
times lower than in the entire sample). All the differences are significantly different
from zero.
The automobile and industrial sectors show similar patterns, although at a lower
level. For the other sectors, we observe rising crisis probabilities during bear
markets compared with the entire sample period. For many cases, we find higher
crisis probabilities in bull markets. This may indicate that periods of fast rising
stock prices are also vulnerable for shocks (burst of a bubble), although the
evidence is not conclusive.
Testing whether the differences between the banking sector and the other industries
are significant gives conclusive evidence once again. Table 2.6 reports the results.
For seven out of eleven cases, the difference is significant at the 1 % level, and for
the other four cases at the 5 % or 10 % level.
Table 2.7 displays the results for Germany. Analyzing the banking sector first,
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-0.1011
T
echnology
0.2922*
0.4992***
-0.2070
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Table 2.6: US: Cross-Sectional Differences in Bearish Markets
This table reports the cross sectional differences between the banking sector and the
other sectors during bearish market conditions. *** shows significance at the 1 % level,
** at the 5 % level and * at the 10 % level.
∆(λˆ2cross) ∆(λˆ
3
cross) ∆(λˆ
4
cross) ∆(λˆ
5
cross)
Automobiles & Parts 0.4103*** 0.3279*** 0.1644** 0.1345**
Basic Materials 0.0693** 0.1676*** 0.0514 0.1986***
Consumer Services 0.3656*** 0.4163*** 0.2489*** 0.2142***
Food & Beverage 0.5446*** 0.4243*** 0.2695*** 0.2182***
Healthcare 0.1371*** 0.1710*** 0.0831 0.1141**
Industrials 0.2236*** 0.0857 0.0949 0.0987*
Insurance 0.6676*** 0.4743*** 0.2802*** 0.2218***
Pers. & Household 0.6701*** 0.4699*** 0.2775*** 0.2224***
Technology 0.3779*** 0.3113*** 0.2006*** 0.1973***
Telecommunications -0.0056 0.2937*** 0.1548** 0.1660***
Utilities 0.1519*** 0.1542*** 0.0795 0.1040*
we find a high conditional default probability of 72.9 % for two banks during
bear markets, but it is not significantly higher than in the bull market, where
it stays at 65.2 %. Three banks exhibit slightly higher values for the bull market.
However, when increasing the number of banks involved, we find evidence of a
higher systemic risk during bear markets, which is 11.7 % for five banks compared
with 1.1 % in bull markets.
In the other sectors, the results are less conclusive. Except for the basic materials
sector, there is no evidence supporting a higher degree of systemic risk during bear
markets.
In Table 2.8, the cross-sectional differences between the banking industry and
the other sectors during bear markets are reported. All the values are significant
at the 1 % level, yielding clear evidence of higher systemic risk in the banking
sector compared with other sectors, given that the respective sector is in a bearish
condition.
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Table 2.8: Germany: Cross-Sectional Differences in Bearish Markets
This table reports the cross sectional differences between the banking sector and the
other sectors during bearish market conditions. *** shows significance at the 1 % level,
** at the 5 % level and * at the 10 % level.
∆(λˆ2cross) ∆(λˆ
3
cross) ∆(λˆ
4
cross) ∆(λˆ
5
cross)
Automobiles & Parts 0.2259*** 0.3981*** 0.1525*** 0.0978***
Basic Materials 0.1726*** 0.3403*** 0.0488*** 0.0747***
Consumer Services 0.7339*** 0.5799*** 0.1852*** 0.1003***
Food & Beverage 0.7416*** 0.5942*** 0.1894*** 0.1013***
Industrials 0.3000*** 0.3141*** 0.1092*** 0.0978***
Healthcare 0.4408*** 0.5887*** 0.1861*** 0.0996***
Insurance 0.2160*** 0.3959*** 0.1792*** 0.1013***
Personal & Household 0.6504*** 0.5483*** 0.1846*** 0.1012***
Technology 0.2649*** 0.5014*** 0.1210*** 0.0767***
2.4.3 Volatile vs. Tranquil Markets
In this subsection, we compare the systemic risk during volatile and tranquil stock
market conditions. These periods are chosen in a similar way to the bear and bull
markets, using the volatility of sector index stock returns as an indicator.
Table 2.9 reports the estimation results for the US during volatile and tranquil
times. An increased systemic crisis probability of the banking sector during volatile
market conditions is observed. For the two-companies case, the probability is
59.5 %, compared with 41.5 % in tranquil times. For five companies, it stays at
a high level of 19.8 %, which is four times higher than for the whole period. In
the tranquil market, it lies at 4 %. All the differences in the banking sector are
significant.
The results for the other industries show increasing crisis probabilities during
volatile times compared with the overall results in Table 2.1. In tranquil periods,
they are lower than observed for the entire period, but at the five-companies level,
they are significantly higher during volatile times in four cases only.
The cross-sectional comparison during volatile market conditions is reported in
Table 2.10. Except for the industrial sector, all the differences are significant
(at the five-firms level). In six cases, this is true at the 1 % significance level,
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Table 2.10: US: Cross-Sectional Differences in Volatile Markets
This table reports the cross sectional differences between the banking sector and the
other sectors during volatile market conditions. *** shows significance at the 1 %
level, ** at the 5 % level and * at the 10 % level.
∆(λˆ2cross) ∆(λˆ
3
cross) ∆(λˆ
4
cross) ∆(λˆ
5
cross)
Automobiles & Parts 0.3993*** 0.2654*** 0.1396** 0.1111*
Basic Materials 0.0424 0.1215* 0.0963* 0.1778***
Consumer Services 0.3125*** 0.3819*** 0.2206*** 0.1913***
Food & Beverage 0.4819*** 0.4095*** 0.2445*** 0.1932***
Healthcare 0.4793*** 0.3296*** 0.2390*** 0.1884***
Industrials 0.0911* -0.0236 0.0094 0.0226
Insurance 0.5908*** 0.4065*** 0.2417*** 0.1925***
Pers. & Household 0.5728*** 0.3890*** 0.2257*** 0.1918***
Technology 0.2251*** 0.1925*** 0.1366** 0.1563**
Telecommunications -0.1180 0.2751*** 0.1478* 0.1579**
Utilities 0.0656 0.1335** 0.0918 0.1264*
supporting the hypothesis of higher systemic risk in the banking sector during
volatile times.
Table 2.11 displays the estimation results in volatile and tranquil stock market
periods for Germany. In the banking sector, the crisis probability is 74.2 %,
considering two banks in volatile times, compared with 42.2 % in tranquil times,
which is significantly lower. At the five-companies level, a systemic risk probability
of 10.1 % is estimated during volatile conditions, ten times higher than the result
using the entire sample. In tranquil times, it drops to 0.6 %, which is 50 % lower
than in the whole sample period and not significant anymore. Thus, the systemic
risk of the banking sector is truly increased during volatile times.
In the other sectors, there is no evidence for this conclusion. Although the majority
of estimated values are higher for the volatile periods, and smaller for the tranquil
periods than the probabilities estimated using the entire sample, they are not
significantly different, except for the basic materials sector.
In Table 2.12, the cross-sectional differences in volatile markets and their
significance levels are presented. As for the first case considered, there is clear
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Table 2.12: Germany: Cross-Sectional Differences in Volatile Markets
This table reports the cross sectional differences between the banking sector and the
other sectors during volatile market conditions. *** shows significance at the 1 %
level, ** at the 5 % level and * at the 10 % level.
∆(λˆ2cross) ∆(λˆ
3
cross) ∆(λˆ
4
cross) ∆(λˆ
5
cross)
Automobiles & Parts 0.2838** 0.3417*** 0.1526*** 0.1125***
Basic Materials 0.2107*** 0.3337*** 0.1164*** 0.0791**
Consumer Services 0.5862*** 0.4703*** 0.1981*** 0.1134***
Food & Beverage 0.7292*** 0.5234*** 0.2018*** 0.1174***
Industrials 0.4452*** 0.2686*** 0.1152* 0.1047***
Insurance 0.1734*** 0.2522*** 0.1819*** 0.1173***
Healthcare 0.3963*** 0.5047*** 0.1900*** 0.1133***
Personal & Household 0.6436*** 0.4892*** 0.1951*** 0.1169***
Technology 0.6734*** 0.4858*** 0.1959** 0.1160***
evidence of higher probabilities of joint conditional defaults in the banking sector
during volatile times. For the five-companies case, eight out of nine sectors show
significance at the 1 % level, and one at the 5 % level.
Comparing the results for the US and Germany, one observes that, similar to the
results of the entire sample period, the risk in the US banking sector is lower
when compared with the German one for the two-companies case and distinctively
higher when considering five banks.
2.4.4 Recession vs. Boom Periods
The growth rate of the GDP serves as the third indicator of adverse conditions, i.e.
we subsample recession and boom periods. Note that, compared with the previous
two cases, the periods selected in this subsection are identical for all the sectors.
In the US, we identify two recession periods.16 In Germany, we identify four
16The identification of recession periods in the US is delicate as we hardly observe negative
GDP growth rates during the observation period. We identify two short recessions 09/1990 –
03/1991 and 01/2001 – 09/2001. The second one does not completely fulfil our criterion of two
consecutive quarters with negative GDP growth, as we have a positive growth rate in the second
quarter of 2001. The selected boom periods are 10/1993 – 06/1994, 04/1997 – 09/1997, 07/1998
– 12/1998, and 07/1999 – 12/1999.
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recession periods, indicated by at least two consecutive quarters of significant
negative growth.17 The GDP data was obtained from Thomson Financial
Datastream as well.
Table 2.13 reports the results for the US. Surprisingly, the crisis probability of the
banking sector in booming periods is higher when compared with recession periods.
In the other sectors, this effect is not observable. Mostly increased probabilities
during recessions and decreased ones during boom periods are reported. For up
to four companies, these differences are also significant for seven sectors.
To discover the reason for the unexpected finding in the banking sector during
recessions, this case is examined more closely. The sample is split into the recession
of 1990/1991 and the recession of 2001. For these two periods, the systemic crisis
probabilities are estimated separately. We find that, for the first period, the
systemic risk in the banking sector was extremely low, with 10.9 % for two banks,
6.6 % for three banks, and 4.1 % and 1.0 % for four and five banks, respectively. In
the recession of 2001, the results are completely different, namely 53.5 %, 36.5 %,
20.8 % and 16.1 %, indicating that the first recession period did not increase the
systemic banking risk, whereas the second one did. This finding may be due to the
fact that until 1999 the Glass-Steagall Act was in force, which separated investment
and commercial banking activities. It is also in line with Hartmann et al. (2005),
who discover increasing systemic risk in the US banking sector during the 1990s.
To analyze the cross-sectional differences between the banking sector and the other
sectors, we rely on the second recession only, since we are mainly interested in the
systemic risk prevailing under the current regulation regime. Table 2.14 reports
the cross-sectional differences during the recession of 2001. The crisis probabilities
are significantly higher in all the sectors except for the utilities sector.
Table 2.15 displays the crisis probabilities for these periods in Germany. The
banking sector shows increased systemic risk during recessions. For the two-banks
17These are 02/1991 – 08/1991, 02/1992 – 08/1992, 08/1995 – 02/1996, and 08/2002 – 05/2003.
The boom periods used in the subsequent study are 08/1991 – 02/1992, 08/1997 – 02/1998, and
05/1999 – 05/2000 as they show consecutive growth of GDP above average.
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Table 2.14: US: Cross-Sectional Differences During Recessions
This table reports the cross sectional differences between the banking sector and the
other sectors during recessions. *** shows significance at the 1 % level, ** at the 5 %
level and * at the 10 % level.
∆(λˆ2cross) ∆(λˆ
3
cross) ∆(λˆ
4
cross) ∆(λˆ
5
cross)
Automobiles & Parts 0.0913*** 0.1402*** 0.0880*** 0.1043***
Basic Materials 0.1404*** 0.1781*** 0.0939*** 0.1407***
Consumer Services 0.0711** 0.2569*** 0.1826*** 0.1495***
Food & Beverage 0.1811*** 0.3009*** 0.1939*** 0.1546***
Healthcare 0.1152*** 0.1341*** 0.1289*** 0.1112***
Industrials 0.2132*** 0.1496*** 0.0957*** 0.0936***
Insurance 0.4396*** 0.2829*** 0.1598*** 0.1413***
Pers. & Household 0.4522*** 0.3205*** 0.1680*** 0.1602***
Technology 0.1741*** 0.1408*** 0.1101** 0.0971**
Telecommunications 0.0263 0.1685*** 0.1000*** 0.1381***
Utilities 0.0437** 0.0225 -0.0533 -0.0406
case, the probability of a joint default given that one defaults is, with 63.2 %,
almost twice as big as in periods of strongly growing GDP. Considering five banks,
the crisis probability is 2.9 %, more than 100 % higher than estimated during the
entire period and almost 200 % higher than in booming times. For up to four
banks, the differences between recession and boom periods are significant. This
significance vanishes for the five-banks case.
In the other industries, in seven cases, increasing probabilities for two companies
during recession periods are observed. For the consumer services and food &
beverage sectors, the values are close to zero, as in the other cases considered. For
five companies, the crisis probabilities increase in six cases; however, in none of the
non-banking sectors does the systemic crisis probability stay significantly above
zero.
The cross-sectional inspection during recession periods is reported in Table 2.16. It
shows a higher systemic risk of the banking sector in all the cases and between all
the sectors considered. For up to four companies, these differences are significant
except for the industrial sector. For five firms, the crisis probability is almost
three percentage points higher for the banking sector compared with the others,
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Table 2.16: Germany: Cross-Sectional Differences in Recessions
This table reports the cross sectional differences between the banking sector and the
other sectors during recessions. *** shows significance at the 1 % level, ** at the 5 %
level and * at the 10 % level.
∆(λˆ2cross) ∆(λˆ
3
cross) ∆(λˆ
4
cross) ∆(λˆ
5
cross)
Automobiles & Parts 0.0282 0.2364*** 0.1067** 0.0284
Basic Materials 0.0497 0.2502*** 0.1036* 0.0254
Consumer Services 0.6254*** 0.4912*** 0.1292*** 0.0287
Food & Beverage 0.6317*** 0.4966*** 0.1292*** 0.0289
Healthcare 0.3782*** 0.4649*** 0.1249*** 0.0270
Industrials 0.1749*** 0.2495*** 0.0355 0.0190
Insurance 0.0545 0.3019*** 0.1216* 0.0289
Pers. & Household 0.5542*** 0.4757*** 0.1244** 0.0288
Technology 0.2692*** 0.4114*** 0.1219** 0.0280
however, the significance of this difference vanishes. Thus, there is evidence of a
higher systemic risk in the banking industry, although it is weaker than for the
other two adverse periods considered. This may be due to the fact that we selected
the first two adverse time periods based on a sector-specific indicator (the sector
stock index). Regarding the recession identification, the growth rate of the GDP
was used. Since different sectors may react with different time lags to recession
periods, the results might be biased through this effect.
2.5 Robustness Checks
2.5.1 Sample Periods
So far, we have detected the periods of adverse conditions by stock market and
economic indicators. As a robustness check for the previous results, we investigate
the issue of whether different regimes in stock returns regarding the dependence
structure exist. The core question is whether the dependence in the lower tail of
the joint distribution increases in adverse regimes.
Regime-switching models for financial time series were introduced by Hamilton
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(1989) and Hamilton (1990). A copula-based regime-switching study can be
found in Rodriguez (2007); however, this paper focuses on the macroeconomic
dependence during the Mexican and the Asian crises and analyses the changes in
regimes in GARCH volatility processes.
The estimation of the specification we suggest is computationally demanding, thus
we restrict ourselves to the bivariate case in the banking sector only. We estimate
the bivariate regime-switching model for the bank stock returns considered in
the previous section and the banking sector index returns. This shows how the
systematic risk in the tail of the distribution changes among the different regimes.18
Furthermore, to keep things tractable, we assume the marginal distributions of
stock returns to be normal with constant mean µ but switching variances σ2st , st =
{1, 2} between the two regimes.19 We choose this specification since the volatility
of returns is the usual measure of risk at a univariate level. The joint behavior
is modeled, as in the previous section, using the BB7 copula with dependence
parameters δst and θst . These parameters also depend on the current regime st at
time t. The probabilities of switching from one regime to another are assumed to
follow a Markov chain with transition matrix Q:
Q =
 q11 1− q11
1− q22 q22
 , (2.9)
where qij = P (st = j|st−1 = i).
The estimation of the parameters is conducted as described in Hamilton (1994)
and Kim (1994). Note that the copula approach allows us to keep the likelihood
function analytically tractable since we can decompose the multivariate density
function into the marginal distributions and the copula. The log-likelihood
function can be written as
18Hartmann et al. (2005) call the tail dependence between stock and index returns ‘ tail-β ’,
analogous to the standard definition of systematic risk.
19As noted in previous sections, the assumption of normality in the margins may induce a
misspecification bias.
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L(r; Θ) = (2.10)
log
T∏
t=1
1
′
 c(u1,t, u2,t|st = 1, θ1, δ1)f1(r1,t|st = 1, µ1, σ11)f2(r2,t|st = 1, µ2, σ12)P (st = 1)
c(u1,t, u2,t|st = 2, θ2, δ2)f1(r1,t|st = 2, µ1, σ21)f2(r2,t|st = 2, µ2, σ22)P (st = 2)
 ,
where 1 is the two-dimensional unit vector, Θ the parameter vector, and ui,t =
Fi(ri,t) for i = 1, 2.
Table 2.17 reports the results for the US. We report the two dependence parameters
during each regime as well as the standard deviations, the latter on an annualized
basis. In the last two rows, the lower tail dependence coefficient during the two
distinctive regimes is reported.
For each bank, we can observe two different volatility regimes: the first one
with relatively low volatility and the second regime with high volatility. With
changing volatility, we also observe increasing dependence parameters δst , and
thus increasing systemic risk (see Equation (2.6)).
Considering for example the results for Citigroup, one observes a much higher crisis
probability of 36.6 % during the volatile regime, compared to only 3.5 % during the
tranquil regime. Only the estimated values for Bank of America are inconclusive
as the crisis probability does not change significantly. Similar results are observed
for the other banks considered.
Table 2.18 displays the results for Germany, which are similar to the results for the
US. For example, the crisis coefficient of Deutsche Bank changes from almost zero
to 72 %. Thus, we observe a pronounced increase of systemic risk during regimes
of high volatility. For all the other banks, we find clear evidence of increased
systemic risk during the volatile regimes, confirming the results of the previous
section using a data-driven regime selection approach.
Systemic Risk: Is the Banking Sector Special? 45
Table 2.17: US: Estimation Results of the Bivariate Regime-Switching
Copula Model
This table reports the results of the bivariate regime switching model for each of the
banks considered. The second series is in each case the banking index. Note that the
reported standard deviations of daily returns are annualized. The corresponding lower
tail dependence coefficients are reported in the last two rows.
Citigroup Bank of America JP Morgan Wells Fargo Wachovia
δˆ1 0.2067 0.7950 0.3521 0.0992 0.0992
δˆ2 0.6897 0.8040 0.6221 0.6930 0.7048
θˆ1 1.2503 1.9606 1.4300 1.2550 1.1977
θˆ2 2.4770 2.4991 1.7600 2.4840 2.4774
σˆ1,Index 0.0174 0.2668 0.0193 0.0303 0.0032
σˆ1,Stock 0.0002 0.2813 0.0176 0.0017 0.0047
σˆ2,Index 0.1971 0.0997 0.2187 0.2019 0.1984
σˆ2,Stock 0.3186 0.0133 0.3587 0.2662 0.2688
λˆ1 0.0349 0.4182 0.1397 0.0009 0.0009
λˆ2 0.3660 0.4223 0.3282 0.3678 0.3740
2.5.2 Marginal Distributions
In this section, we conduct a robustness analysis of the results with respect to the
modeling choice of the marginal distributions of stock returns. In the previous
sections, we have argued to use the empirical distribution functions to avoid
misspecification bias. As a robustness check, we repeat the estimation for the
entire sample period with the alternative of a parametric form for the marginal
distribution functions.
As our preliminary data analysis in Section 2.3 showed, leptokurticity is present
in nearly every time series used in this study. Skewness should be a less important
point, but is still present in some of our data. Since we wish to obtain a good fit to
the data, we have to use a parametric form allowing for these stylized facts. To do
so, we employ the skewed Student-t distribution (see Fernandez and Steel (1998)
as reference), which allows for heavy tails as well as skewness. The standardized
density gυ(x) with υ degrees of freedom is given by
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Table 2.18: Germany: Estimation Results of the Bivariate Regimes-
Switching Copula Model
This table reports the results of the bivariate regime switching model for each of the
banks considered. The second series is in each case the banking index. Note that the
reported standard deviations of daily returns are annualized. The corresponding lower
tail dependence coefficients are reported in the last two rows.
Deutsche Bank HVB Commerzbank Depfa Bank IKB
δˆ1 0.0847 0.0988 0.1856 0.0711 0.0692
δˆ2 2.0969 0.6890 0.7801 0.3387 0.4124
θˆ1 1.1583 1.1968 1.2611 1.7697 1.1164
θˆ2 4.1598 2.4750 2.4801 1.6515 1.2068
σˆ1,Index 0.0391 0.0276 0.0039 0.0002 0.0452
σˆ1,Stock 0.0525 0.0094 0.0013 0.0765 0.0002
σˆ2,Index 0.2635 0.2062 0.2005 0.2104 0.2075
σˆ2,Stock 0.3473 0.3227 0.2797 0.3203 0.1837
λˆ1 0.0003 0.0009 0.0239 0.0001 0.0000
λˆ2 0.7185 0.3657 0.4113 0.1292 0.1862
gυ(x) =

2
γ+ 1
γ
fυ(
x
γ
) for x ≥ 0
2
γ+ 1
γ
fυ(xγ) for x < 0,
(2.11)
where fυ(x) denotes the standard Student-t density with υ degrees of freedom.
For γ = 1, one obtains the standard Student-t distribution. As for the copula, we
estimate the parameters of the marginal distributions by employing the method
of maximum likelihood.
Table 2.19 reports the estimated crisis probabilities employing the parametric
marginal distributions for the US, using the entire sample period 1990 to 2006
as in Section 2.4.1. Thus, the results are directly comparable to Table 2.1. We
compare the estimated values for the banking sector first. The differences are very
small. They range, in absolute terms, from 0.1 % for the three-banks case to 1.1 %
when considering two banking institutions. All the estimated values remain highly
significant. For the other sectors considered, we have some deviations regarding
the significance level. This result of rather small differences with respect to the
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Table 2.19: US: Robustness Against the Choice of Marginal Distributions
This table reports the estimation results of the crisis coefficient using the skewed
Student-t-distribution as marginal model for the entire sample period. *** shows
significance at the 1 % level, ** at the 5 % level and * at the 10 % level.
λˆ2 λˆ3 λˆ4 λˆ5
Banks 0.3549*** 0.1955*** 0.0937*** 0.0566***
Automobiles & Parts 0.0727*** 0.0198** 0.0140** 0.0042**
Basic Materials 0.2973*** 0.0807*** 0.0274*** 0.0043**
Consumer Services 0.2960*** 0.0517*** 0.0113** 0.0026*
Food & Beverage 0.2682*** 0.0382** 0.0046* 0.0020
Healthcare 0.2821*** 0.1237*** 0.0301*** 0.0143**
Industrials 0.1654*** 0.0783*** 0.0249** 0.0079*
Insurance 0.0175 0.0158* 0.0076** 0.0038**
Pers. & Household 0.0553 0.0252* 0.0080* 0.0010
Technology 0.2127*** 0.0955*** 0.0411*** 0.0165**
Telecommunications 0.4133*** 0.0893*** 0.0236*** 0.0033*
Utilities 0.2889*** 0.1349*** 0.0570*** 0.0287***
modeling of the marginal distributions remains valid for most of the other sectors.
In some cases, the significance level changes; this can mainly be attributed to
the fact of discrete significance levels. Overall, we conclude that the differences
between using a non-parametric versus a parametric model for the marginal
distribution are immaterial.
The results for Germany, which are reported in Table 2.20, can be directly
compared with Table 2.3 of Section 2.4.1. One can clearly observe that the
differences are, as for the US, minimal. The crisis coefficient for two banks
changes from 44.4 % using the empirical distribution function to 42.4 % using
the parametric model, both highly significantly different from zero. This picture
remains while increasing the number of companies considered. For the case of
five banks, the difference between the two estimated values amounts to 0.0002,
which can be considered to be negligibly small. As in the original estimation, the
significance level is at 5 %.
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Table 2.20: Germany: Robustness Against the Choice of Marginal
Distributions
This table reports the estimation results of the crisis coefficient using the skewed
Student-t-distribution as marginal model for the entire sample period. *** shows
significance at the 1 % level, ** at the 5 % level and * at the 10 % level.
λˆ2 λˆ3 λˆ4 λˆ5
Banks 0.4237*** 0.2739*** 0.0581** 0.0134**
Automobiles & Parts 0.4630*** 0.1629*** 0.0211** 0.0013
Basic Materials 0.5468*** 0.2019*** 0.0429*** 0.0041**
Consumer Services 0.0156 0.0044 0.0000 0.0001
Food & Beverage 0.4630*** 0.1629*** 0.0211* 0.0013
Healthcare 0.0709** 0.0020 0.0004 0.0000
Industrials 0.3324*** 0.1096*** 0.0269** 0.0025
Insurance 0.4985*** 0.1605*** 0.0003 0.0000
Pers. & Household 0.0421* 0.0071 0.0013 0.0000
Technology 0.4002*** 0.1056*** 0.0355* 0.0176
2.5.3 Factor Analysis
As a final robustness check, we conduct a factor analysis for each set of stock
return series. This analysis will provide information about the entire multivariate
distribution of the considered stock returns, not only the lower tail as in the main
part of this study. Thus, this analysis is not directly able to be helpful for drawing
conclusions about systemic risk but will indicate whether the observed stronger
dependence of the banking sector in the tail of the distribution is also present in
the overall distribution, indicating stability of the results.
A factor analysis requires a decision on the number of common factors. As the
number of factors should be able to capture the main explaining factors, but should
also be much smaller than the number of considered variables, we use two factors
for each of the five considered companies of one sector.20
Table 2.21 and Table 2.22 report the results of the factor analyses. We report
the uniquenesses, i.e. the portion of idiosyncratic variance, and the portion of
20See e.g. Ha¨rdle and Simar (2007, p. 251). To infer the optimal number of factors, we
employed likelihood ratio tests. The hypothesis of only one factor was rejected for every sector.
Therefore, we decided to use two factors for each sector.
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Table 2.21: US: Factor Analysis
This table reports the results of the factor analysis for the 12 considered US sectors.
The five columns ui denote the uniquenesses of the respective stock returns, the last
column reports the proportion of explained variance by the two common factors.
u1 u2 u3 u4 u5 Cum. Var.
Banks 0.487 0.348 0.315 0.501 0.450 0.580
Automobiles & Parts 0.801 0.005 0.601 0.561 0.684 0.470
Basic Materials 0.471 0.407 0.541 0.193 0.948 0.488
Consumer Services 0.397 0.498 0.640 0.767 0.806 0.379
Food & Beverage 0.555 0.455 0.744 0.835 0.664 0.350
Healthcare 0.471 0.381 0.490 0.822 0.516 0.464
Industrials 0.554 0.543 0.520 0.632 0.647 0.421
Insurance 0.421 0.005 0.530 0.765 0.680 0.520
Pers. & Household 0.460 0.868 0.513 0.689 0.750 0.344
Technology 0.430 0.630 0.447 0.511 0.677 0.461
Telecommunications 0.063 0.511 0.744 0.652 0.927 0.421
Utilities 0.563 0.377 0.394 0.558 0.476 0.527
variance explained by the two common factors. The latter can be interpreted
in the following way: the higher the fraction of variance that can be explained
by the common factors, the higher the dependence among the five considered
companies. For the US banking sector, this fraction is 58 %, the highest among
all the sectors. The uniquenesses are of a relatively equal size, between 32 % and
50 %. For the German banks considered, the fraction of variance explained by the
common factors is lower with 46 %, but is still the highest among all the German
sectors. The uniquenesses of the fourth and fifth bank of the German sample are
high, indicating less exposure to the common factors.
Overall, the factor analysis supports the result of a high degree of dependence in
the banking sectors, indicating the robustness of the results found in the main
section.
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Table 2.22: Germany: Factor Analysis
This table reports the results of the factor analysis for the 10 considered German
sectors. The five columns ui denote the uniquenesses of the respective stock returns,
the last column reports the proportion of explained variance by the two common
factors.
u1 u2 u3 u4 u5 Cum. Var.
Banks 0.352 0.428 0.337 0.768 0.817 0.460
Automobiles & Parts 0.432 0.315 0.698 0.888 0.969 0.339
Basic Material 0.283 0.302 0.665 0.736 0.964 0.410
Consumer Services 0.596 0.935 0.761 0.774 0.545 0.278
Food & Beverage 0.746 0.992 0.940 0.961 0.005 0.251
Industrials 0.570 0.515 0.609 0.822 0.751 0.347
Insurance 0.239 0.306 0.805 0.927 0.975 0.349
Healthcare 0.005 0.826 0.844 0.869 0.919 0.308
Pers. & Household 0.943 0.128 0.785 0.748 0.981 0.283
Technology 0.505 0.500 0.620 0.754 0.764 0.371
2.6 Further Analyses
2.6.1 Commercial Banks vs. Investment Banks
Traditionally, the US banking sector has been separated into commercial and
investment banks.21 In this subsection, we analyze the systemic risk among
the major US investment banks compared with their commercial counterparts.22
Ex-ante, it is unclear whether one should expect higher or lower crisis probabilities
compared with the commercial banking sector. On the one hand, the business
models are more homogeneous in the investment banking sector and, thus, a higher
degree of systemic risk should be observable. This argument is supported by the
fact that investment banks have higher exposures to each other through derivatives
transactions and also fewer, but bigger, players exist in the market. On the other
hand, investment banks operate more globally than their commercial counterparts,
21During the recent financial crisis, several investment banks have been acquired by commercial
banks (e.g. Merrill Lynch). Thus, the separation of the banking sectors is, at present, not as
clear-cut as it has been in the past.
22As no significant (pure) investment bank exists in Germany, we restrict the analysis to the
US.
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Table 2.23: Commercial vs. Investment Banks
This table reports the estimation results of the crisis coefficient for the sample of
commercial and investment banks. *** shows significance at the 1 % level, ** at the
5 % level and * at the 10 % level.
λˆ2 λˆ3 λˆ4 λˆ5
Commercial Banks 0.5242*** 0.3245*** 0.1701*** 0.1176***
Investment Banks 0.6010*** 0.4260*** 0.3161*** 0.2365***
increasing the potential diversification benefits. The commercial banks are much
more exposed to regional crises, as for example experienced during the savings and
loans crisis in the US during the 1980s and 1990s.
We consider the five major investment banks operating during our sample period,
namely Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merril Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and
Bear Stearns. The time series of available stock prices is shorter than for the
industry sectors considered in the main section. We are able to obtain the
multivariate time series for all five banks from May 1999, when Goldman Sachs
went public, until 2006. To be able to conduct a meaningful comparison, we
re-estimate the systemic crisis probabilities in the commercial banking sector
during the same time period.
Table 2.23 reports the results. We can observe an increased crisis probability of
between 52.4 % and 11.8 % for the commercial banks during the 1999 - 2006 period,
compared with the entire period, when the crisis probabilities were between 36.6 %
for two banks and 5.5 % for five banks, respectively.
The crisis coefficient for the investment banks is estimated between 60.1 % for two
banks and 23.7 % for five banks and, thus, shows a higher degree of systemic risk,
compared with the commercial banks. The difference for the higher dimensional
case (N = 5) is especially noteworthy, as the crisis probability is twice as big as
in the commercial banking sector. Thus, we can conclude that the dependence
introduced by the similarity of business models seems to increase the downside
dependence in the investment banking sector compared with the commercial
52
banking sector.
2.6.2 Financial Crisis
It is natural to ask how the 2007/2008 financial crisis changed the systemic risk
in the different sectors. We thus repeat the estimation for the time period June
1st, 2007 to October 10th, 2008, which marks the most recent observations as we
conduct the analysis. Unfortunately, we have to restrict ourselves to the US data,
as we are not able to collect a data set for the German banking sector comparable
to the data used before. The Hypovereinsbank is not listed anymore as it has been
taken over by the Italian Unicredit. Similarly, Depfa Bank merged on October 1st,
2007 with Hypo Real Estate. Moreover, the IKB Deutsche Industriebank was one
of the first victims of the crisis and was finally sold to Lone Star.
For the US, all the banks considered in the main section are still exchange listed.
In two sectors we have to make minor changes as companies were acquired by
investors or competitors. The telecommunication company Alltel was acquired in
May 2007 and thus replaced by Embarq; the utilities company TXU was acquired
in October 2007 and thus replaced by the FPL Group. All the other sectors’
representatives remain unchanged.
Table 2.24 reports the results of the estimation. Comparing the results with the
systemic risk during the entire preceding study period (Table 2.1), a substantial
increase in the systemic crisis probabilities in the banking sector is observable.
For the two largest banks, the conditional joint default probability rose to 69.8 %,
around 33 percentage points higher than before. Considering a larger number of
banks, it remains at a high level; for five banks, the crisis probability is at 29.9 %,
24 percentage points higher than before.
The other sectors considered also show increased joint default probabilities,
although mostly on a lower level. Only basic materials and utilities show crisis
probabilities of an equal size. The size of the crisis probabilities in these two sectors
is somehow surprising and it is difficult to come up with a convincing explanation.
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Table 2.24: US: Systemic Risk during the 2007/2008 Financial Crisis
This table reports the estimation results of the crisis coefficient for the financial crisis
from 07/01/07 to 10/10/08. *** shows significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5%
level and * at the 10% level.
λˆ2 λˆ3 λˆ4 λˆ5
Banks 0.6980*** 0.5489*** 0.4188*** 0.2992***
Automobiles & Parts 0.3266*** 0.2032*** 0.1407*** 0.0925***
Basic Materials 0.6980*** 0.5489*** 0.4188*** 0.2992***
Consumer Services 0.5068*** 0.2463*** 0.1410*** 0.0719**
Food & Beverage 0.5825*** 0.2504*** 0.0963*** 0.0507**
Healthcare 0.3771*** 0.2125*** 0.1027*** 0.0763***
Industrials 0.3966*** 0.3213*** 0.2049*** 0.1611***
Insurance 0.1192 0.1018** 0.0925*** 0.0707***
Pers. & Household 0.3881*** 0.2611*** 0.1560*** 0.0858***
Technology 0.4942*** 0.3167*** 0.2000*** 0.1421***
Telecommunications 0.6871*** 0.3412*** 0.1816*** 0.1120***
Utilities 0.6744*** 0.4777*** 0.3703*** 0.3061***
Comparing the systemic risk in the banking sector with the previous ‘crisis’
periods, it can be seen that the financial crisis period carried a larger degree
of systemic risk. For five banks, it is 8 percentage points higher than in the bear
market period, 10 percentage points higher than in the volatile market period, and
27 percentage points higher than during recessions.
Therefore, one can conclude that the proposed crisis coefficient has reacted to the
financial crisis in the expected fashion, confirming the validity of its definition.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we address the question of the existence and strength of systemic
risk in the banking sector and other industry sectors of the United States and
Germany using security market information. To do so, we apply a copula-based
measure of dependencies in the tail of the multivariate distributions of stock
returns. We estimate this crisis coefficient for the entire sample period as well
as for selected subperiods of adverse market conditions. As a robustness check,
we specify a two-state regime-switching copula model that allows for switching
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dependencies and volatilities between two different regimes. Furthermore, we
analyze the robustness with respect to the modeling of the marginal distributions,
conduct a factor analysis of the stock returns, and analyze the investment banking
sector, as well as the recent financial crisis.
Our main results are as follows: we find significantly higher systemic risk in the
banking sectors of the US and Germany compared with the other sectors of the
respective economies. Due to the importance of the banking sector, this clearly
justifies the need for a supervising authority whose task is to prevent a systemic
crisis affecting the entire economy. Presuming that banking regulation lowers
systemic risk, the need for stricter regulation is supported. However, as discussed
in the first chapter, theoretical studies, such as Eichberger and Summer (2005),
show that systemic risk might increase as a consequence of extensive regulation.
Thus, it is difficult to draw unambiguous policy implications. Considering the
insurance sector, we find evidence for very low degrees of systemic risk. This
suggests the policy implication that a system-wide regulation of the insurance
sector is not necessary and one should focus on the banking sector.
Second, the degree of systemic risk in a sector strongly depends on the state of
the economy, characterized by the sector’s stock market index or the business
cycle. In adverse states, the systemic risk is considerably higher than in positive
environments. This finding indicates a high sensitivity of the banking sector to
the economic conditions, demanding the full attention of the regulator during
adverse periods of time. The result of higher systemic risk during volatile times in
the banking sector is confirmed by the results of the estimated regime-switching
copula model.
Third, our cross border comparison of the banking sectors in Germany and
the United States supports the results of Hartmann et al. (2005), who find
higher extreme dependencies in the US banking system when compared with the
European one. On the one hand, the different degrees of systemic risk in the two
banking sectors might be a result of the different structures of the two banking
systems. On the other hand, one might argue that this result implies a more
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successful banking regulation in Germany compared with the US.
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2.8 Appendix A
Table 2.25: US: Company Description
Company Principal Activities
General Motors Automotive and Other Operations and Financing and Insurance
Operations
Ford Motor Co. Production and selling of cars and trucks.
Johnson Controls Automotive systems and building controls
Harley-Davidson Motorcycles and Related Products
Genuine Parts Co. Distribution of automotive replacement parts, industrial replacement
parts, office products and electrical and electronic materials
Citigroup Provision of financial services
Bank of America Provision of banking and certain non-banking financial services
JPMorgan Chase Provision of global financial services
Wells Fargo & Co. Provision of banking, insurance, investment, mortgage banking and
consumer financing services
Wachovia Provision of commercial and retail banking and trust services
Du Pont De Nemours
& Co
Manufacturing and selling of materials, synthetic fibers, agriculture
and biotechnology products.
Dow Chemical Manufacturing and selling of chemicals, plastic materials, agricultural
and other specialized products and services.
Alcoa Production of aluminum products
Phelps Dodge Production of copper, carbon black, magnet wire and continuous-cast
copper rod
Newmont Mining Acquisition, development, exploration and production of gold prop-
erties worldwide
Wal-Marts Stores Operation of retail stores in various formats
Home Depot Selling of assortment of building materials, home improvement and
lawn and garden products
Disney Company Provision of entertainment and information
Comcast Development, management and operation of broadband communica-
tions network
McDonald’s Operation and franchise restaurant businesses under the McDonald’s
brand.
Coca-Cola Manufacturing, distribution and marketing of nonalcoholic beverage
concentrates and syrups
Pepsico Manufacturing, marketing and selling of salty, sweet and grain-based
snacks, carbonated and non-carbonated beverages and foods
Anheuser-Busch Beer manufacturing and wholesale
Archer-Daniels-
Midland
Production, transportation, storage, processing and merchandising of
agricultural commodities and products
Kellogg Manufacturing and marketing of ready-to-eat cereal and convenience
food products
Continued on next page
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Table 2.25 – continued from previous page
Company Principal Activities
Johnson & Johnson Manufacturing and marketing of a range of products in the health
care field
Pfizer Discovering, development, manufacturing and selling of prescription
medicines for humans and animals and also healthcare products
Merck & Co. Development, manufacturing and marketing of a broad range of
innovative products to improve human and animal health
Amgen Discovering, development, manufacturing and marketing of human
therapeutics based on advances in cellular and molecular biology
Abbott Laboratories Discovering, development, manufacturing and selling of a broad and
diversified line of health care products.
General Electric Development, manufacturing and marketing of a wide variety of
products for the generation, transmission, distribution, control and
utilization of electricity
Boeing Offering of products and services in aerospace industry
United Technologies Provision of high technology products and services to the building
systems and aerospace industries worldwide
3M Research, manufacturing and marketing of various products
Caterpillar Design, manufacturing and marketing of construction machinery and
engines.
American
International
Provision of general and life insurance operations, financial services,
retirement savings and asset management
Berkshire Hathaway Provision of insurance and reinsurance of property also casualty risks
and reinsure life, accident and health risks world-wide
St. Pauls Travellers Provision of commercial property-liability and non life reinsurance
products and services worldwide
AFLAC Provision of supplemental health and life insurance services
Loews Provision of property and casualty insurance, production and selling
of cigarettes and operate offshore oil and gas drilling rigs and natural
gas pipeline systems
Procter & Gamble Manufacturing and marketing consumer products
Altria Group Manufacturing and marketing various consumer products, including
cigarettes, grocery products, snacks, beverages, cheese and conve-
nient meals
Colgate-Palmolive Manufacturing and marketing a wide variety of consumer products
Kimberly-Clark Manufacturing and marketing of various health and hygiene products
Nike Design, production, development and market ing of high quality
sports and fitness footwear, apparel, equipment and accessory
products
Microsoft Development, manufacturing, licensing and supporting a wide range
of software products for a multitude of computing devices
IBM Provision of business and information technology services
Intel Design, development, manufacturing and marketing computers,
networking and communication products
Hewlett-Packard Provision of products, technologies, solutions and services to
individual consumers and businesses.
Continued on next page
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Table 2.25 – continued from previous page
Company Principal Activities
Oracle Development, manufacturing, marketing and distributionof computer
software.
AT&T Provision of communication services and products
Verizon Provision of wireline and wireless communication services
Sprint Nextel Provision of communication products and solutions
ALLTEL Provision of wireline and wireless communication
Leucadia Telecommunication, healthcare services, banking and lending, man-
ufacturing, winery operations, real estate activities and development
of copper mine
Exelon Energy generation and delivery
Dominion Resources Generation, transmission, distribution and selling of gas and electric
energy
Southern Company Acquisition, development, building, operation of power production
and delivery facilities
TXU Generation of electricity, wholesale energy trading, retail energy
marketing, energy delivery, and other energy-related services
Duke Energy Provision integrated energy services, offer physical delivery and
manage electricity and natural gas
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Table 2.26: Germany: Company Description
Company Principal Activities
BMW Development, Manufacturing and selling of a range of cars and
motorcycles
VW Design, manufacturing and distribution of cars and other vehicles
worldwide
Continental Manufacturing tires, plastic products and other industrial rubber
products
Rheinmetall Supply of automotive components and defence equipments
Elringklinger Manufacturing of cylinder-head gaskets and other sealing and plastic
components mainly for the automotive industry
Deutsche Bank Provision of a range of banking and financial services
HVB Provision of universal banking and financial services
Commerzbank Provision of banking services
Depfa Bank Provision of a range of banking, financial and related services to
public sector clients worldwide
IKB Provision of banking services, predominantly by granting medium
and long term loans to small and medium sized companies
BASF Chemicals, Plastics, Performance Products, Agricultural Products &
Nutrition and Oil & Gas
Bayer Health care, nutrition and high-tech materials sectors
Linde Industrial gas, Engineering and Material handling
K+S Supply of agricultural and industrial products and related services
Fuchs Petrolub Manufacturing and marketing of lubricants, speciality chemicals, oil
products, polishing products, base oil, heating oil and fuel
Deutsche Lufthansa Provision of passenger and freight airline services and related
businesses, both domestically and internationally
Celesio Pharmaceutical wholesale, Pharmacies and Solutions
Karstadt Quelle Management of department stores, mail order services, information
and finance services and real estate services
Axel Springer Printing, publishing and sale of newspapers, magazines, books and
periodicals
TUI Tourism, Shipping and other operating units
Suedzucker Production of sugar
Gabriel Sedlmayr Brewing an distribution of beer and other beverages
Baywa Sale of agricultural and horticultural products
KWS Saat Cultivation of a variety of crops and other food produce including
sugar beet, maize, seeds, grain and cereals
Stuttg. Hofbraeu Brewing of beer and sale of soft drinks and other non-alcoholic
beverages
Siemens Information and Communications, Automation and Control, Power,
Transportation, Medical, Lighting
Thyssen Krupp Steel, Services, Automotive, Technology, Elevators, Engineering
MAN Supply of capital goods and systems in the fields of commercial vehicle
construction, mechanical and plant engineering
Continued on next page
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Table 2.26 – continued from previous page
Company Principal Activities
GEA Group Customized Systems, Process Equipment, Process Engineering and
Plant Engineering
Pfleiderer Marketing of engineered wood, surface-finished panels and rail
sleeper technology, provison of infrastructure for the energy and
communication sectors
Allianz Life/Health, Property/Casualty, Banking, Asset Management
Muenchener Rueck Provision of insurance and reinsurance services
Hannover Rueck Provision of all major types of reinsurance services
Gerling Provision of a comprehensive range of general insurance business,
including accident, liability, motor and property insurance
Nuernberger Provision of a wide range of insurance policies, including life,
accident, disability, health, automobile, general liability and other
insurance services
Bayer Schering Development and manufacturing of pharmaceuticals and diagnostic
substances
Altana Research, manufacturing and marketing of innovative prescription
drugs and chemical products
Schwarz Pharma Research, development, manufacturing and marketing of pharmaceu-
ticals
Merck Development, manufacturing and distribution of pharmaceuticals and
chemicals
Stada Arzneimittel Manufacturing of generic drugs
Beiersdorf Develop, produce and market cosmetics, health care products and
adhesives.
Henkel Cosmetics/toiletries, Detergents/household cleaners, Adhesives
Adidas Production and marketing of sports goods
Puma Design, manufacturing and marketing of sporting goods
Bijou Brigitte Manufacturing, importation and retailing of custume jewellery, gold
and silver jewellery, precious stones and fashion accessories
SAP Development, marketing, and selling of a variety of software solutions
for organizations including corporations, government agencies, and
educational institutions
Infineon Technologies Design, research, development, manufacture and marketing of
semiconductors and complete systems solutions used in a variety of
micro electrical applications
United Internet Marketing, sales and other services in the fields of telecommunica-
tions, information tech nology, data processing and related areas
Software AG Development and license of enterprise system software products,
enterprise application integration and electronic business
freenet.de Provision of internet connectivity services
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Table 2.27: US: Summary Statistics
This table reports descriptive statistics of the daily log returns. The fourth and fifth column give the start and end date of the time series.
The mean and the standard deviation are reported on an annual basis. The next two columns give the skewness and the excess kurtosis.
The Min and Max columns report the smallest and highest return observed in the sample period. The column ADF reports the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller Test of a unit root. The next column reports the value of the Q-Statistic with m lags. We follow Tsay (2005) and use
m = log(T ). The last column gives the Jarque-Bera-Test of Normality. *** shows significance at the 1 % level, ** at the 5 % level and *
at the 10 % level.
Sector Name ISIN Start Date End Date µ σ S K Min Max ADF Q(m) JB
Automobiles & Parts Harley-Davidson US4128221086 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.2329 0.3439 -0.2892 8.76 -0.2486 0.1300 -16.09*** 13.32*** 14240.6***
General Motors US3704421052 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0318 0.3251 0.0761 3.80 -0.1504 0.1665 -14.95*** 6.59 2676.8***
Johnson Controls US4783661071 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1560 0.2627 0.1236 4.17 -0.1309 0.1097 -16.81*** 18.61** 3227.9***
Ford Motor Company US3453708600 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0359 0.3343 0.1390 3.97 -0.1589 0.1451 -15.96*** 27.14*** 2932.5***
Genuine Parts US3724601055 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0847 0.2006 0.2520 3.45 -0.0951 0.0808 -16.33*** 38.33*** 2247.9***
Banks Citigroup US1729671016 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1997 0.3271 0.0309 4.92 -0.1711 0.1684 -16.49*** 22.33*** 4485.7***
Bank of America US0605051046 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1204 0.2929 -0.1422 3.89 -0.1443 0.0988 -16.60*** 47.81*** 2813.8***
JPMorgan Chase & Co. US46625H1005 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1217 0.3454 0.1585 5.45 -0.1998 0.1487 -15.54*** 10.81 5505.0***
Wells Fargo US9497461015 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1699 0.2631 0.1152 2.67 -0.0919 0.0953 -17.69*** 24.16*** 1324.7***
Wachovia US9299031024 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1333 0.2764 0.0497 3.62 -0.1171 0.1075 -17.11*** 18.41** 2424.4***
Basic Materials Du Pont De Nemours & Co US2635341090 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0789 0.2670 0.0539 3.25 -0.1170 0.0941 -17.13*** 21.47*** 1955.5***
Dow Chemical Company US2605431038 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0671 0.2791 0.0125 4.31 -0.1118 0.1079 -17.73*** 14.88* 3432.9***
Alcoa US0138171014 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0865 0.3138 0.2073 3.19 -0.1166 0.1315 -17.21*** 17.54** 1909.7***
Phelps Dodge US7172651025 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1476 0.3323 0.4218 5.59 -0.1278 0.2373 -16.55*** 15.83** 5921.2***
Newmont Mining US6516391066 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0185 0.4003 0.4150 4.47 -0.1826 0.1927 -16.72*** 32.94*** 3827.6***
Consumer Services Wal-Marts Stores US9311421039 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1254 0.2928 0.0376 3.54 -0.1560 0.0902 -16.97*** 40.56*** 2325.7***
Home Depot US4370761029 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1799 0.3360 -0.9693 17.51 -0.3388 0.1213 -17.19*** 31.48*** 57396.3***
Disney (Walt) Company US2546871060 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0807 0.3045 -0.1165 8.02 -0.2029 0.1420 -16.25*** 11.09 11916.3***
Comcast US20030N1019 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1206 0.3984 0.2849 3.73 -0.1622 0.1754 -16.74*** 26.55*** 2634.1***
McDonald’s US5801351017 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1026 0.2649 -0.0423 4.26 -0.1372 0.1031 -16.18*** 10.85 3360.2***
Food & Beverage Coca-Cola US1912161007 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1062 0.2417 -0.0492 4.15 -0.1107 0.0922 -17.14*** 16.56** 3191.0***
Pepsico US7134481081 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1192 0.2606 0.3688 6.45 -0.1183 0.1497 -16.55*** 42.37*** 7802.0***
Anheuser-Busch US0352291035 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1138 0.2221 -0.1694 3.24 -0.0861 0.0745 -16.57*** 62.77*** 1962.2***
Archer-Daniels-Midland US0394831020 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0845 0.2886 -0.1104 5.71 -0.1843 0.1319 -15.71*** 39.12*** 6043.2***
Kellogg US4878361082 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0863 0.2435 0.3037 4.40 -0.0995 0.1030 -16.73*** 39.22*** 3655.0***
Healthcare Johnson& Johnson US4781601046 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1400 0.2366 -0.2824 6.26 -0.1725 0.0789 -16.86*** 57.89*** 7297.4***
Pfizer US7170811035 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1427 0.2886 -0.1971 2.92 -0.1182 0.0927 -17.32*** 42.18*** 1604.9***
Merck & Co. US5893311077 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0967 0.2770 -1.3578 25.54 -0.3117 0.1225 -16.25*** 29.56*** 122006.1***
Amgen US0311621009 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.2370 0.3905 -0.0045 4.43 -0.2231 0.1406 -15.79*** 50.52*** 3623.3***
Abbott Laboratories US0028241000 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1223 0.2715 -0.3094 5.83 -0.1760 0.1175 -18.16*** 45.33*** 6356.1 ***
Industrials General Electric US3696041033 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1316 0.2512 0.0441 4.48 -0.1129 0.1174 -16.96*** 20.73*** 3723.2***
Boeing US0970231058 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1012 0.3004 -0.5278 8.05 -0.1939 0.1100 -16.36*** 17.30** 12202.9***
United Technologies US9130171096 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1461 0.2735 -1.6024 33.04 -0.3320 0.0938 -17.04*** 41.47*** 203793.6***
3M Company US88579Y1010 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1045 0.2267 0.0208 4.44 -0.1008 0.1050 -16.33*** 22.06*** 3655.5***
Caterpillar US1491231015 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1407 0.3064 -0.1535 4.00 -0.1569 0.1030 -16.62*** 7.11 2975.8***
Insurance American International US0268741073 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1229 0.2607 0.1070 3.71 -0.1102 0.1046 -16.52*** 39.38*** 2557.0***
Berkshire Hathaway US0846701086 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1432 0.2296 0.4446 6.03 -0.0977 0.0974 -16.75*** 41.68*** 6871.3***
St. Pauls Travellers US7928601084 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1022 0.2590 0.2975 5.70 -0.1232 0.1299 -16.42*** 24.97*** 6076.6***
AFLAC US0010551028 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1770 0.3011 0.3640 5.40 -0.1413 0.1491 -17.63*** 21.14*** 5483.2***
Loews US5404241086 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0884 0.2258 -0.2395 7.17 -0.1606 0.0852 -16.10*** 20.13*** 9542.4***
Pers. & Household Procter & Gamble US7427181091 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1315 0.2497 -3.2106 76.19 -0.3766 0.0910 -16.78*** 29.45*** 1081169.9***
Altria Group US02209S1033 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1472 0.2943 -0.8415 16.00 -0.2614 0.1507 -15.15*** 12.51 47871.1***
Colgate-Palmolive US1941621039 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1376 0.2518 -0.0811 10.67 -0.1732 0.1850 -17.05*** 41.75*** 21057.2***
Kimberly-Clark US4943681035 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1013 0.2426 -0.1859 6.06 -0.1196 0.1007 -16.23*** 35.05*** 6818.5***
Nike US6541061031 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1630 0.3450 -0.2589 7.38 -0.2165 0.1335 -15.54*** 13.61* 10116.0***
Technology Microsoft US5949181045 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.2281 0.3397 -0.0460 4.70 -0.1696 0.1787 -15.71*** 12.41 4093.5***
IBM US4592001014 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0966 0.3009 0.0269 7.56 -0.1689 0.1237 -14.99*** 11.12 10566.6***
Intel US4581401001 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1693 0.4215 -0.4220 5.84 -0.2489 0.1833 -14.52*** 26.43*** 6435.2***
Hewlett-Packard US4282361033 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1345 0.4011 -0.0798 6.30 -0.2070 0.1899 -16.01*** 13.19 7346.3***
Oracle US68389X1054 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1912 0.5541 -0.1569 11.57 -0.3716 0.3637 -15.34*** 23.31*** 24786.0***
Telecommunications AT&T US00206R1023 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0820 0.2717 -0.0754 3.70 -0.1354 0.0883 -17.81*** 20.02*** 2540.1***
Verizon US92343V1044 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0592 0.2621 0.1261 4.60 -0.1261 0.1157 -17.31*** 28.89*** 3930.8***
Sprint Nextel US8520611000 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0467 0.3588 -0.7597 12.43 -0.2598 0.1882 -16.95*** 6.38 28988.2***
ALLTEL US0200391037 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1036 0.2449 -0.0410 4.36 -0.1254 0.1178 -16.60*** 18.08** 3517.1***
Leucadia National US5272881047 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1908 0.2400 1.0724 11.79 -0.0681 0.2076 -15.88*** 7.01 26549.9***
Utilities Exelon US30161N1019 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1387 0.2289 -0.3294 6.38 -0.1255 0.1054 -16.15*** 11.87 7608.4***
Dominion Resources US25746U1097 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1083 0.1850 -1.0008 13.76 -0.1368 0.0838 -16.60*** 26.36*** 35750.7***
Southern Company US8425871071 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1339 0.1945 0.0690 3.76 -0.0885 0.0878 -17.89*** 21.15*** 2626.6***
TXU US8731681081 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1180 0.2775 -3.1942 76.52 -0.3709 0.1806 -15.82*** 154.90*** 1090332.0***
Duke Energy US26441C1053 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0925 0.2339 -0.2969 12.06 -0.1614 0.1498 -16.31*** 11.78*** 26976.3***
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Table 2.28: Germany: Summary Statistics
This table reports descriptive statistics of the daily log returns. The fourth and fifth column give the start and end date of the time series.
The mean and the standard deviation are reported on an annual basis. The next two columns give the skewness and the excess kurtosis.
The Min and Max columns report the smallest and highest return observed in the sample period. The column ADF reports the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller Test of a unit root. The next column reports the value of the Q-Statistic with m lags. We follow Tsay (2005) and use
m = log(T ). The last column gives the Jarque-Bera-Test of Normality. *** shows significance at the 1 % level, ** at the 5 % level and *
at the 10 % level.
Sector Name ISIN Start Date End Date µ σ S K Min Max ADF Q(m) JB
Automobiles & Parts BMW DE0005190003 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1136 0.3021 -0.0555 5.27 -0.1599 0.1133 -17.53*** 27.42*** 5155.0***
VW DE0007664005 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0839 0.3079 -0.2001 3.71 -0.1466 0.1250 -15.14*** 42.27*** 2580.4***
Continental DE0005439004 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1097 0.2984 0.0272 3.48 -0.1168 0.1282 -17.04*** 12.84 2247.6***
Rheinmetall DE0007030009 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0905 0.3484 0.0927 6.58 -0.1478 0.2102 -16.01*** 19.18** 8022.1***
Elringklinger DE0007856023 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1907 0.3441 -0.1110 33.81 -0.3555 0.3295 -17.80*** 44.77*** 211489.9***
Banks Deutsche Bank DE0005140008 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0708 0.2832 -0.1360 4.78 -0.1235 0.1277 -16.50*** 30.53*** 4253.4***
HVB DE0008022005 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0639 0.3411 0.0647 7.02 -0.1730 0.1848 -16.21*** 29.57*** 9130.3***
Commerzbank DE0008032004 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0635 0.3008 0.0554 7.24 -0.1349 0.1803 -16.20*** 15.81** 9708.6***
Depfa Bank IE0072559994 13-Mar-91 29-Dec-06 0.1462 0.2947 0.0897 6.21 -0.1645 0.1435 -14.81*** 17.93** 6651.2***
IKB DE0008063306 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0918 0.1871 0.1096 5.53 -0.0901 0.0795 -16.27*** 39.89*** 5670.3***
Basic Materials BASF DE0005151005 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1219 0.2510 0.0501 3.24 -0.0872 0.1074 -17.59*** 16.28** 1952.7***
Bayer DE0005752000 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0872 0.2895 0.8381 27.28 -0.1843 0.3230 -16.96*** 13.37* 138164.7***
Linde DE0006483001 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0618 0.2540 -0.0265 4.16 -0.1132 0.1048 -16.81*** 8.95 3217.2***
K + S DE0007162000 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1281 0.3026 -0.0568 6.19 -0.1835 0.1547 -16.21*** 14.03* 7107.9***
Fuchs Petrolub DE0005790406 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1121 0.2707 0.2594 5.76 -0.1267 0.1278 -16.96*** 24.20*** 6194.8***
Consumer Services Deutsche Lufthansa DE0008232125 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0610 0.3448 -0.0688 4.22 -0.1521 0.1640 -16.20*** 11.20 3309.6***
Celesio DE000CLS1001 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1298 0.2780 0.0451 2.53 -0.1192 0.0944 -17.74*** 24.96*** 1187.8***
Karstadt Quelle DE0006275001 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0093 0.3333 0.0781 5.02 -0.1772 0.1483 -16.47*** 8.62 4668.5***
Springer DE0005501357 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0962 0.2697 0.6612 10.30 -0.1147 0.1709 -16.36*** 9.07 19958.2***
TUI DE000TUAG000 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0300 0.3072 -0.0117 5.73 -0.1734 0.1254 -16.10*** 25.93*** 6083.5***
Food & Beverage Suedzucker DE0007297004 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0569 0.2307 0.3054 7.15 -0.0919 0.1335 -15.93*** 33.70*** 9532.1***
Gabriel Sedl. DE0007224008 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0541 0.2231 -0.0905 19.67 -0.1671 0.1256 -18.24*** 72.75*** 71633.0***
Baywa DE0005194062 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0944 0.2698 0.8125 7.96 -0.1224 0.1466 -16.67*** 28.17*** 12229.6***
KWS Saat DE0007074007 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0830 0.2532 -0.1681 7.91 -0.1445 0.1147 -15.49*** 75.04*** 11597.6***
SHB Stuttgart DE0007318008 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0766 0.2531 2.9084 155.45 -0.2766 0.4257 -18.12*** 21.07*** 4474844.0***
Healthcare Bayer Schering Pharma DE0007172009 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1288 0.2603 0.3705 12.98 -0.1545 0.2258 -16.38*** 16.41** 31304.4***
Altana DE0007600801 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1361 0.3073 -0.5131 14.68 -0.2648 0.1431 -16.74*** 26.99*** 40052.9***
Schwarz Pharma DE0007221905 19-Jun-95 29-Dec-06 0.1734 0.4240 3.7203 88.25 -0.2471 0.5867 -13.32*** 13.13 984832.0***
Merck DE0006599905 20-Oct-95 29-Dec-06 0.1057 0.3379 -0.1333 4.49 -0.1530 0.1245 -14.44*** 31.11*** 2474.7***
Stada DE0007251803 16-Feb-98 29-Dec-06 0.2201 0.3098 0.6720 11.75 -0.1308 0.2280 -13.15*** 18.61** 13518.4***
Industrials Siemens DE0007236101 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0795 0.2977 0.0936 4.45 -0.1067 0.1565 -15.27*** 35.75*** 3685.4***
ThyssenKrupp DE0007500001 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0843 0.3016 -0.0249 4.14 -0.1659 0.1136 -16.35*** 20.67*** 3178.7***
MAN DE0005937007 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1091 0.3149 -0.0799 3.45 -0.1468 0.0983 -16.71*** 4.37 2211.7***
GEA Group DE0006602006 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 -0.0525 0.3797 -0.5844 12.14 -0.2669 0.1595 -16.63*** 27.27*** 27518.1***
Pfleiderer DE0006764749 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0982 0.3979 3.7998 87.49 -0.2154 0.6078 -15.84*** 13.77* 1426450.0***
Insurance Allianz DE0008404005 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0436 0.3098 -0.0306 6.12 -0.1568 0.1380 -15.36*** 34.90*** 6952.2***
Muenchner Rueck DE0008430026 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0620 0.3212 -0.1317 7.36 -0.1719 0.1653 -16.52*** 65.27*** 10060.3***
Hannover Rueck DE0008402215 30-Nov-94 29-Dec-06 0.1020 0.3309 -0.5396 11.13 -0.1989 0.1538 -14.49*** 32.84*** 16449.8***
Gerling DE0008418922 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0065 0.3701 0.9697 79.79 -0.4234 0.4795 -15.69*** 57.59*** 1177373.4***
Nuernberger DE0008435967 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 -0.0062 0.2370 -0.5875 21.09 -0.2289 0.1361 -16.92*** 23.30*** 82553.0***
Pers. & Household Beiersdorf DE0005200000 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1392 0.3020 0.0302 6.17 -0.1342 0.1610 -17.15*** 69.40*** 7045.7***
Henkel DE0006048408 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.0917 0.2537 -0.0353 5.59 -0.1423 0.1081 -19.02*** 7.08 5790.2***
Adidas DE0005003404 17-Nov-95 29-Dec-06 0.1260 0.3236 -0.0012 3.14 -0.1126 0.1024 -14.14*** 30.70*** 1197.7***
Puma DE0006969603 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.1577 0.3917 0.4442 5.79 -0.1526 0.1653 -16.58*** 15.96** 6353.2***
Bijou Brigitte DE0005229504 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.2211 0.3171 0.4127 19.49 -0.2331 0.2831 -16.07*** 12.66 70445.6***
Technology SAP DE0007164600 01-Jan-90 29-Dec-06 0.2111 0.4210 0.1297 9.39 -0.2554 0.2355 -15.97*** 27.60*** 16321.9***
Infineon DE0006231004 10-Mar-00 29-Dec-06 -0.1652 0.5861 3.7095 68.60 -0.1654 0.6903 -12.47*** 29.02*** 353024.2***
United Internet DE0005089031 20-Mar-98 29-Dec-06 0.2829 0.7356 5.8707 134.87 -0.2643 1.0944 -11.49*** 14.17* 1751980.9***
Software AG DE0003304002 23-Apr-99 29-Dec-06 0.0957 0.5859 -1.0304 19.31 -0.4367 0.2271 -12.62*** 25.41*** 31605.8***
Freenet DE0005792006 02-Dec-99 29-Dec-06 0.1274 0.8693 6.4651 136.51 -0.2424 1.2278 -11.00*** 5.34 1449475.4***
Chapter 3
Intra-Industry Contagion Effects
of Earnings Surprises in the
Banking Sector
3.1 Introduction
Systemic risk in the banking sector has been analyzed in the previous chapter by
empirically investigating the degree of dependencies in the tails of competitors’
return distributions. This dependence measure has the big advantage, that it
can be interpreted as conditional default probability. Significantly higher crisis
probabilities in the banking sector, compared with all the other sectors of the
economy were found. However, inherently due to the employed approach, it is
impossible to tell whether this higher degree of dependence is due to narrow
or broad systemic events. Systemic events in the broad sense are due to
macroeconomic shocks, e.g. a shock in the level of interest rates, effecting all
companies simultaneously. Contrarily, narrow systemic events are the result of
micro-shocks at one company spilling over to others. A distinction between these
two types of systemic risk is important, as crisis prevention and crisis management
measures should be adequate.
In this chapter, we empirically investigate whether contagion effects exist in the
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banking sector.1 This question is of interest since the banking sector is of crucial
importance for the entire economy. Due to the high degree of interconnection with
other sectors, a crisis in the banking sector could lead to severe consequences for
the economy. Thus, to prevent such crises, the banking sector is highly regulated -
although, regulation takes place mainly on an individual bank level. The presence
of contagion effects, which increases the risk of a systemic financial crisis, i.e. the
systemic risk in the financial system, calls for a regulation which takes the multiple
linkages within the system into account and minimizes the risks due to spill-over
effects.
We contribute to the literature by analyzing whether negative earnings surprises
have contagious effects in the banking sector, i.e. whether they cause the reporting
bank’s competitors to react on the new information. We furthermore compare the
banking sector with all the other industry sectors, especially the insurance sector,
to investigate the question whether the banking sector behaves differently.
Earnings announcements provide information about the true value of the company
and claims on it. If market prices before the announcement are based on the
earnings expectations and markets are efficient, a negative surprise will lead to an
immediate devaluation of the firms’ value.
As earnings surprises are clear cut micro events (a macro-shock would result in
adjustments of analysts earnings expectations and thus, no earnings surprise would
be observable), these are perfectly suited for the purpose of studying information
contagion, i.e. systemic risk in the narrow sense.
Whether the competitors security prices of a firm react negatively, positively, or
not at all, depends on the type of information and the structure of the sector. If
the information is firm specific and if no linkages exist with the other firms, only
the respective company security prices should react.
However, negative information like a decrease in sales forecasts could be related
1The concept contagion refers in this context to spill-over effects due to information releases
or real interconnections between companies and not volatility spill-overs between markets which
are also labeled contagion in the literature.
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to sector specific information and thus, reveal information for the entire sector,
yielding adverse reactions of competitor security prices. This type of negative
reaction is commonly referred to as information contagion.2
A firm specific event resulting in an adverse announcement can also have direct
negative consequences for the competitors. This is the case if inter-firm connections
increasing the default risk of the competitors through the increased risk of the
originating firm exist. The best example - which is also the motivation of our study
- is the banking sector in which strong connections exist between the institutions
through the interbank lending and borrowing market. Thus, a credit event at one
bank could spill over to other ones, easily leading to an increase in default risk of
the entire sector, i.e. an increase in systemic risk.
However, a firm specific event could also lead to the opposite effect. As discussed
in Lang and Stulz (1992) and Jorion and Zhang (2007), if imperfect competition is
prevailing in the sector, problems in competing firms could allow firms to increase
their prices or their market share to earn (at least temporary) an additional rent.3
This effect is not exclusive for operating problems, as financial problems can cause
negative reputation which possibly causes customers to refrain from doing business
with the firm as analyzed by Maksimovic and Titman (1991), and thus, switching
to a competing producer or service provider.
Taking everything into account, when adverse events happen, the observable
consequences will be the sum of the aforementioned effects. Theoretically, there is
no reason why one or the other effect should be predominant.
To detect possible contagion effects, we employ traditional event study methodol-
ogy. The event study literature on the reaction of security prices due to the release
of new information is extensive. Most papers analyze the effects on the company to
which the new information applies. Stock price reactions after quarterly earnings
announcements were first analyzed by Ball and Brown (1968) and Jones and
2See also Chapter 1 for a discussion of information and real contagion.
3As an example for this effect Jorion and Zhang (2007) name the bankruptcy of LTV
Corporation, which benefited its major competitor, Bethlehem Steel.
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Litzenberger (1970). They find that earnings surprises indeed is new information
which is incorporated in stock prices of the reporting company.
The literature on intra-industry contagion is no where near as extensive. Lang
and Stulz (1992) and Jorion and Zhang (2007) study the intra-industry effects due
to bankruptcies (announcements), where the first paper measures the effects on
the stock, the latter on the credit default swap market. Both studies conclude
that intra-industry contagion effects after bankruptcies exist. In addition, Jorion
and Zhang (2007) find that this result holds for chapter 11 bankruptcies only.
For chapter 7 bankruptcies the authors find contrary evidence, although it is
statistically weak due to only 22 relevant observations.
The first paper analyzing intra-industry effects following earnings surprises is
Foster (1981), where a relatively small sample of 75 events is studied. A negative
impact of a firm’s earnings release on the stock prices of other firms operating
in the same sector is found only, if the announcing firm reacts negatively itself.
Han et al. (1989) study the effect of voluntarily disclosed earnings forecasts of
managers and find evidence for contagious effects. Other studies finding evidence
for information transfers following earnings surprises include Han and Wild (1990)
and Ramnath (2002).
Akhigbe et al. (1997) detect intra-industry effects of bond rating changes using a
sample of 354 events reported in The Wall Street Journal. The effect of rating
changes on earnings forecasts of rival firms, i.e. firms operating in the same
industry, is studied by Caton and Goh (2003). They find significant effects, but
only if the downgraded firm is non-investment grade.
None of the studies mentioned above consider the banking sector separately. The
sample of Lang and Stulz (1992) does not contain any events in the banking sector.
The other cited studies report their results on an aggregated level only, which may
be due to the small sample sizes.4
4The sample of Jorion and Zhang (2007) includes 272, Akhigbe et al. (1997) includes 354,
Caton and Goh (2003) includes 453, Foster (1981) includes 75 and Han et al. (1989) includes 195
observations in total.
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A few papers analyzing adverse events in the banking sector do exist. Akhigbe and
Madura (2001) study 99 publicized bank failures and find contagion effects on rival
banks, which are stronger when the failed bank is large, a multibank holding, or
publicly held. The contagion effects of dividends reductions at banks are analyzed
by Slovin et al. (1999). Their main finding is that these reductions are negative
events for both, large super-regional banks as well as regional banks themselves,
but only cuts at super-regional banks have negative consequences on stock prices
of other banks.
Our study is closely related to this strand of literature. We fill the gap in the
literature between studies on intra-industry contagion effects of earnings surprises
and studies of the banking sector. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
study analyzing contagion effects in the banking sector due to negative earnings
surprises. Furthermore, we are the first to compare the results with the average
of the non-banking sectors, and especially the insurance sector, which is a second
highly regulated sector of the US economy.
The main results of our study are as follows. We find that negative earnings
surprises cause significant contagion effects in the banking sector. In contrast,
the non-banking sectors show, on average, no signs of contagious behavior. The
difference between the banking sector and the non-banking sectors proves to be
highly significant. When analyzing the insurance sector separately, we do not
find any contagion effects which indicates a smaller degree of systemic risk in the
insurance sector. Finally, we find that contagion in the banking sector is the
strongest, if the originator as well as the affected institutions are important banks.
These results support the need for a system-based regulation of the banking sector.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 contains a description of the
study design including the used data set. In Section 3.3, we present the empirical
results. Concluding remarks are stated in Section 3.4.
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3.2 Design of the Study
3.2.1 Goal and Overview of the Study
The goal of our study is to investigate whether information contagion is present in
the banking sector and whether the banking sector behaves differently compared
with the other sectors of the economy. To do so, we use negative earnings surprises,
i.e. analysts’ forecasts minus realized earnings, as informational event. Negative
earnings surprises are perfectly suited as all macroeconomic information should
already be included in the analysts’ forecasts. The new negative information is thus
mainly attributable to the reporting company itself. We measure the contagion
effect by analyzing the reaction of the stock prices of companies operating in the
same sector as the reporting company.
We first analyze whether the reporting company’s stock price exhibit a significant
decline to make sure that the negative earnings surprise indeed is a negative
information for the reporting company. We then analyze the stock price reaction
of companies operating in the same sector. To analyze whether the banking sector
exhibit a different behavior we compare the results with the non-banking sectors
and also the insurance sector.
3.2.2 Data
We analyze the effects of negative earnings surprises on the stock prices of the
affected firms’ competitors over the sample period January 1st, 1990 through
March 21st, 2007 in the United States using traditional event study methodology.5
The earnings data is obtained from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System
(I/B/E/S) retrieved via Thomson Financial Datastream.6 We focus our study on
5For an overview of the event study methodology and applications in economics and finance
see, e.g., Brown and Warner (1980), Brown and Warner (1985), and MacKinlay (1997). For more
recent applications see also the literature discussed in section 3.1.
6I/B/E/S is generally viewed as the premier database and supplier of earnings forecasts for
professionals and has also been used extensively in academic studies.
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the US, as data availability regarding I/B/E/S is by far the best.7 We obtain
the time series of analysts’ mean forecasts of earnings per share for the following
quarter as well as the number of analysts covering the particular company. We then
exclude all observations for which less than three analysts report earnings forecasts.
Additionally, the cross-sectional standard deviations of the analysts’ forecasts are
obtained. For each observed earnings forecast we sample the subsequently reported
earnings per share. To do this, we have to determine the precise date on which
the earnings were reported. This information is obtained from the Worldscope
database, and used as the event date in the following study.
We calculate Standardized Unexpected Earnings using two different approaches.
First, we follow Foster et al. (1984) (model 1) and Han and Wild (1990) and
compute the relative deviation of the reported earnings from the forecasted
earnings, precisely,
SUE1i,t =
EPSi,t − ÊPSi,t
|EPSi,t| , (3.1)
for company i and quarter t. ÊPSi,t is the mean forecast one day prior to the
release of the realized earnings; EPSi,t is the subsequently reported earnings per
share. In Equation (3.1), the deviation of the forecast from the realized earnings
is standardized by the absolute value of the realized earnings, yielding a relative
surprise measure. As can been seen directly from the definition of SUE1i,t, this
way to standardize the earnings surprise could be problematic in case the company
realize earnings of very small size or even zero.
Thus, to assure the robustness of the analysis with respect to the chosen surprise
measure, we standardize the earnings surprise in a second way. The absolute
earnings surprise is normalized by the dispersion of the analysts’ forecasts,
7The data availability for Germany was not sufficient to conduct the study on this market.
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SUE2i,t =
EPSi,t − ÊPSi,t
σ[ÊPS]
, (3.2)
with σ[ÊPS] denoting the cross-sectional standard deviation of the analysts’
forecasts. This approach, which has also been used in the literature, e.g. by Datta
and Dhillon (1993) or Mendenhall (2004), incorporates the degree of surprise; a
deviation from the mean forecast will be less surprising if there is a high level of
discordance about the future earnings among the analysts. Analogous to our first
standardization, where the Standardized Unexpected Earnings is not well defined
when an earnings observation of zero occurs, this second way to normalize the
earnings surprise suffers from the possibility of a zero denominator. This situation
occurs if all analysts reporting to I/B/E/S exactly agree regarding their earnings
forecast. Furthermore, earnings or dispersion values close to zero might distort
our analysis as the standardized earnings surprises will become very large.
We tackle this stability problem in the following way. First, we delete all
observations with EPSi,t = 0 or σ[ÊPS] = 0. Second, to deal with potential
outliers, we calculate the mean and standard deviation of all earnings surprises
SUE1 and SUE2, respectively, and delete all values outside a three-sigma interval.
All results reported in Section 3.3 are computed this way, using an outlier cleaned
data set. To ensure robustness with respect to the outlier treatment, we have
repeated the entire study once without the second step of deleting the outliers
and once using a five-sigma interval instead of the three-sigma interval, both
yielding very similar results, statistically undistinguishable. As an additional
robustness check, we have adopted the ad-hoc approach of Mendenhall (2004)
to set σ[ÊPS] = 0.01 if the reported standard deviation is zero. Again, no notable
differences appeared.
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Table 3.1: Overview of the Industry Sectors
This table reports the industry sectors considered. The classification is according to
the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB).
Oil & Gas Producers Automobiles & Parts Fixed Line Telecommunication
Oil Equipment, Serv. & Distr. Beverages Mobile Telecommunication
Chemicals Food Producers Electricity
Forestry & Paper Household Goods Gas, Water & Multiutilities
Industrial Metals Leisure Goods Banks
Mining Personal Goods Nonlife Insurance
Construction & Materials Tobacco Life Insurance
Aerospace & Defense Health Care Eq. Real Estate
General Industrials Pharma & Biotech General Financial
Electronic & Electrical Eq. Food & Drug Retailers Equity Investment Instr.
Industrial Engineering General Retailers Software & Computer Services
Industrial Transportation Media Technology Hardware
Support Services Travel & Leisure
3.2.3 Abnormal Returns
The subsequent analysis is based on the same period as our event data was
sampled from. We group the event data by industry sector based on the Industry
Classification Benchmark (ICB), resulting in 38 sectors.8 The list of these sectors
is reported in Table 3.1.9
To measure the reaction of competitors, i.e. firms operating mainly in the
same industry sector, we sample stock market returns of all companies from
the respective sectors traded at NASDAQ and covered by I/B/E/S during the
examined time period. As we do not require data availability over the entire
sample period, the competitor portfolio is changing as firms list/delist at NASDAQ
or analysts begin/abort covering firms.
Following other studies (e.g. Akhigbe et al. (1997) or Jorion and Zhang (2007)),
we form equally weighted competitor portfolios. An alternative method is to form
8Originally the ICB is classified into 39 sectors. However, for the sector nonequity investment
instruments we have practically no observations and thus, excluded it from the analysis.
9As the data set used in this chapter is much larger than the data used in the other chapters
of this thesis we are able to use a finer classification scheme, based on level three of the ICB.
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value weighted portfolios. This would relate to the overall wealth effects in the
economy; however, as we want to measure the average reaction, and not the value
weighted reaction of companies to adverse news from their competitors, equally
weighted returns are more appropriate in this context.
Table 3.2 reports summary statistics of the sampled competitor portfolios. Overall,
the competitor portfolios include 32.13 companies per event on average. The
banking sector competitor portfolio contains between 41 and 46 companies at each
point in time, with an average of 45.57 banks and a standard deviation of 0.81
banks.
For each event date t, we define the abnormal return ARp,t of a competitor portfolio
p as the difference between the realized return Rp,t and the expected normal return
conditioning on information up to time t denoted by Xt:
ARp,t = Rp,t − E[Rp,t|Xt]. (3.3)
The realized return is computed from end of day prices as total return, i.e.
including dividends and adjusted for other price, but not wealth relevant corporate
actions, such as right issues and stock splits. The expected normal return is
estimated according to the market model approach,
E[Rp,t|Xt] = αˆp + βˆpRm,t, (3.4)
where Rm,t denotes the market index return. As the market index we employ
the S&P 500 as it is the major well diversified US stock market index. The two
parameters αˆp and βˆp are sector specific and are estimated over the pre-event period
[t−T , t−2] for each event. We choose the estimation window to cover approximately
one year, i.e. T = 250. Observations on other event dates are excluded from the
estimation data to minimize possible correlation bias.
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Table 3.2: Size of Competitor Portfolios
This table reports summary statistics regarding the number of stocks N being in the
competitor portfolios. N denotes the sample mean whereas, σ, min, and max are the
standard deviation, minimum, and maximum value, respectively.
Sector N σ[N ] min[N ] max[N ]
Banks 45.57 0.81 41 46
Nonlife Insurance 46.71 0.60 43 47
Life Insurance 12.91 0.28 12 13
Oil & Gas Producers 30.68 0.64 28 31
Oil Equipment, Serv. & Distr. 44.81 0.43 43 45
Chemicals 24.68 0.59 22 25
Forestry & Paper 1.93 0.26 1 2
Industrial Metals 11.91 0.31 10 12
Mining 3.98 0.15 3 4
Construction & Materials 17.93 0.31 16 18
Aerospace & Defense 12.92 0.31 11 13
General Industrials 22.76 0.49 21 23
Electronic & Electrical Eq. 25.93 0.28 24 26
Industrial Engineering 21.78 0.58 19 22
Industrial Transportation 14.92 0.28 14 15
Support Services 32.93 0.30 31 33
Automobiles & Parts 8.92 0.27 8 9
Beverages 9.95 0.23 9 10
Food Producers 21.97 0.17 21 22
Household Goods 18.92 0.27 18 19
Leisure Goods 7.92 0.28 7 8
Personal Goods 13.00 0.00 13 13
Tobacco 3.00 0.00 3 3
Health Care Eq. 51.89 0.31 51 52
Pharma & Biotech 33.86 0.34 33 34
Food & Drug Retailers 11.99 0.12 11 12
General Retailers 59.99 0.10 59 60
Media 38.89 0.36 37 39
Travel & Leisure 36.86 0.38 35 37
Fixed Line Telecommunication 9.98 0.13 9 10
Mobile Telecommunication 5.84 0.37 5 6
Electricity 33.59 0.72 29 34
Gas, Water & Multiutilities 20.81 0.51 17 21
Real Estate 48.81 0.51 46 49
General Financial 47.85 0.44 46 48
Equity Investment Instr. 2.00 0.00 2 2
Software & Computer Services 34.91 0.29 34 35
Technology Hardware 62.73 0.62 59 63
All 32.13 15.04 1 63
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Under the null hypothesis of no abnormal reaction, the standardized average
abnormal returns follow the Student-t distribution with T − 2 degrees of freedom,
which is approximately normal. The standard deviations of the abnormal returns
are also estimated over the estimation windows. Following Mikkelson and Partch
(1985), we adjust the estimated standard deviations by the prediction error
resulting in
σp,t = sp,t
√
1 +
1
(T − 1) +
(Rm,t − R¯m)2∑
τ (Rm,τ − R¯m)2
, (3.5)
where s2p,t is the residual variance from the market model adjusted for autocorre-
lation and heteroskedasticity by the method of Newey-West.
All events with overlapping event periods [−1, 1] are excluded from the analysis.
We use this rather short event window to reduce problems from non-independent
observations and to obtain a sufficient number of events. Compared with event
studies analyzing the effects on the reporting company itself, the potential for
overlapping event windows is much greater in our case, as each reporting company
itself is also included in the competitor portfolio if another company from the same
sector exhibits an event.
We calculate the abnormal returns for the event day [0] and the subsequent day
[1]. This is done as we do not have precise information about the timing of the
information release on the event day. If it were after the closing of the exchange,
potential reactions would be observable on the following trading day and not on
the event day.
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Table 3.3: Distribution of Events Across Time
This table reports the distribution of negative earnings surprises over time. The
displayed numbers are the sample size after deleting observations with a zero
denominator in one of the definitions of standardized earnings surprises. Note that
2007 only include observations until March, 21st, which was the sampling date.
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
# Earnings Surprises 1 2 298 414 366 363
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
# Earnings Surprises 400 361 442 424 305 419
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
# Earnings Surprises 407 475 435 444 439 24
3.3 Empirical Results
3.3.1 Description of the SUE Data
In this section, we report the results of the intra-industry contagion analysis due
to negative earnings surprises. In total we sample 6,019 events of negative SUE
after removing all infinite values due to zero earnings per share or volatility of
earnings estimate, but before filtering using the three-sigma interval as described
in the previous section.10
Table 3.3 reports the distribution of earnings surprises across the sample period.
Except for the first two years, with almost no observations, the earnings surprise
sample is well balanced across time. Table 3.4 reports the distribution of
events across sectors. The smallest number of events is observed for the equity
investments instruments sector. The number of events in the banking sector is
among the highest.
10The original sample contained 6397 observations. Both values SUE1 and SUE2 are deleted
if at least one of both is not well defined, resulting in a relative decrease of the sample size of
5.91 %.
76
Table 3.4: Distribution of Events Across Sectors
This table reports the distribution of negative earnings surprises across sectors.
The displayed numbers are the sample size after deleting observations with a zero
denominator in one of the definitions of standardized earnings surprises.
Earning
Sector Surprises
Banks 308
Nonlife Insurance 339
Life Insurance 58
Oil & Gas Producers 300
Oil Equipment, Serv. & Distr. 331
Chemicals 212
Forestry & Paper 29
Industrial Metals 138
Mining 44
Construction & Materials 139
Aerospace & Defense 122
General Industrials 245
Electronic & Electrical Eq. 219
Industrial Engineering 169
Industrial Transportation 134
Support Services 146
Automobiles & Parts 92
Beverages 73
Food Producers 97
Household Goods 118
Leisure Goods 73
Personal Goods 50
Tobacco 21
Health Care Eq. 232
Pharma & Biotech 214
Food & Drug Retailers 76
General Retailers 92
Media 259
Travel & Leisure 195
Fixed Line Telecommunication 59
Mobile Telecommunication 70
Electricity 423
Gas, Water & Multiutilities 246
Real Estate 95
General Financial 170
Equity Investment Instr. 7
Software & Computer Services 122
Technology Hardware 302
Σ 6019
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Table 3.5: Summary Statistics of Negative Earnings Surprises
This table reports summary statistics for the negative earnings surprises SUE
calculated from the sampled I/B/E/S data and after deleting outliers as describe in
the text. SUE denotes the mean, whereas σ, med, min, and max are the standard
deviation, median, minimum, and maximum value.
SUE σ[SUE] med[SUE] min[SUE] max[SUE]
SUE1 -0.2669 0.4999 -0.1 -5.0 -0.0016
SUE2 -2.1660 2.7015 -1.0 -21.0 -0.0170
After deleting outliers not in the three-sigma interval, the data set decreases
to 5,946 observations. Summary statistics of the cleaned sample are given in
Table 3.5. As we only consider negative earning surprises, the distribution is
naturally skewed to the left yielding smaller mean than median values. The mean
earnings surprise standardized by its absolute realization (SUE1) is -0.27, with
a minimum value of -5.0 and a maximum value of -0.0016. When standardizing
using the dispersion of analyst forecasts (SUE2) the mean is -2.17, the minimum
and maximum values are -21.0 and -0.0170, respectively.
3.3.2 Results on Announcing Companies
First, we analyze the effect of negative earnings surprises on the reporting
companies themselves. This analysis will show, whether on average the news
indeed was a negative surprise, and we can verify the timing of the market
responses to the new information, i.e. whether the reported date in the Worldscope
database was actually the date of information release to the public. If the
information was available to the public, or at least to the analysts making the
forecasts, before the reported event date, or the date of reported earnings were not
correct, we should, on average, not observe an abnormal reaction by the reporting
company. In this case, we would not expect the competitor companies to react as
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Table 3.6: Share Price Reaction of Reporting Company
This table reports the average abnormal stock reaction of the companies announcing
earnings surprises. The different panels condition on certain negative SUE. The last
three columns report the p-values testing the null of positive abnormal returns. Sign-
test is a standard Binomial sign test, whereas ws-test stands for the Wilcoxon sign
test.
NOBS Event Date AR (%) p[t-test] p[sign-test] p[ws-test]
Panel A: SUE1,2 < 0
5946 [0] -0.7322 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
5946 [1] -0.5417 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Panel B: SUE1 < -5 %
4213 [0] -0.7778 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
4213 [1] -0.5622 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Panel C: SUE1 < -10 %
2980 [0] -0.7870 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
2980 [1] -0.5648 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Panel D: SUE2 < -1
3815 [0] -0.8694 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
3815 [1] -0.6658 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Panel E: SUE2 < -2
1927 [0] -1.1475 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1927 [1] -0.7191 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
well.
Table 3.6 reports the average abnormal returns of the companies announcing
earnings surprises.11 Panel A displays the results for all negative earnings surprises.
Panel B and C show the results for subsamples, conditioned on SUE1 being smaller
than -5 % and -10 %; Panel D and E condition on SUE2 being smaller than -1 and
-2, respectively.
To test the significance of the results, we perform a standard t-test as well as two
standard nonparametric tests. The Binomial sign test simply tests whether the
median is significantly smaller than zero using information of the signs (plus or
11The subsequent analysis on intra-industry contagion in the following sections splits the data
set further by industry (bank or non-bank) and size. We refrain from reporting the price reactions
of reporting companies on this more detailed level as this is not the focus of the analysis.
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minus) of the observations only, whereas the Wilcoxon sign test takes the size of
deviation from zero of the observations into account. The p-values of the respective
tests are reported in the last three columns.
On the event date [0] the average negative abnormal daily return is -0.73 %, which
is followed by -0.54 % on the next successive day. Both values are significantly
smaller than zero, with p-values very close to zero. Conditioning on more negative
earnings surprises, i.e. news with a bigger negative surprise, the average abnormal
returns decreases, as to expect, down to -0.78 % for SUE1 < −5 % and -0.79 % for
SUE1 < −10 %, and -0.87 % for SUE1 < −1 and -1.15 % for SUE2 < −2. All
abnormal returns in the various subsamples of Table 3.6 are significantly negative.
Furthermore, the first ex-event day [1] also shows significant negative average
returns, which are, however, in absolute terms, about 30 % smaller than the event
day abnormal returns.
The magnitude of these company specific stock price reactions after negative
earnings surprises are well in line with previous studies. Rendleman Jr. et al.
(1982) report stock price reactions of -1.4 %, -1.0 %, -0.7 %, -0.2 %, and 0.1 % for
the first to fifth decile of earnings surprises. As they also include positive surprises,
only the first five deciles are comparable. Conditioning on SUE2 < −1, Datta and
Dhillon (1993) find an average negative stock price reaction on the event day of
-1.39 % when preceding, and -0.94 % when following dividend surprises.
We conclude that the sampled earnings surprises were indeed negative news to the
market and had a significant negative price impact on the reporting companies’
stocks.
3.3.3 Results on Competitor Companies
To get an first overview, Table 3.7 reports summary statistics of the abnormal
returns of the competitor portfolios. The focus of this chapter lies on the banking
sector, thus, we split our sample into banks and non-banks and perform the analysis
80
Table 3.7: Summary Statistics of Abnormal Returns
This table reports summary statistics of the abnormal returns in percent. q25 and q75
denote the 25 % and the 75 % quantiles, respectively.
Banks
NOBS Event Date mean std. dev. median q25 q75
291 [0] -0.0843 0.7595 -0.0993 -0.3990 0.3164
291 [1] 0.0165 0.8130 -0.0186 -0.4057 0.3740
Non-Banks
NOBS Event Date mean std. dev. median q25 q75
5655 [0] -0.0015 1.1004 -0.0135 -0.5321 0.5076
5655 [1] 0.0190 1.0576 0.0084 -0.4969 0.5150
separately. One can observe negative mean and median returns at date [0] for both
samples, however the non-banks are much closer to zero. The standard deviations
are, compared to the mean values, relatively large.
The significance levels of the abnormal returns of the competitor portfolios are
reported in Table 3.8. We display the results for the sample of all negative earnings
surprises as well as for the same subsamples used in Table 3.6. Again, we report
p-values of the t-test, the Binomial sign test, and the Wilcoxon sign test.
The left part of the table presents the results for the banking sector, the right part
of the table for the other sectors. Note that, although we report average results
for all non-banks together, when computing returns for an earnings surprise in
a sector, we only consider the competitors of the reporting company, i.e. firms
operating in the same sector.
We consider the entire data set, i.e. Panel A, first. For the banking sector, we
observe on the event date an abnormal return of -0.0843 % which is significantly
negative with a p-value of 0.0143 for the t-test and 0.0275 for the Wilcoxon sign
test, indicating the existence of contagion. On the subsequent day the abnormal
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return is slightly positive, but, not significantly different from zero.
In contrast, the non-banking sectors show, on average, no signs of contagious
behavior. The average abnormal return of competitor portfolios is -0.0015 % on
the event day and 0.0190 % on the subsequent day; both being not significantly
different from zero, and thus, not showing any contagion effects.
Panel B and C condition on the relative deviation of the expectation from
the realization. As one expects, the abnormal return decreases conditioning
on stronger deviations with -0.1300 % for SUE1 < −5 % and -0.1781 % for
SUE1 < −10 % on the event day, both being highly significant with p-values
below 0.01 for the t-test and below 0.02 for the Wilcoxon sign test. Again, no
significant abnormal returns are observed on the first post event day.
Conditioning on the degree of surprise, measured by the unexpected earnings
normalized with the dispersion of forecasts (SUE2), yields similar results. The
event date return increases (in absolute terms) by the degree of surprise to
-0.0913 % and -0.1332 %. Again, the post event date average abnormal return
remains insignificant. In contrast, the average abnormal returns of the non-banking
sectors are insignificant, even when conditioning on greater relative deviations or
surprises.
To see whether the observed different behavior of the banking sector and the
other sectors is also statistically significant, we test whether the difference of
abnormal returns is different from zero using a standard t-test. Table 3.9 reports
the results of this test. The difference on the event date is -0.0828 % for the entire
set of negative earnings surprises, which is significant with a p-value of 0.0206.
Conditioning on bigger surprises increases the difference and decreases the p-value
down to 0.0043 for relative surprises below -10 %. Overall, the reported evidence
suggests significantly higher negative reactions of competitors in the banking sector
compared with the non-banking sectors.
One might ask whether the results of the conducted t-tests are biased by
overlapping event windows of the banking and the non-banking sectors, and thus,
correlated observations. If, for example, a negative earnings surprise in the banking
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Table 3.9: Results of Test of Difference
This table reports the differences and significance levels between the average reaction
of the banking sectors and the average reaction of the other sectors. ∆AR is the
difference between the abnormal returns of the banking sector and the non-banking
sectors reported in Table 3.8.
NOBS Event Date ∆AR (%) p[t-test]
Panel A: SUE1,2 < 0
5655 / 291 [0] -0.0828 0.0206
5655 / 291 [1] -0.0024 0.4759
Panel B: SUE1 < -5 %
4069 / 144 [0] -0.1307 0.0098
4069 / 144 [1] -0.0742 0.0919
Panel C: SUE1 < -10 %
2897 / 83 [0] -0.1934 0.0043
2897 / 83 [1] -0.0207 0.3885
Panel D: SUE2 < -1
3582 / 233 [0] -0.0900 0.0237
3582 / 233 [1] 0.0140 0.6217
Panel E: SUE2 < -2
1818 / 109 [0] -0.1528 0.0109
1818 / 109 [1] -0.0141 0.4155
sector has negative consequences for a subset of sectors and not the entire market,
this effect would not be completely captured by the normalizing using expected
returns based on the market model. However, if this cross-sectorial dependence is
present in the considered data, it will decrease the possibility of rejecting the null
hypothesis successfully, as the difference in abnormal return between the related
sectors would decrease. Thus, our results can be regarded as conservative and
would be even stronger if controlling for overlapping event windows of banking
and non-banking earnings surprises.
A second highly regulated sector of the economy is the insurance sector. Similarly
to the banking sector, insurance companies are regulated on an individual level.
However, when discussing regulating the financial sector on a systemic level,
insurance companies are frequently mentioned as part of the system which should
84
Table 3.10: Contagion in the Insurance Sector
This table reports the reactions from the announcing firms’ competitor portfolios for
the insurance sector. The different panels condition on certain negative SUE. The
last three columns report the p-values testing the null of positive abnormal returns.
Sign-test stands for a standard Binomial sign test, whereas ws-test stands for the
Wilcoxon sign test.
NOBS Event Date AR (%) p[t-test] p[sign-test] p[ws-test]
Panel A: SUE1,2 < 0
394 [0] -0.0049 0.4409 0.3622 0.4789
394 [1] -0.0083 0.4015 0.5000 0.4853
Panel B: SUE1 < -5 %
275 [0] 0.0113 0.6153 0.8362 0.6435
275 [1] -0.0482 0.1064 0.0923 0.1443
Panel C: SUE1 < -10 %
194 [0] -0.0581 0.1077 0.4147 0.1889
194 [1] -0.0379 0.2095 0.4147 0.3736
Panel D: SUE2 < -1
266 [0] -0.0381 0.1727 0.4756 0.2984
266 [1] -0.0041 0.4596 0.4756 0.4868
Panel E: SUE2 < -2
161 [0] -0.0578 0.1362 0.5000 0.1611
161 [1] 0.0015 0.5116 0.5673 0.5460
be included. To investigate the validity of this argument, we analyze the insurance
sector separately, in order to see whether contagion effects exist within this sector.
As can be seen from Table 3.1, insurance companies are classified as life or non-life
insurers in our study. Due to the small number of events in the life insurance sector
(58 observations, see Table 3.4), we report the pooled results. We consider both
sectors together, however, as before, when forming competitor portfolios, only
companies of the specific sector are considered. Table 3.10 reports the average
abnormal stock returns for the insurance sector. Although the abnormal return of
the reporting insurers’ competitor portfolios are negative in most instances, the size
is much smaller compared with the banking sector and only insignificantly smaller
than the average of all sectors. For example, the observed abnormal return on the
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event day for the entire data set is -0.0049 %, -0.0843 % for the banking sector and
-0.0015 % for the non-banking sectors. In all subsamples all significance tests fail
to reject the hypothesis of an abnormal return greater than zero.12 Therefore, in
contrast to the banking sector, no contagion effects are observable in the sample
of negative earnings surprises at the insurance companies considered.
3.3.4 Effect of Size of Announcing and Competitor Banks
Finally, we analyze whether the strength of the contagion effects differ in
characteristics of the announcing banks. More precisely, we suspect that adverse
events at more important banks cause stronger negative contagion effects at
their competitors than adverse announcements from less important banks. The
‘ importance ’ of a bank is proxied by its size, i.e. its market capitalization, which
is also obtained from Thomson Financial Datastream. We use the average market
capitalization of the year in which the earnings surprise was reported. Based on
this criterion, we split the banking sample by the average market capitalization of
the sector, which is the annual average of the year in which the event takes place.13
Table 3.11 displays the results of this analysis. Panel A in the upper part reports
the average abnormal returns of the smaller banks in the sample, Panel B the
average abnormal returns of the larger banks. The latter is, with -0.1324 %, almost
twice as large as the former with -0.0715 %. The significance level is, however, less
conclusive, with a p-value of 0.0683 (t-test) and 0.0749 (Wilcoxon sign test) for
the subsample of big banks, and 0.0461 (t-test) and 0.0752 (Wilcoxon sign test)
for the subsample of small banks. This might be a consequence of the reduced
sample size for subsample B and thus, increased standard errors. Furthermore,
12A formal test of difference between the banking and insurance sector was also conducted.
However, it was not possible to reject the hypothesis of a difference of zero at reasonable
significance levels.
13An alternative would be to split the sample by the median market capitalization. As
the sample is not equally balanced with respect to size, the average value is, however, more
appropriate in this context.
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Table 3.11: Effect of Announcers’ Size
This table reports the abnormal reactions from competitor portfolios divided by the
average size of the company reporting negative unexpected earnings. MV stands for
the average market capitalization , MVi for the market capitalization of the reporting
bank. Sign-test stands for a standard Binomial sign test, whereas ws-test stands for
the Wilcoxon sign test.
Banks
NOBS Event Date AR (%) p[t-test] p[sign-test] p[ws-test]
Panel A: Reporting Bank: MVi < MV
230 [0] -0.0715 0.0461 0.1312 0.0752
230 [1] -0.0161 0.8618 0.5784 0.5557
Panel B: Reporting Bank: MVi > MV
61 [0] -0.1324 0.0683 0.1528 0.0749
61 [1] -0.0951 0.1422 0.3045 0.2532
one can observe a strong negative reaction on the post event day if a large bank
is reporting a negative surprise, which is, however, not significant.14
In the next analysis, we also subdivide the competitor portfolio with respect
to the size of the competitor banks. Two disjoint portfolios are formed, one
containing smaller than average banks, the second bigger than average banks.
We repeat the analysis for these two subsamples first, considering all events, i.e.
not differentiating whether the reporting bank is a small or big one. Afterwards,
we further subdivide the sample by size of the reporting bank as in the analysis at
the beginning of this subsection. The results of this analysis are reported in Table
3.12.
The left part of the table displays the average abnormal earning surprises for the
portfolio of all big competitors, whereas the right part contains the results for the
small competitor portfolios. Panel A considers earning surprises at all banks. Panel
B and C subdivide this sample into events at big and small banking institutions.
When considering all earnings surprises, the average abnormal return of big
14We do not report the results for subsamples conditioning on the degree of earnings surprise
as in the previous section, as the number of events decreases fast, especially in the large bank
subsamples, yielding non informative results.
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competitor banks is with -0.1086 % smaller than the return of small competitor
banks of -0.0720 %, although this difference is not significant. The same is true
when analyzing the effects of negative surprises occurring at small banks. The big
competitor’s abnormal reaction is -0.0886 %, compared with -0.0616 % for small
banks. Both values are slightly smaller than the effects reported in Panel A,
considering all events. The biggest average abnormal return observed is displayed
in the left part of Panel B, i.e. effects of earnings surprises at big banks on big
competitor banks. On the event date, a value of -0.1842 % is observed, followed
by -0.1717 % on the subsequent day. Although these values indicate the strongest
spill-over potential between big banks, the significance levels are only moderate,
as the sample is small.
Overall, the results reported in this section indicate that the size of the banks
considered is an important factor regarding the strength of contagion effects. The
highest level of contagion is observed for big competitor banks when another big
bank experiences a negative earnings surprise.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we address the question of whether contagion is present in the
US banking sector, measured by stock price reaction following negative earnings
surprises. To put the results into perspective we compare the banking sector with
the non-banking sectors.
Applying traditional event study methodology we find that negative earnings
surprises are contagious in the banking sector. The degree of contagion is increased
by the degree of surprise. The abnormal return of the banks’ competitors portfolios
is on average -0.08 % for all negative surprises and increases up to -0.18 % for
greater earnings surprises. These results are significantly larger (in absolute terms)
than the average abnormal returns for the non-banking sectors. Earnings surprises
at important (big) banks cause more pronounced reactions at competitor banks
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than surprises at small banks. The highest degree of contagion is found for big
banks, reacting on negative news at another big bank.
Given the importance of a stable banking system for the real economy, the existence
of contagion effects makes it necessary to draw the attention of the regulator to
the entire system, rather than regulating on an individual bank level. Potential
contagion effects could translate through the banking system, leading to a systemic
crisis.
Analyzing the second highly regulated sector - the insurance sector - separately, we
do not find any signs of contagion in this sector. This finding supports the notion
that a systemic regulation of the insurance sector is less important compared to the
banking sector. The financial supervision should therefore focus on the banking
sector when aiming to implement a system-based regulation.
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Chapter 4
Portfolio Management in the
Presence of Systemic Risk
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we empirically investigate the consequences of the presence of
systemic risk on optimal asset allocation. In doing so, we consider systemic
risk on a domestic level, i.e. the risk of nation wide shocks, affecting all
companies of the domestic market heavily and, thus, causing the prices to jump
simultaneously. This problem is of high relevance for any investor as systemic
risk could spoil diversification benefits when the investor counts on it most. We
therefore investigate two main questions: first, how does the optimal stock portfolio
allocation change when taking systemic risk into account? - and second, what
does an investor lose by neglecting the presence of systemic risk in their portfolio
allocation decisions?
There exist few empirical studies on the asset allocation problem when taking
systemic risk explicitly into account. Furthermore, the findings of these studies
are not unambiguous. Ang and Bekaert (2002) propose a regime-switching model
in discrete time to account for the possibility of changing economic environments.
Using international stock index data they find that the costs of ignoring systemic
crises are small when no risk-free asset is available. However, if a risk-free asset
91
92
is investable, ignoring systemic effects becomes much more costly. Kole et al.
(2006) follow the idea of using a regime-switching model, but formulate the asset
allocation problem in continuous time. Using a data set of international stock
indices, including emerging markets, they conclude that the costs of ignoring the
possibility of systemic crises can be substantial. Alternatively to employing a
regime-switching model, Das and Uppal (2004) propose to incorporate the presence
of systemic risk by the occurrence of perfectly correlated price jumps. They study
the effects of global systemic risk for index portfolios of six developed and six
emerging markets, respectively. In an one-point in time analysis, they conclude
that the loss from neglecting systemic risk is small. Our paper is most closely
related to this work. We adopt their approach of modeling systemic risk using a
Poisson jump-diffusion model in continuous time.
We contribute to the literature on systemic risk and optimal portfolio choice
by extending the analysis of Das and Uppal (2004) in several directions. First,
we argue that risk arising from jumps should be more important in the case of
direct domestic equity investments into individual stocks, compared to the case
of national indices analyzed by these authors, as domestic wide crises occur more
frequently than global crises. Therefore, we conduct a study on a domestic basis,
assuming an investor who invests their entire wealth in the stocks composing a
major domestic stock index. In doing so, they can follow two different strategies:
a crisis conscious strategy, taking the existence of systemic risk explicitly into
account - or a crisis ignorant strategy, which disregards this type of risk.1 We then
analyze the differences of these two strategies with respect to portfolio composition,
return, and expected utility. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study
the effects of systemic risk on a direct stock market investment.
Second, we broaden the basis of the empirical findings by conducting an historical
simulation study and repeating the estimation and portfolio choice decisions. Our
results are thus less likely to be biased by current market conditions compared to
1The notion of crisis conscious and crisis ignorant is adopted from Kole et al. (2006).
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analyzing the portfolio decision at only one point in time.
Third, as we deal with up to 30 investable securities, we have to tackle the high
dimensionality of the optimization problem. To reduce the complexity of the
problem we make use of the decomposition technique developed by Aı¨t-Sahalia
et al. (2009) and show, how this methodology can be applied to a real world data
set in a factor model framework.
Fourth, we approach the estimation problem differently than Das and Uppal (2004)
and, furthermore, disentangle the effects arising from ignoring the existence of
systemic risk during the estimation of the processes’ parameters and the effect
emerging from the actual asset allocation decisions.
Our main results are as follows. We find that the crisis conscious investor tends
to take less extreme positions in the individual stocks compared with the crisis
ignorant investor. However, individual stock’s exposure can also increase, if the
stock is less exposed to systemic risk and thus provide diversification benefits.
Interestingly, the overall fraction of wealth invested in the risky stocks remains
relatively stable across the crisis conscious and the crisis ignorant strategy. When
analyzing the consequences of adhering to the crisis ignorant strategy, we find that
both, the loss in expected return, and the loss in expected utility, are significant
from a statistical as well as from an economical perspective.
The literature on optimal portfolio choice has been pioneered by Samuelson
(1969) in discrete time, companioned with the seminal work of Merton (1969)
in continuous time. Merton’s model has been extended along several directions.
Merton (1971) extends the original framework for more general utility functions
and the inclusion of jump processes, whereas Merton (1973) makes the asset
processes’ parameters stochastic themselves, yielding a stochastic opportunity set.
These ideas have been further developed. Kim and Omberg (1996) and Liu (2007)
study the portfolio choice problem for the case of stochastic opportunity sets and
generalizations of the original model with respect to the utility function as well as
the parameters’ processes.
Optimal portfolio choice for more than one risky asset, when generalizing the
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return process to jump-diffusion models, is further investigated by Aase (1984).
Liu et al. (2003) derive semi-analytical solutions for the allocation problem in the
case of one risky and one riskless asset with jumps occurring in the price as well
as in the volatility process, whereas Liu and Pan (2003) consider the case with
diffusive volatility only, but add derivatives to the market setting to allow for a
hedging of volatility risk.2
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the
stochastic framework and the solution to the optimal portfolio choice problem.
Section 4.3 develops the factor structure which estimation is set out in Section 4.4.
Section 4.5 describes the data used, Section 4.6 provides the estimation results.
In Section 4.7, we report and discuss the results of the portfolio choice decisions.
Section 4.8 concludes this chapter.
4.2 Stock Price Dynamics and Optimal Portfolio
Choice
4.2.1 Stock Price Dynamics
The study of diffusive stock price models incorporating jumps goes back to
Press (1967). Merton (1971) discusses first the implications of jumps present
in stock price processes on optimal portfolio choice in the context of stochastic
jump frequency but deterministic jump amplitude. The pricing of options when
stock prices follow a jump-diffusion process with stochastic jump amplitude was
considered first by Merton (1976). We will briefly review this framework. Merton
(1976) argues that the total variation of a stock price can be assumed to have
two components. First, as in the standard diffusive Black-Scholes model, a stock
2Further work on this field was done by Branger et al. (2008) who merge the former two
approaches into one paper. Other papers considering optimal portfolio choice with jump diffusion
processes are Wu (2003) and Cvitanic´ et al. (2008).
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price changes due to the ‘usual’ fluctuations of the market. As examples for these
‘usual’ fluctuations Merton mentions temporary imbalances in supply and demand,
changes in economic outlook, or, other new information having only a marginal
impact on the stock price. The second component of stock price changes are
‘unusual’ or ‘abnormal’ fluctuations in the market. These happen upon the arrival
of significant information related to the company and, thus, affect the stock price
strongly.
In the model proposed by Merton, the first component is modeled by a standard
geometric Brownian motion, the latter by a Poisson jump process. Let St be a
stock price at time t. Then the dynamics of St is assumed to follow the stochastic
differential equation
dSt = St[(r + α)dt+ σdZt + PtdNt(λ)], (4.1)
where r denotes the risk-free rate; α the excess drift (excess return), given that
no jump event occurs; σ the volatility conditioning on no jump occurrence; Zt is
a standard Brownian motion; and Nt(λ) a standard Poisson process with arrival
rate λ. The random percentage change in the stock price if a jump occurs is
given by the stochastic jump amplitude Pt, distributed on (−1,∞). All processes
are assumed to be mutually independent. Thus, E[PtdNt(λ))] = E[Pt]λdt and
V ar[PtdNt(λ)] = E[P
2
t ]λdt. The quantity ln(1 + Pt) equals the continuously
compounded return of the jump component and is assumed to follow a normal
distribution with mean η and variance ν2. Consequently, the quantity (1 + Pt)
follows a lognormal distribution. As long as no jump occurs, St is continuous and
follows the standard Black-Scholes dynamics dSt = St[(r+α)dt+σdZt]. However,
if a jump occurs, dSt = St[(r + α)dt + σdZt + Pt]. All the parameters r, α, σ, η,
ν, and λ are assumed to be constant over time.
The solution to this SDE is provided by Merton (1976, p. 129):
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St = S0e
(r+α− 1
2
σ2)t+σZtP˜ (Nt), (4.2)
with P˜ (Nt) = 1 if Nt = 0, i.e. no jump occurred between 0 and t, and
P˜ (Nt) =
∏Nt
i=1(1 + Pi) if Nt > 0, where Nt is the number of jumps between 0 and
t, distributed Poisson with parameter λt. As all the terms (1 + Pi), i = 1, ..., Nt,
are lognormal, St will be lognormal as well (for a known number of jumps). The
probability of j jumps is given by
P (Nt = j) =
(λt)j
j!
e−λt. (4.3)
As derived by Press (1967), the mean and variance of the log-return per unit time
can be computed as
r + α− 1
2
σ2 + λη, (4.4)
and
σ2 + λ(η2 + ν2). (4.5)
Following Das and Uppal (2004), the framework of Merton (1976) is adjusted to
explicitly model the possibility of a systemic crisis. This is achieved by considering
a model for n stocks, each of which follow the jump diffusion specification (4.1).
In order to have a true systemic component in the model, we assume that the
jump process is identical for each stock, i.e. if a jump occurs (corresponding to
a systemic event), each stock will react to this event, however with a different
sensitivity. Precisely, the price dynamics of stock i, i = 1, ..., n, is assumed to be
dSi,t
Si,t
= (r + αi)dt+ σ
′
idZt + ξiPtdNt(λ), (4.6)
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where most variables are defined as in (4.1), with the subscribed i distinguishing
among the stocks, and σi denoting the ith column of the matrix σ defined by
σσ′ = Σ; Σ being the covariance matrix of the n stock returns arising from the
pure diffusion part. dZt = [dZ1,t, ..., dZn,t]
′ denotes the vector of increments of n
orthogonal standard Brownian motions. Note that there does not exist a jump
process for each individual stock price, but each stock price is exposed to the same
jump process. Possible differences of the sensitivities of a stock with respect to
the systemic jump factor are captured in the non-stochastic vector ξ = [ξ1, ..., ξn]
′.
On the arrival of a systemic event, the stock price Si,t− will change to Si,t−ξiPt+.
4.2.2 Optimal Portfolio Choice
In this section, we present the solution of the portfolio problem in the spirit of
Merton (1969). We consider a constant opportunity set, i.e. the parameters of
the stochastic processes are constants. As described by Kim and Omberg (1996),
in the case of one risky asset, any of the two assumptions - an opportunity set
which is uncorrelated with the asset returns, or a logarithmic utility function - will
produce a myopic strategy with respect to the portfolio weights. As a constant
opportunity set is a special case of the first assumption, we expect to arrive at a
myopic solution.
Markets are assumed to be arbitrage-free and frictionless. Agents are pricetakers
with full information and without short sales restrictions. They do not receive any
income and optimize their expected utility with respect to their terminal wealth.
We assume the standard power utility function given by U(x) = x
1−γ
1−γ for the
investor. They can trade continuously in the n risky assets and one risk-free asset
with price S0, which can be characterized by the differential equation
dS0,t
S0,t
= rdt, (4.7)
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where r denotes the instantaneous risk-free rate, which is assumed to be constant.
Borrowing and short selling of the risk-free asset are allowed without any
restrictions.
The investor, initially endowed with wealth W0, invests a fraction ωi of their wealth
into asset i, i = 0, 1, ..., n. Consequently, the budget equation
∑n
i=0 ωi = 1 must
be satisfied at each point in time. The dynamics of the wealth is then given by
dWt = Wt[(ω
′
tα+ r)dt+ ω
′
tσdZt + ω
′
tξPtdNt(λ)], (4.8)
where Wt denotes the wealth process; ωt = [ω1,t, ..., ωn,t]
′ is the vector of portfolio
weights (of the risky assets); and α = [α1, ..., αn]
′ is the vector of excess returns.
The other variables are defined as in the previous section.
Solutions to the optimal portfolio problem for the cases with and without Poisson
jump process were derived in the seminal work of Merton (1969) and Merton
(1971), respectively, although in contrast to the presented framework, with
deterministic jump size.
The problem of choosing optimal portfolio weights ω∗ in order to maximize
expected utility over terminal wealth is given by
max
{ωt}
E0 [U(WT )] , (4.9)
subject to the budget constraint. The resulting maximization problem including
the jump process is given by:3
3See also Das and Uppal (2004, p. 2816). For a brief derivation see Appendix A.
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0 = max
{ωt}
{
b′(t)
b(t)
+ (1− γ)(r + ω′tα)−
1
2
γ(1− γ)ω′tΣωt
+λE
[
(1 + ω′tξPt)
1−γ − 1]}, (4.10)
where b(t) is a function of time only. The resulting first order condition for the
optimal portfolio weights is given by
0 = α− γΣω + λE[ξtPt(1 + ω′ξtPt)−γ]. (4.11)
As can be seen from (4.11), the solution coincides with the well known pure
diffusion case if λ = 0.
4.3 Factor Model
The first order condition (4.11) derived in the previous section is a system of n
non-linear equations. Das and Uppal (2004) solve these equations numerically to
compute the optimal portfolio weights for six national stock indices at one point
in time. As we wish to study in a real world example, the optimal portfolio
composition of a stock portfolio with more than six components and over time, a
straight numerical solving becomes infeasible in reasonable time. We thus apply
the decomposition technique proposed by Aı¨t-Sahalia et al. (2009). To do this, we
have to make further structural assumptions regarding the stock price dynamics,
which is assumed to be generated by a linear factor structure including jumps. In
the subsequent analysis, we consider the case of two market risk factors. There
exists one market wide jump risk factor and one continuous market wide risk
factor. Additionally there exist k sector specific risk factors. Each company of the
same sector has the same sensitivity towards the respective risk factors, including
the jump risk factor; the sensitivities of firms belonging to different sectors are,
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however, different.
We define the indicator function 1{i∈Kj} as
1{i∈Kj} =
 1, if i ∈ Kj0, if i /∈ Kj , (4.12)
where Kj is the set of indices of stocks in sector j. Then, the assumed factor model
is given by
dSi,t
Si,t
= (r + αi)dt+
k∑
j=1
βj1{i∈Kj}dZt +
k∑
j=1
γj1{i∈Kj}dBj,t
+
k∑
j=1
δj1{i∈Kj}dB
i
t +
k∑
j=1
ξj1{i∈Kj}PtdNt, (4.13)
where βj is the factor sensitivity towards the market risk factor of stocks belonging
to sector j; γj the factor sensitivity towards the sector risk factor
4; δj the
idiosyncratic risk factor sensitivity of stocks belonging to sector j; and ξj the jump
process sensitivity of stocks belonging to sector j. dZ, dBj, and dB
i denote the
increments of standard Brownian motions being pairwise orthogonal. As before,
Pt denotes the stochastic jump amplitude with domain (−1,∞); and dN the
increment of the systemic Poisson process with intensity λ.
The covariance of the pure diffusion part (i.e. λ = 0 in (4.13)) is then given by
4We commit a slight misuse of notation here, as γ already denotes the risk aversion coefficient.
No confusion should arise, as the meaning will be clear from the context.
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Cov
[
dSi1
Si1
,
dSi2
Si2
]
=

(β2j1 + γ
2
j1
+ δ2j1)dt if i1 ∈ Kj1 ∧ i1 = i2
(β2j1 + γ
2
j1
)dt if i1 ∈ Kj1 ∧ i2 ∈ Kj1 ∧ i1 6= i2
(βj1βj2)dt if i1 ∈ Kj1 ∧ i2 ∈ Kj2 ∧ j1 6= j2
.
(4.14)
The portfolio choice problem can be greatly simplified in the case of a covariance
matrix having a structure like (4.14), as described by Aı¨t-Sahalia et al. (2009). The
basic idea is to decompose the optimization problem in two orthogonal spaces, one
spanned by the jump component, and one being orthogonal to this space. Doing
so, it is possible to significantly reduce the optimization problem which has to
be solved numerically. In what follows, we briefly describe the decomposition
technique applying it to the simple case of two sectors with two companies each.
We choose this simple example to demonstrate the main idea as clear as possible.
The solution for k sectors, with mk firms each, is structurally similar.
For convenience, we define
ϑ2j = β
2
j + γ
2
j + δ
2
j , (4.15)
and
κ2j = β
2
j + γ
2
j . (4.16)
Then, the covariance matrix of the diffusion term is given by
Σ =

ϑ21 κ
2
1 β1β2 β1β2
κ21 ϑ
2
1 β1β2 β1β2
β1β2 β1β2 ϑ
2
2 κ
2
2
β1β2 β1β2 κ
2
2 ϑ
2
2
 .
This matrix is now decomposed into two matrices, one spanned by the same basis
as the jump vector and one spanning the orthogonal space
Σ = Σ¯ + Σ⊥(B), (4.17)
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where B denotes the basis spanned by the jump vector. In the case of two sectors
with two companies each, the basis is given by B = {[1, 1, 0, 0]′, [0, 0, 1, 1]′} . Thus,
Σ can be decomposed into
Σ¯ =

1
2
(ϑ21 + κ
2
1)
1
2
(ϑ21 + κ
2
1) β1β2 β1β2
1
2
(ϑ21 + κ
2
1)
1
2
(ϑ21 + κ
2
1) β1β2 β1β2
β1β2 β1β2
1
2
(ϑ22 + κ
2
2)
1
2
(ϑ22 + κ
2
2)
β1β2 β1β2
1
2
(ϑ22 + κ
2
2)
1
2
(ϑ22 + κ
2
2)
 , (4.18)
and
Σ⊥(B) =

1
2
(ϑ21 − κ21) −12(ϑ21 − κ21) 0 0
−1
2
(ϑ21 − κ21) 12(ϑ21 − κ21) 0 0
0 0 1
2
(ϑ22 − κ22) −12(ϑ22 − κ22)
0 0 −1
2
(ϑ22 − κ22) 12(ϑ22 − κ22)
 . (4.19)
The return vector α and the portfolio weights vector ω are decomposed on the
same basis, i.e. in this case:
α = α1

1
1
0
0
+ α2

0
0
1
1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡α
+α⊥(B), (4.20)
and
ω = ω1

1
1
0
0
+ ω2

0
0
1
1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ω
+ ω⊥(B). (4.21)
Plugging these decompositions into the part of (4.10) which is concerned with ω,
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we get the following maximization problem
max
{ω,ω⊥(B)}
(ω⊥(B))′α⊥(B) − γ
2
(ω⊥(B))′Σ⊥(B)ω⊥(B)
+ω′α− γ
2
ω′Σω +
λ
1− γE[(1 + ω
′ξPt)1−γ − 1]. (4.22)
As can be seen from (4.22), the problem separates into two problems; one for ω⊥(B)
which is given by the first line, and one for ω, which is given by the second.
By construction, the first problem with respect to ω⊥(B) does not involve any jump
components. Thus, the first order condition coincides with the case of no jump
risk and we have
0 = α⊥(B) − γΣ⊥(B)ω⊥(B)∗. (4.23)
As the elements sij of Σ
⊥(B) are zero if i and j belong to different sectors, the
system of linear equations can be solved sector by sector. The second optimization
problem lies in the jump vector space and must be solved numerically. The first
order condition is given by
0 = α− γΣω − λE[ξPt(1 + ω′ξPt)−γ]. (4.24)
Solving this equation numerically, we make use of the assumption that ln(1 + Pt)
is normally distributed.
At this point, the merits of applying the orthogonal decomposition of the portfolio
problem become obvious: compared to the first order condition (4.11) which has
to be solved for the ‘full’ model, the structural assumptions regarding the factor
structure of the stock price dynamics allow us to reduce the numerical burden
significantly. Precisely, the problem reduces from solving a system of n non-linear
equations, to a problem where we have to solve only a system of k equations, where
n is the number of stocks and k the number of sectors. Of course, this relief comes
at the price of the rather restrictive assumptions regarding the parameters of the
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price processes. As it is possible to refine the sector classification used one can
increase k up to n - at this point one arrives at the original ‘full’ problem. Thus,
deciding on the number of sectors is always a trade-off between computational
feasibility and more realistic structural assumptions.
4.4 Estimation
In this section, we describe our estimation approach for the presented model
capturing systemic risk via a common Poisson jump process. Various approaches
to estimate the parameters of jump-diffusion models have been proposed in the
literature. Press (1967) is one of the first to estimate the jump parameters of
univariate stock price series using the method of cumulants.
Ball and Torous (1983) suggest to estimate the parameters employing the method
of maximum likelihood.
If data is discretely sampled every change of value is a discrete jump. Thus, it is
an obvious question, whether it is possible to disentangle the continuous Brownian
motion components from that of the jump components employing likelihood-based
statistical methods without using additional information, e.g. derivatives prices.
This question is answered by Aı¨t-Sahalia (2004), who shows that it is indeed
asymptotically possible to distinguish continuous and jump parts with perfect
accuracy.5
As we cannot observe the continuous and jump factor separately, we need to
estimate a factor model with latent factors. To do so, we conduct a Kalman
filter-based maximum likelihood approach, which has been proposed by Kim et al.
(1994). The Kalman filter has the advantageous property of combining time-series
and cross-sectional information in an efficient way. For a detailed derivation and
5Honore´ (1998) points out, that without restrictions on the parameter space, the likelihood
function is unbounded. This issue is solved by constraining the optimization problem.
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discussion of the Kalman filter, see e.g. the standard references Harvey (1989) or
Hamilton (1994).
In general, we observe n stock returns yi,t, i = 1, ..., n, at each point in time t
(with possible missing values at the beginning of the sample period for some i).
A classification into k sectors results in k + 2 common risk factors. Precisely,
we have one market wide diffusion risk factor, k sector specific factors, and one
market wide jump risk factor. Note that we deviate from the previous convention
to print vectors and matrices bold, as all variables in the subsequent definitions are
multivariate. The definitions of these vectors and matrices are given thereafter.
The measurement equation for n observables and k+2 latent factors, respectively,
can be written as
yt
(n×1)
= H
(n×(k+2))
xt
((k+2)×1)
+ d
(n×1)
+ εt
(n×1)
. (4.25)
The vector d contains the expected returns for the n stocks; the matrix H contains
the sensitivities of each stock towards the k + 2 risk factors; εt captures the
idiosyncratic risk of each stock with
εt ∼ N(0,Ξ), Ξ = diag(δ).
For the transition equation we have
xt
((k+2)×1)
= G
((k+2)×(k+2))
xt−1
((k+2)×1)
+ c
((k+2)×1)
+ ψt
((k+2)×1)
, (4.26)
with
ψt ∼ N(0,W ), W = diag(σ).
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The types of variables x, y, d, δ, G, c, σ, and H are specified as:
yt = [y1,t, ..., yn,t]
′
xt = [∆Zt,∆B
1
t , ...,∆B
k
t ,∆Jt]
′
d = [d1, ..., dn]
′
δ = [δ21, ..., δ
2
1, δ
2
2, ..., δ
2
k−1, δ
2
k, ..., δ
2
k]
′
G = 0k+2
c = [0, ..., 0, jη]′
σ = [1, ..., 1, jν2]′
H =

β1 γ1 0 · · · 0 ξ1
...
...
...
...
...
β1 γ1 0 ξ1
β2 0 γ2 ξ2
...
...
... · · · ... ...
...
...
... · · · ... ...
βk−1 0 ξk−1
βk γk ξk
...
...
...
...
...
βk 0 0 · · · γk ξk

The matrix G is specified as (k + 2) × (k + 2) zero matrix, as we assume no
autocorrelation present in the stock returns. The variable j = 0, 1, ..., N in the
definitions of c and σ represents the possible number of jumps occurred in one
observation step. Its role will become more clear after writing down the likelihood
function.
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Note that, in order to avoid excessive notation, we have dropped the time
subscribed. However, in order to deal with missing observations we implement
the Kalman filter with time varying size of H, d, and Ξ. Reducing the size of the
matrices whenever an observation is missing conveniently deals with the problem
of gaps in the time series.
Collecting all parameters to be estimated in the set Ψ = (H, d, δ, c, σ), we can now
write down the (log-)likelihood function which needs to be maximized:
L(y; Ψ) =
T∑
t=1
log
N∑
j=1
e−λλj
j!
(2pi)−n/2|Ft,j|−1/2e− 12v′t,jF
−1
t,j vt,j . (4.27)
The variable vt,j denotes the prediction error, i.e. vt,j = yt − Et−1[yt], and Ft,j
the corresponding covariance matrix. Both quantities directly emerge from the
Kalman filter iterations.6
Since our data is sampled discretely, the theoretical likelihood function would
involve an infinite sum. We thus have to decide on a cut-off point, N , for practical
implementation of the estimation. Increasing the value of N improves the finite
approximation but also increases the computational burden.
In their univariate setting, Ball and Torous (1985) used N = 10, corresponding to
a maximum number of ten shocks per month for one stock. As systemic shocks
occur less frequent than individual shocks (as every systemic shock affects every
company, but not vice versa), we use N = 3 in the subsequent analysis.7
6For the precise iteration through prediction and updating equations in the filtering algorithm
see Harvey (1989), p. 104-106.
7As a robustness check we have also estimated our model with N = 4 for several data sets
yielding very similar results to N = 3 not improving the fit statistically significant. Thus, one
could expect small marginal value of increasing N further.
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4.5 Data
We analyze the effects of systemic risk for the case of an investor whose investment
universe comprises the stocks listed in the German DAX 30. For instance, this
investor could be a mutual fund investing in German blue chips.
We sample end of month price data, which is adjusted for dividends, stock splits,
and right issues.8 As sample period we use the time spanning from January, 1998
to December, 2007. This means we cover a time span of 10 years, yielding a
maximum number of 120 observations per stock. The price series are transformed
to log return series by yt = log(St/St−1) where St denotes the stock price and
yt the return at time t. Table 4.1 reports descriptive summary statistics of the
return data used. For 24 companies, we obtain a complete time series, whereas for
Hypo Real Estate, Daimler, Deutsche Postbank, Deutsche Post, Deutsche Bo¨rse
and Infineon we must rely on a smaller number of observations.
For most stocks, we observe a positive mean return during our sample period.
Allianz shows a mean return which is slightly below zero; the only stock with a
strong negative mean return is Infineon. The standard deviations of most of the log
returns lie between 25 % and 40 %. Only Postbank and Eon show lower dispersion,
whereas Commerzbank, SAP, and Infineon exhibit a higher volatility, the latter
with the maximum observed value of 61 %. All but the return series of Hypo Real
Estate, SAP, and Fresenius, show a negative skew, i.e. exhibiting a longer left tail,
making large negative returns more likely than large positive returns. The kurtosis,
is mostly larger than three, indicating leptokurtic return distributions. Only Linde
and Volkswagen exhibit tails which are slightly lighter compared to the Normal
distribution. The highest kurtosis is observed for Mu¨nchner Ru¨ck, Lufthansa,
and Commerzbank. The last column shows the p-value of the Jarque-Bera test
of normality. For 18 series we can reject the null hypothesis of normality at the
5 % significance level. For two additional stocks this can be done at the 10 %
8The data source is Thomson Financial Datastream.
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Table 4.2: Sector Classification
This table displays the sector classification. It is based on the Industry Classification
Benchmark (on the first level) and was slightly modified by merging the sectors basic
materials and healthcare, as well as telecommunications and technology.
I Basic Materials / Healthcare IV Consumer Services
1 BASF 16 DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA
2 BAYER 17 METRO
3 FRESENIUS MED.CARE 18 TUI
4 LINDE
5 MERCK KGAA V Telecommunications / Technology
19 SAP
II Industrials 20 INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES
21 DEUTSCHE TELEKOM
6 DEUTSCHE POST
7 MAN VI Utilities
8 SIEMENS
9 THYSSENKRUPP 22 RWE
23 E ON
III Consumer Goods VII Financials
10 ADIDAS 24 ALLIANZ
11 BMW 25 HYPO REAL ESTATE HLDG.
12 DAIMLER 26 COMMERZBANK
13 CONTINENTAL 27 MUENCHENER RUCK.
14 HENKEL PREF. 28 DEUTSCHE POSTBANK
15 VOLKSWAGEN 29 DEUTSCHE BANK
30 DEUTSCHE BOERSE
level. Thus, we conclude that the usually observed stylized facts of stock returns,
namely a negative skew and heavy tails, are also present in our data set. It is
also well established that these facts are less pronounced for data sampled with a
lower frequency. It is worth noting that the negative skewness and positive excess
kurtosis cannot be explained in a linear factor model if we consider Brownian
motions only. However, a Poisson jump process with negative expected jump
amplitude is able to generate returns showing exactly the features observed. As
the statistics in Table 4.1 are solely based on an univariate analysis, we cannot
distinguish between idiosyncratic and systemic jumps in the data at this point.
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To implement our factor model, we have to define the sectors. Basically, one can
imagine two main approaches to do this. First, one could group the stocks based on
some economic criterion, e.g. the sector in which the company operates. Second,
one could imagine to follow a data driven strategy, and group the stocks by some
statistical approach aiming to best match the structural assumptions imposed in
the proposed model. As the latter proposal could be characterized as data mining
and is without intuition, we decided to follow the first approach and group the
stocks according to their sector belongings.
The grouping of the companies is done according to the Industry Classification
Benchmark (ICB)9 which classifies all companies into one of the 10 industries:
oil & gas, basic materials, industrials, consumer goods, health care, consumer
services, telecommunications, utilities, financials, and technology. For the oil & gas
sector, we do not have any observations. For the healthcare, telecommunication,
and technology sectors, we have, at maximum, two companies each. Thus, we
decided to group these sectors further to have a sufficient amount of observations
for each class. As most of the companies of the basic materials sector operate in
the healthcare sector as well,10 we decided to assign the health care companies to
the basic materials sector. Regarding the technology sector, we think that it is
most closely related to the telecommunications sector, and we thus merge these
two industry sectors. In the utilities sector we also only observe two companies.
However, as we have the entire time series available for both companies and as
the utilities sector is special amongst the other sectors we decided not to merge it
with another industry. The final sector classification is displayed in Table 4.2. We
use the numerical sector identifiers I through VII in the following discussion. The
numbering 1 through 30 of the individual companies is used to identify individual
stocks.
9See www.icbenchmark.com.
10Pharmaceuticals & biotechnology is a subsector of the healthcare industry sector.
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4.6 Estimation Results
First, we estimate the complete model including a market wide jump factor as
described in the previous section. Additionally, we estimate the standard pure
diffusion model, i.e. without the existence of Poisson jumps to have a comparison
and benchmark at hand. Table 4.3 displays the results of this estimation.
The estimated average returns per month from the continuous part of the model
are reported in the left part of the table. Compared with the pure diffusion model,
all drift estimates are higher in the jump diffusion model. The reason for this
becomes immediately visible by examining the parameters of the jump component.
The expected mean jump size η is clearly below zero with a value of -11.23 %. Thus,
in order to compensate for the existence of negative jumps, the individual drift
parameters must be adjusted upwards (see also equation 4.4) to fit the time series.
Interestingly, the drift parameter of Allianz (d24), which is negative in the purely
continuous model, changes its sign by introducing systemic jumps, indicating that
the negative mean return observed for this company can be attributed to systemic
events.
To get an impression of the importance of the systemic jumps, we report the mean
jump return η and its volatility ν scaled by the respective sensitivities ξj in Table
4.4. The sensitivity of the financial sector (VII) towards the systemic jump factor
is among the highest of all sectors. The expected jump size upon the arrival of a
systemic event is -5.48 % with a standard deviation of 15.11 %. According to the
large standard deviation, it is very likely not only to observe joint negative jumps,
but also joint upwards movements. Taking into account the large variability of
the jump returns, a heavy shock, causing the jump return realizing two standard
deviations below its mean would cause all financial stock prices to drop by 36 %
simultaneously.
The arrival rate of systemic events is estimated as 0.1583. This means we expect
the occurrence of such an event every 7 months on average. Estimating a jump
diffusion model with perfectly correlated jumps for six countries, Das and Uppal
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Table 4.3: Estimated Parameters
This table reports the estimation results of of the systemic jump model for the DAX
stocks as well as for the same data, neglecting the possibility of a systemic jump.
The left part gives the results for the average returns per month di of each stock, the
right reports the estimation results for the volatility and jump process parameters. βj
denotes the sensitivities towards the market wide continuous factor; γj the sensitivities
towards the sector factors; δj the sensitivities towards the idiosyncratic factors; η and
ν the mean and standard deviation of the jump factor; and λ the jump intensity.
Parameter Systemic Jump Diffusion Parameter Systemic Jump Diffusion
d1 0.0165 0.0113 β1 0.0410 0.0548
d2 0.0120 0.0070 β2 0.0622 0.0760
d3 0.0116 0.0059 β3 0.0544 0.0564
d4 0.0118 0.0063 β4 0.0394 0.0694
d5 0.0147 0.0099 β5 0.0543 0.0839
d6 0.0074 0.0019 β6 0.0281 0.0332
d7 0.0214 0.0152 β7 0.0455 0.0737
d8 0.0155 0.0092 γ1 0.0207 0.0214
d9 0.0149 0.0091 γ2 0.0047 0.0001
d10 0.0080 0.0039 γ3 0.0231 0.0305
d11 0.0110 0.0073 γ4 0.0047 0.0001
d12 0.0065 0.0034 γ5 0.0473 0.0476
d13 0.0176 0.0139 γ6 0.0489 0.0487
d14 0.0101 0.0065 γ7 0.0291 0.0337
d15 0.0168 0.0128 δ1 0.0671 0.0671
d16 0.0107 0.0033 δ2 0.0719 0.0716
d17 0.0139 0.0055 δ3 0.0624 0.0623
d18 0.0087 0.0006 δ4 0.0706 0.0728
d19 0.0127 0.0046 δ5 0.1065 0.1069
d20 -0.0067 -0.0147 δ6 0.0378 0.0384
d21 0.0079 -0.0003 δ7 0.0654 0.0653
d22 0.0119 0.0084 ξ1 0.3023 -
d23 0.0143 0.0102 ξ2 0.3642 -
d24 0.0076 -0.0009 ξ3 0.2184 -
d25 0.0193 0.0110 ξ4 0.4853 -
d26 0.0081 0.0005 ξ5 0.5227 -
d27 0.0087 0.0005 ξ6 0.2029 -
d28 0.0120 0.0022 ξ7 0.4881 -
d29 0.0140 0.0054 η -0.1123 -
d30 0.0345 0.0266 ν 0.3095 -
λ 0.1583 -
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Table 4.4: Jump Amplitudes
This table reports the estimated jump amplitudes as well as their estimated standard
deviations. Each column corresponds to one of the sectors considered, using the
numerical identifiers introduced in Table 4.2.
I II III IV V VI VII
mean jump return -0.0339 -0.0409 -0.0245 -0.0545 -0.0587 -0.0228 -0.0548
standard deviation 0.0936 0.1127 0.0676 0.1502 0.1618 0.0628 0.1511
(2004) report a jump arrival rate of 5 %, which corresponds to a systemic event
every 20 months. Naturally, the arrival of a systemic event in one country should
be more likely than in six countries simultaneously. Thus, we conclude that the
estimated value for λ is of reasonable size.
Surprisingly, the consumer services sector (IV) also shows a high exposure to
systemic risk. The sector with the largest sensitivity, and therefore the largest
jump component, is the telecommunications / technology sector (V), which is less
unexpected. The lowest sensitivity towards the systemic shock is carried by the
utilities sector (VI), exhibiting an expected return upon the arrival of abnormal
news of only -2.28 %.
Inspecting the volatility parameters βj, γj, δj of the continuous part of the model,
we can observe smaller values for the systematic risk factors βj in the jump diffusion
case, which, as in the case of the drift parameters, compensate for the existence
of the systemic jump factor (see equation (4.5)). The sector specific continuous
part γj changes slightly between the two models, with no clear direction of sign.
The coefficients for the industrials, as well as for the consumer services sector, γ2
respectively γ4, are very close to zero for both models. On the other hand, the
corresponding idiosyncratic sensitivities δ2 and δ4 are relatively high, which may
be a sign for a rather weak link between the companies of these two sectors. For
all sectors the idiosyncratic risk does not change considerably.
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4.7 Optimal Portfolios
In this section, we present the results of the portfolio choice problem and discuss
their implications. First, we analyze the changes of optimal portfolio weights when
considering or neglecting the presence of systemic risk in the German market. We
then disentangle the different effects caused by optimization and estimation. In the
third part, we study the consequences of neglecting systemic risk in an historical
simulation approach. As a robustness check, we then repeat the analysis for the
US stock market.
4.7.1 Optimal Portfolio Weights
For the first static analysis, we assume that the portfolio of stocks to be invested
in consists of all DAX companies at the beginning of 2008. Using the methodology
presented in the previous sections, we compute the optimal portfolio weights given
the estimated parameters for an investor incorporating the risk of systemic events
vis-a`-vis an investor neglecting this possibility. We call the former the crisis
conscious investor, whereas the latter is called the crisis ignorant investor. Note
that the crisis ignorant investor already neglects the possibility of systemic jumps
when estimating the model’s parameters. The risk-free rate used is the one month
Libor rate on the euro, which is 4.28 % on an annual basis at the end of our
estimation period, December 2007, which is the hypothetical investment date of
our DAX investor.
Table 4.5 reports the results for risk aversion coefficients of three, five, and seven.
For each stock, we report the optimal portfolio weights for the systemic crisis
conscious investor in the left column and the optimal weights for an investor
neglecting potential systemic risk, the crisis ignorant investor, in the right column.
In the penultimate row, the table displays the overall investment in risky assets
for the respective cases. Considering the case for γ = 3 first, we see that the
crisis conscious investor optimally invests slightly more than their entire wealth
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into stocks.11 The same is true for the crisis ignorant investor, who invests only
minimally more than the former one. This result is in line with the finding of Das
and Uppal (2004, p. 2823), who report only minimal changes in the overall risky
portions invested. When increasing the level of risk aversion the decrease of the
risky investment fraction is of almost equal relative size for both cases. For a γ of
five, the investor puts around 60 % of his wealth at risk, for a γ of seven around
42 % remain invested in the stocks.12
The last row of Table 4.5 reports the similarity across strategies considering the
risky part of the investment, computed as
∆ω =
30∑
i=1
|ωiconscious − ωiignorant|
1
2
30∑
i=1
|ωiconscious + ωiignorant|
. (4.28)
The value of this similarity measure increases from 0.38 to 0.45 when increasing
the risk aversion coefficient from three to seven. Thus, one can observe a bigger
difference in portfolio selection for increasing risk aversion. Consequently, the
influence of the systemic risk component on portfolio selection is increasing in γ.
Inspecting the individual portfolio weights, we observe that in most instances, as
one would expect, the absolute weights decrease for the crisis conscious portfolio.
In 12 cases this can be observed for long, in 15 cases for short positions. Three
positions do not behave according to this general pattern. First, we can observe
the fraction of wealth invested in BMW changing from a long to a short position,
although on a very small scale. Second, and more pronounced, the investment in
the stock of Metro is changing from a short position of -5.49 % to a long position
11Note that, a levered position of the crisis conscious investors can occur due to the employed
finite approximation of the normal distribution when computing optimal portfolio weights.
Theoretically, a levered or short overall position is never chosen by the investor, in order to
avoid negative wealth. See Liu et al. (2003) on this issue.
12For the crisis ignorant investor, this effect has to hold as the optimal portfolio weights are
inversely proportional related to the risk aversion coefficient. For the crisis conscious investor, it
is, however, less clear what to expect.
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Table 4.5: Portfolio Weights
This table reports the optimal portfolio weights computed for both, the case considering
systemic risk and the case neglecting systemic risk. The former was determined
numerically as described in Section 4.3 and is reported in the left columns. The
later can be computed analytically and is reported in the right columns.
γ = 3 γ = 5 γ = 7
ωconscious ωignorant ωconscious ωignorant ωconscious ωignorant
1 D:BAS 0.2548 0.3474 0.1490 0.2085 0.1044 0.1489
2 D:BAY 0.0025 0.0321 0.0045 0.0192 0.0031 0.0137
3 D:FME -0.0249 -0.0487 -0.0112 -0.0292 -0.0079 -0.0209
4 D:LIN -0.0118 -0.0230 -0.0037 -0.0138 -0.0026 -0.0098
5 D:MRK 0.1511 0.2444 0.0895 0.1466 0.0627 0.1047
6 D:DPW -0.2503 -0.3166 -0.1347 -0.1900 -0.0950 -0.1357
7 D:MAN 0.3506 0.5488 0.2032 0.3293 0.1401 0.2352
8 D:SIE 0.0962 0.1552 0.0602 0.0931 0.0406 0.0665
9 D:TKA 0.0689 0.1526 0.0448 0.0915 0.0299 0.0654
10 D:ADS -0.1592 -0.2771 -0.0873 -0.1663 -0.0602 -0.1188
11 D:BMW -0.0002 0.0144 0.0014 0.0086 0.0013 0.0062
12 D:DAI -0.2378 -0.3257 -0.1312 -0.1954 -0.0907 -0.1396
13 D:CON 0.3504 0.5767 0.1971 0.3460 0.1370 0.2472
14 D:HEN3 -0.0512 -0.0552 -0.0270 -0.0331 -0.0184 -0.0237
15 D:VOW 0.3108 0.4848 0.1750 0.2909 0.1217 0.2078
16 D:LHA -0.1129 -0.1973 -0.0719 -0.1184 -0.0446 -0.0846
17 D:MEO 0.0624 -0.0549 0.0297 -0.0330 0.0269 -0.0235
18 D:TUI1 -0.2293 -0.3680 -0.1394 -0.2208 -0.0921 -0.1577
19 D:SAP 0.0983 0.1224 0.0546 0.0735 0.0380 0.0525
20 D:IFX -0.3405 -0.4420 -0.1969 -0.2652 -0.1383 -0.1894
21 D:DTE -0.0105 -0.0223 -0.0077 -0.0134 -0.0057 -0.0095
22 D:RWE 0.1615 0.0366 0.0988 0.0220 0.0687 0.0157
23 D:EOA 0.3771 0.4349 0.2143 0.2610 0.1477 0.1864
24 D:ALV -0.3745 -0.5813 -0.2110 -0.3488 -0.1469 -0.2491
25 D:HRX 0.2589 0.3528 0.1467 0.2117 0.1023 0.1512
26 D:CBK -0.3460 -0.4670 -0.1949 -0.2802 -0.1357 -0.2001
27 D:MUV2 -0.3097 -0.4667 -0.1744 -0.2800 -0.1214 -0.2000
28 D:DPB -0.1336 -0.3328 -0.0750 -0.1997 -0.0521 -0.1426
29 D:DBK -0.0240 -0.0823 -0.0131 -0.0494 -0.0090 -0.0353
30 D:DB1 1.0732 1.5663 0.6065 0.9398 0.4226 0.6713
Σ 1.0003 1.0085 0.5959 0.6050 0.4264 0.4324
∆ω 0.3801 0.4218 0.4480
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of 6.24 %, which means it does not only change the sign but also increases in
absolute terms. Third, the portfolio weight of the investment in the stock of RWE
increases from 3.66 % to 16.15 %. As for the entire risky investment, an increase
in risk aversion leads to a pure scaling effect - not changing the overall results.
The only qualitative differences observable are that the portfolio weight of BMW
changes to a long position for the crisis conscious case and that the weight of Bayer
increases to 0.0045 for γ = 5 and falling back to 0.0031 for γ = 7.
To examine the consequences on a sectorial level, we report the aggregated portfolio
weights for each sector in Table 4.6. As for the case of the weights for single
stocks, we can observe different reactions when changing from crisis ignorant to
crisis conscious portfolio weights. The weights for the basic materials / healthcare,
industrials, and consumer goods sectors are positive and decrease when changing
to the crisis conscious strategy. The consumer services and telecommunications /
technology sectors exhibit short positions which decrease on an absolute basis. The
investment fraction in the utilities sector is positive and increases when changing
strategies which is due to the sharp increase of the weight of the RWE investment.
The portfolio weight of the financial sector, in contrast, changes from a small
negative position of -1.10 % to a positive position of 14.43 %.
We thus conclude, although the overall position in risky stocks does not differ
substantially under the two different approaches, in most instances the crisis
conscious investor chooses less extreme portfolio weights but might also decide
to hold bigger position in stocks, which are less exposed to systemic risk compared
to the other investment alternatives.
4.7.2 Disentangling Estimation and Optimization Effects
So far we have compared the portfolio weights of the crisis conscious investor with
the weights of the crisis ignorant investor obtained by estimating the processes
parameters already assuming the nonexistence of jumps for the crisis ignorant
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investor. Thus, we cannot be sure whether the differences in the individual weights
are due to the fact that the investor takes the possibility of systemic events into
account when choosing their optimal portfolio weights or due to differences arising
from the consideration of systemic jump events when estimating the parameters.
To disentangle these two effects, we recalculate the optimal portfolio weights of
the crisis ignorant investor by using the process parameters obtained from the
estimation of the systemic jump diffusion model, adjusting these to match the
mean vector and covariance matrix of a pure diffusion model. This is achieved
by using formula (4.4) and (4.5). We call the strategy using these portfolio
weights the ‘moment matching’ strategy. Overall, we now compare three different
strategies: (a) the crisis conscious strategy, considering systemic risk in estimation
and optimization. (b) the crisis ignorant strategy, neglecting systemic risk in
estimation and optimization. (c) the moment matching strategy, considering
systemic risk in estimation but not optimization.
The portfolio weights for the case of a risk aversion coefficient of γ = 3 are provided
in Table 4.7. In the first two columns, ωC (crisis conscious) and ωI (crisis ignorant),
the results of the original optimizations are displayed. The third column ωMM ,
contains the optimal portfolio weights of the moment matching strategy which
matches the mean and covariance of the pure diffusion model to the estimated
model including jumps. This allows us to decompose the estimation and the
optimization effect. The column ∆Syst reports the difference of ωC and ωI , and
equates the overall effect of ignoring systemic risk in the estimation, as well as
during optimization when choosing optimal portfolio weights. This difference is
decomposed in the columns ∆Opt and ∆Est using the identity
∆Syst = ∆Est + ∆Opt. (4.29)
The quantity ∆Opt captures the difference of the crisis conscious ωC and the
moment matching strategy ωMM and is thus attributable to the portfolio
optimization. It remedies any effect from the estimation as the same parameters
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Table 4.7: Effects of Estimation
This table reports the optimal portfolio weights for the pure diffusion case computed
using the parameters from the pure diffusion estimation and the ones using the
parameters from the jump-diffusion estimation adjusted by moment matching. The
risk aversion coefficient is set to γ = 3. The columns ωC , ωI , and ωMM denote
the optimal portfolio weights of the crisis conscious, crisis ignorant, and the moment
matching strategies. ∆Syst is the difference of crisis conscious and crisis ignorant
(ωC−ωI), ∆Opt the difference of crisis conscious and moment matching (ωC−ωMM ),
and ∆Est the difference of the moment matching and crisis ignorant strategy (ωMM −
ωI).
ωC ωI ωMM ∆Syst ∆Opt ∆Est
1 D:BAS 0.25 0.35 0.36 -0.09 -0.11 0.01
2 D:BAY 0.00 0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.00
3 D:FME -0.02 -0.05 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.04
4 D:LIN -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.03
5 D:MRK 0.15 0.24 0.22 -0.09 -0.07 -0.02
6 D:DPW -0.25 -0.32 -0.38 0.07 0.13 -0.06
7 D:MAN 0.35 0.55 0.52 -0.20 -0.17 -0.03
8 D:SIE 0.10 0.16 0.14 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02
9 D:TKA 0.07 0.15 0.10 -0.08 -0.03 -0.05
10 D:ADS -0.16 -0.28 -0.25 0.12 0.10 0.02
11 D:BMW 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
12 D:DAI -0.24 -0.33 -0.38 0.09 0.14 -0.05
13 D:CON 0.35 0.58 0.56 -0.23 -0.21 -0.01
14 D:HEN3 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08 0.00 0.03 -0.02
15 D:VOW 0.31 0.48 0.50 -0.17 -0.19 0.01
16 D:LHA -0.11 -0.20 -0.23 0.08 0.12 -0.04
17 D:MEO 0.06 -0.05 -0.02 0.12 0.08 0.04
18 D:TUI1 -0.23 -0.37 -0.37 0.14 0.14 0.00
19 D:SAP 0.10 0.12 0.11 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
20 D:IFX -0.34 -0.44 -0.46 0.10 0.12 -0.02
21 D:DTE -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.01
22 D:RWE 0.16 0.04 -0.02 0.12 0.18 -0.06
23 D:EOA 0.38 0.43 0.52 -0.06 -0.14 0.08
24 D:ALV -0.37 -0.58 -0.56 0.21 0.18 0.02
25 D:HRX 0.26 0.35 0.35 -0.09 -0.09 0.00
26 D:CBK -0.35 -0.47 -0.52 0.12 0.18 -0.05
27 D:MUV2 -0.31 -0.47 -0.48 0.16 0.17 -0.01
28 D:DPB -0.13 -0.33 -0.22 0.20 0.08 0.12
29 D:DBK -0.02 -0.08 -0.06 0.06 0.04 0.02
30 D:DB1 1.07 1.57 1.54 -0.49 -0.46 -0.03
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are used. ∆Est is the difference of ωMM and ωI , representing the difference
due to estimating different models. Note that as the difference due to the
portfolio optimization may be bigger than the overall difference, the difference
due to estimation effects might have a different sign than the difference due to
optimization. Actually, this is observed in 17 instances meaning that in these
cases the differences due to different estimation procedures are mitigated and
not enhanced. In 22 cases the absolute difference originating from portfolio
optimization is bigger than the differences due to estimation, indicating that the
former effect is dominant. However, it is difficult to make out any general pattern.
Thus, we conclude that the differences due to the estimation procedure seem not to
cause a systematic bias, yet alter the optimal portfolio weights quite substantially
and should also be taken into account.
4.7.3 Consequences of Neglecting Systemic Risk
To investigate the consequences of following the crisis ignorant strategy - opposed
to the crisis conscious strategy - we conduct an historical simulation study. More
precisely, we repeat the estimation and optimization analysis procedure for the
past 17 years on a monthly basis.
We first obtain the composition of the DAX at the beginning of each month from
1991 to 2007.13 The DAX was first published on December 30th, 1987. The
composition changed 20 times due to mergers, take-overs, IPOs, or because of
normal changes due to revised rankings with regard to the selection criteria.14 An
13This information is freely available on the website of the Deutsche Bo¨rse AG.
14To be included in the DAX, the following prerequisite must be fulfilled (see website of the
Deutsche Bo¨rse AG for more detailed information): The stock must be listed in the Prime
Standard segment, be traded continuously on Xetra, show a free float portion of at least 5
percent and be headquartered (operating or registered headquarter) in Germany. Among all
companies fulfilling these prerequisites, 30 are selected based on the two main criteria, order
book turnover on Xetra and in Frankfurt floor trading, and free float market capitalization as at
a certain reporting date.
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overview about the DAX composition as of 01/01/1991 is given in Table 4.13 in
Appendix B.
The deletions and additions until 31/12/2007 are reported in Table 4.15. In total
we consider 47 companies. Additionally, we sample stock price information for
each of these 47 companies during our sample period. Continuously compounded
returns are again calculated adjusting for dividends, stock splits, and right issues.
We commence the historical simulation in 1991 for two reasons. First, we need
sufficient historical data to estimate the parameters of our model and therefore
need time series information prior to the first investment date. Second, before 1991
two companies were listed in the DAX, for which we could not obtain historical
data (Feldmu¨hle Nobel and Nixdorf).
The details of our historical simulation are as follows: at the end of each month, we
estimate the parameters of the crisis conscious as well as the crisis ignorant model
for the 30 stocks, currently listed in the DAX at this point in time. We use up to
ten years of data for each stock, and require at least five years to be available. If
less than five years are available, we exclude the stock from the portfolio until the
required amount of data is available (this occurs mainly for IPOs directly entering
the DAX). The minimal number of stocks considered is 23, on average 27.8 stocks
enter into the investor’s portfolio. Additionally, we compute the moment matching
parameters for the jump-diffusion model to yield a pure diffusion distribution with
identical first and second moments as described in the previous section.
Using these parameter sets, we compute the optimal portfolio weights for the three
different cases: (a) crisis-conscious, (b) crisis-ignorant, and (c) moment matching,
i.e. crisis-conscious in the estimation but crisis-ignorant in the optimization. As
risk-free rate we employ the prevailing one month Libor rate for the euro obtained
from the British Banker’s Association.15 Using these portfolio weights ωi,t,s of
the nt stocks considered, we obtain for each month t the portfolio return of the
15See http://www.bba.org.uk.
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respective portfolios yt,s, s ∈ {a, b, c}, by
yt,s =
nt∑
i=0
ωi,t,syi,t, (4.30)
where yi,t, i = 1, ..., nt, is the return of the ith stock; y0,t is the risk-free rate; and
ω0,t,s = 1−
∑nt
i=1 ωi,t,s.
In total we obtain 194 monthly return observations for each strategy.16 Table 4.8
reports the summary statistics of these realized portfolio returns for risk aversion
coefficients between three and seven.
The mean monthly return of the crisis conscious strategy lies between 0.24 % and
0.41 % for the different levels of risk aversion. The dispersion is comparatively high.
In contrast, the mean return of the crisis ignorant strategy is smaller, ranging from
-0.90 % to -0.34 % and thus, is even negative. The dispersion is higher compared to
the crisis conscious case and thus, amplifying the difference of returns per unit risk
calculated as µ/σ compared with simple returns. Higher median than mean returns
indicate a skew of the distributions to the left. The lower and upper quartile are
much more extreme in the crisis ignorant case. The third case, estimating the
parameters using the jump-diffusion model, matching the first two moments to
a diffusion model and choosing weights ignoring the possibility of systemic risk,
yields very similar results to the crisis ignorant strategy.17
16As we consider 17 years of monthly data we started with 204 observations. However, 10
months were discarded as the numerical optimization were notoriously unstable in these instances.
17We do not want to conceal a caveat applying to our study. It is well known in the literature
that optimal portfolio choices do not perform well in practice. Very simple heuristical rules, like
the naive 1/N strategy continue to outperform vast varieties of optimal strategies - beginning
from Markowitz mean-variance portfolios throughout more complex strategies. Recent and
detailed evidence on this observation is given by DeMiguel et al. (2007) who implement and
benchmark a broad range of strategies to finally concluding that 1/N outperforms for most data
sets considered. This is mainly due to the difficulties when estimating the correct parameters
of complex models. The same is true for our strategies, including the crisis conscious strategy.
The naive approach of investing equal fractions of wealth into the available stocks yields better
results in terms of expected return, risk adjusted return as well as expected utility. Therefore, we
emphasize that we do not want to argue that the presented strategy should be used for managing
a real investment portfolio. The goal of our study is to analyze the effects of neglecting systemic
risk relative to considering systemic risk when forming investment portfolios. Thus our results
are important, as they show that systemic risk can deteriorate investment results substantially.
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To get a better impression of the overall distribution of returns, we plot in Figure
4.1 the histograms of the three cases for a risk aversion coefficient of three. One
can clearly observe the consequence of neglecting the existence of possible systemic
events. Extreme returns in the upper and lower tails become much more likely
where returns close to the mean return decrease in quantity. Thus, even though
having an equal degree of risk aversion, the investor who ignores systemic jumps
suffers under a much higher dispersion of monthly portfolio returns.
The portfolio choice optimization in our study is based on an investor choosing
portfolio weights in order to maximize expected utility. Thus, it is most
appropriate to compare the results of the strategies with respect to the utility
realized by the investors. Having an empirical distribution of realized wealth at
hand, we can compute the utility right away. As utility numbers are difficult to
interpret, we calculate the mean relative utility using the crisis conscious case as
benchmark. These numbers are given in the last column of Table 4.8. For each
case of γ, the expected utility loss of the crisis ignorant investor is bigger than 20 %
and up to 32 % for the lowest value of γ. A loss of more than 20 % of expected
utility can be seen as economically significant.
To see whether the found loss in mean return and utility is also statistically
significant, we conduct a paired t-test with the null hypothesis of a mean difference
between the crisis conscious and the crisis ignorant strategy equal to zero. The
results are reported in Table 4.9. The mean returns are different at a moderate
level of significance between 1.29 % and 5.25 %. The significance levels decrease
for the differences in expected utility to p-values very close to zero. Therefore,
we can conclude that the loss an investor suffers from ignoring the possibility of
systemic crises is also statistically significant.
In the previous section, we have seen a very similar portion of wealth invested into
the risky assets for the main cases, crisis conscious and crisis ignorant. One could
imagine that this observation was pure coincidence and the results presented in
this section are driven by the fact that one of the two investors takes on more
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Table 4.8: DAX Investment - Results of Historical Simulation
This table reports selected statistics of the monthly returns obtained by the historical
simulation using DAX data from 1991 to 2007 and three different investment
strategies: (a) the crisis conscious strategy employing the systematic jump diffusion
model, (b) the crisis ignorant strategy employing the pure diffusion model, and (c)
the moment matching strategy based on the jump diffusion estimates and the pure
diffusion optimization. µ denotes the average return, σ the standard deviation of
returns. The column q0.50 reports the median, whereas q0.25 and q0.75 the respective
quantiles of the return distribution. The last column reports expected utility of the
respective strategy relative to the strategy of the crisis concious investor.
γ = 3
µ σ µ/σ q0.5 q0.25 q0.75 E[U ]
(a) crisis conscious 0.0024 0.1660 0.0142 0.0061 -0.0607 0.0875 1.0000
(b) crisis ignorant -0.0098 0.2279 -0.0430 0.0052 -0.1022 0.1028 0.6833
(c) moment matching -0.0090 0.2183 -0.0414 0.0015 -0.1081 0.0999 0.7478
γ = 5
µ σ µ/σ q0.5 q0.25 q0.75 E[U ]
(a) crisis conscious 0.0040 0.0996 0.0399 0.0066 -0.0294 0.0501 1.0000
(b) crisis ignorant -0.0067 0.1350 -0.0493 0.0035 -0.0580 0.0566 0.7771
(c) moment matching -0.0060 0.1290 -0.0464 -0.0011 -0.0612 0.0552 0.8272
γ = 7
µ σ µ/σ q0.5 q0.25 q0.75 E[U ]
(a) crisis conscious 0.0041 0.0706 0.0578 0.0069 -0.0202 0.0382 1.0000
(b) crisis ignorant -0.0038 0.0968 -0.0391 0.0019 -0.0416 0.0431 0.7826
(c) moment matching -0.0034 0.0925 -0.0369 -0.0013 -0.0437 0.0426 0.8281
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Figure 4.1: Monthly Returns of Historical Simulation
This figure shows the monthly returns histograms of the historical simulation for (a) the crisis
conscious strategy employing the systematic jump diffusion model, (b) the crisis ignorant
strategy employing the pure diffusion model, and (c) the moment matching strategy based
on the jump diffusion estimates and the pure diffusion optimization.
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Table 4.9: DAX - Results of the Paired T-Test
This table reports the results of the paired t-test of the differences in mean return and
expected utility between the crisis conscious and the crisis ignorant strategy investing
in the DAX. The null hypothesis is equal values for the two strategies.
γ ∆(µ) p-value ∆(E[U ]) p-value
3 0.0122 0.0525 0.1788 0.0122
5 0.0106 0.0169 0.0623 0.0005
7 0.0079 0.0129 0.0402 0.0002
risky positions in general. To check whether this is true, we calculate the mean of
the risky fractions over all periods ωˆ = 1
T
∑T
t=1
∑nt
i=1 ωi,t, as well as its standard
deviation and report them in Table 4.10. It can be clearly seen, that the differences
are small and very unlikely the reason of the observed loss in expected utility and
return.
4.7.4 US-Investment
As a final robustness test, we repeat the historical simulation study for a second
market. We take the perspective of an US investor allocating their wealth among
the 30 stocks comprising the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA). We use the
same sample period as for the German market. Table 4.14 in Appendix B lists
the stocks of the DJIA as of January 1991, Table 4.16 reports subsequent changes.
Note that in contrast to the inclusion into the DAX, there are no technical rules for
the DJIA. Here, the 30 included stocks are selected at the discretion of The Wall
Street Journal. No strict criteria apply except that the chosen companies should
be established US companies and leaders in their field. Continuity is desired and
thus, changes occur rarely.18 Due to this features, data availability is very good
and we are able to include at least 29 stocks at each point in time, and 29.75 stocks
in the portfolio on average. As risk-free rate we employ the one month US dollar
18See webpage of Dow Jones Indexes www.djindexes.com.
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Table 4.10: Fraction of Risky Investment
This table reports the average fraction of wealth invested into the risky assets ωˆ as
well as its standard deviation of the risky fraction for various levels of risk aversion.
crisis conscious crisis ignorant
γ ωˆ σ ωˆ σ
3 1.0800 0.3484 1.0344 0.3593
5 0.6646 0.2412 0.6265 0.2342
7 0.4671 0.1783 0.4475 0.1592
Libor rate.
The results for the US market are reported in Table 4.11. Compared with the
results for the German market the return realizations are bigger for a γ equal to
three and smaller for larger risk aversion coefficients. When comparing the crisis
conscious and the crisis ignorant strategy, one can observe similar patterns as for
the case of Germany. Mean returns and mean returns per unit risk are higher for
the crisis conscious case. The expected utility loss is - with values between 9 %
and 18 % - lower than in the German case but still notable. Table 4.12 reports
the results of the corresponding paired t-test. Again, we find moderate levels of
significance for the differences in mean returns, but highly significant results for
the differences in expected utility. Overall, the results do not change qualitatively,
indicating robustness with respect to the market considered.
4.8 Conclusion
We have analyzed the consequences of systemic risk on optimal portfolio choice and
subsequent portfolio return realizations. To do this, we have taken the perspective
of an investor, allocating their wealth across the risky assets of a major domestic
stock market index as well as a risk-free asset. In contrast to the results of Das
and Uppal (2004) who consider an investment into six stock indices on a global
basis, we have found much bigger negative consequences of ignoring the presence of
130
Table 4.11: DJIA Investment - Results of Historical Simulation
This table reports selected statistics of the monthly returns obtained by the historical
simulation using DJIA data from 1991 to 2007 and three different investment
strategies: (a) the crisis conscious strategy employing the systematic jump diffusion
model, (b) the crisis ignorant strategy employing the pure diffusion model, and (c)
the moment matching strategy based on the jump diffusion estimates and the pure
diffusion optimization. µ denotes the average retruns, σ the standard deviation of
returns. The column q0.50 reports the median, whereas q0.25 and q0.75 the respective
quantiles of the return distribution. The last column reports expected utility of the
respective strategy relative to the strategy of the crisis concious investor.
γ = 3
µ σ µ/σ q0.5 q0.25 q0.75 E[U ]
(a) crisis conscious 0.0110 0.1376 0.0803 -0.0011 -0.0527 0.0851 1.0000
(b) crisis ignorant -0.0016 0.1675 -0.0095 -0.0097 -0.0680 0.0897 0.9101
(c) moment matching -0.0061 0.1648 -0.0373 -0.0111 -0.0760 0.0786 0.9110
γ = 5
µ σ µ/σ q0.5 q0.25 q0.75 E[U ]
(a) crisis conscious -0.0109 0.1086 -0.1005 -0.0116 -0.0632 0.0447 1.0000
(b) crisis ignorant -0.0186 0.1367 -0.1360 -0.0173 -0.0760 0.0641 0.8211
(c) moment matching -0.0195 0.1333 -0.1463 -0.0126 -0.0789 0.0549 0.8227
γ = 7
µ σ µ/σ q0.5 q0.25 q0.75 E[U ]
(a) crisis conscious -0.0060 0.0789 -0.0760 -0.0067 -0.0418 0.0372 1.0000
(b) crisis ignorant -0.0112 0.0990 -0.1133 -0.0114 -0.0545 0.0471 0.8412
(c) moment matching -0.0121 0.0964 -0.1252 -0.0087 -0.0576 0.0403 0.8433
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Table 4.12: DJIA - Results of the Paired T-Test
This table reports the results of the paired t-test of the differences in mean return and
expected utility between the crisis conscious and the crisis ignorant strategy investing
in the DJIA. The null hypothesis is equal values for the two strategies.
γ ∆(µ) p-value ∆(E[U ]) p-value
3 0.0126 0.0535 0.0465 0.0074
5 0.0077 0.0256 0.0534 0.0088
7 0.0052 0.0523 0.0316 0.0044
systemic risk when making portfolio decisions on a domestic level. Depending on
the degree of risk aversion and the market considered, the investor loses between
9 % and 32 % of their expected utility. These differences are also highly statistically
significant. The losses in expected utility and expected return are mainly due to
more extreme weights in stocks with significant exposure towards systemic risk,
and smaller weights in stocks less sensitive towards systemic risk when following
the crisis ignorant strategy. Errors due to the disregard of systemic risk during
the estimation procedure do not have a systematic effect on these results.
We admit that the considered strategies perform poorly compared to simple
heuristics as 1/N . However, the purpose of our study is not to find superior
trading strategies, but to analyze the consequences of neglecting systemic risk.
The negligence of this type of risk in portfolio decisions can cause painful losses
to the investor. As a consequence, this type of risk should be incorporated in any
kind of portfolio strategy, be it a simple or sophisticated one.
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4.9 Appendix A
In this appendix, we provide a brief derivation of the optimal portfolio weights in
the spirit of Merton (1969).19
Following Merton (1969), we solve the portfolio choice problem by applying the
dynamic programming approach. Define the indirect utility function J as:
J(Wt, t) = max{ωt}
Et [U(WT )] . (4.31)
This can be rewritten as:
J(Wt, t) = max{ωt}
Et [J(Wt+dt, t+ dt)] (4.32)
= max
{ωt}
Et [J(Wt + dW, t+ dt)] . (4.33)
Applying Ito’s lemma on J , taking expectations, subtracting J [Wt, t] from both
sides and dividing by dt one can obtain the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation:
0 = max
{ωt}
{
∂J
∂t
+
∂J
∂W
[rWt + ω
′
tαWt] +
1
2
∂2J
∂W 2
W 2t ω
′
tΣωt
λE
[
J(Wt +Wtω
′
tξPt, t)− J(Wt, t)
]}
. (4.34)
Take as a trial solution for the indirect utility function:
J(Wt, t) = b(t)
W 1−γt
1− γ . (4.35)
We have:
∂J
∂W
= b(t)W−γ;
∂2J
∂W 2
= −b(t)γW−1−γ; ∂J
∂t
= b′(t)
W 1−γt
1− γ . (4.36)
19For a more detailed exposition see e.g. Korn (1997) or Duffie (2001).
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Thus, we can rewrite (4.34) to:
0 = max
{ωt}
{
b′(t)
W 1−γt
1− γ + b(t)W
−γ
t Wt[r + ω
′
tα]−
1
2
b(t)γW−1−γt W
2
t ω
′
tΣωt
+λE
[
b(t)
(Wt +Wtω
′
tξPt)
1−γ
1− γ − b(t)
W 1−γt
1− γ
]}
. (4.37)
Simplifying yields the desired result:
0 = max
{ωt}
{
b′(t)
b(t)
+ (1− γ)[r + ω′tα]−
1
2
γ(1− γ)ω′tΣωt
+λE
[
(1 + ω′tξPt)
1−γ − 1]}. (4.38)
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4.10 Appendix B
Table 4.13: Companies Listed in the DAX
This table reports the 30 companies listed in the DAX as of 01/01/1991.
Allianz Deutsche Babcock Mannesmann
BASF Deutsche Bank Metallgesellschaft
Bayer Deutsche Lufthansa Preussag
Bayer. Hypo.- und Wechselbank Dresdner Bank RWE
Bayerische Vereinsbank Henkel Schering
BMW Hoechst Siemens
Commerzbank Karstadt Thyssen
Continental Kaufhof Veba
Daimler-Benz Linde Viag
Degussa MAN Volkswagen
Table 4.14: Companies Listed in the DJIA
This table reports the 30 companies listed in the DJIA as of 01/01/1991.
Allied-Signal Exxon Philip Morris
Aluminum Comp. of America General Electric Primerica
American Express General Motors Procter & Gamble
American Tel. & Tel. Goodyear Sears Roebuck
Bethlehem Steel Int. Business Machines Texaco
Boeing International Paper Union Carbide
Chevron McDonald’s United Technologies
Coca-Cola Merck & Company, Inc. USX
Du Pont Minesota Mining & Mfg Westinghouse Electric
Eastman Kodak Navistar International Woolworth
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Table 4.15: Changes in the Composition of the DAX
This table reports the changes in the composition of the DAX between 01/01/1991
and 31/12/2007 as well as a brief reason for the change.
Date Deletion Addition Reason
18/09/1995 Deutsche Babcock SAP Higher market cap. of SAP
22/07/1996 Kaufhof METRO Merger
23/09/1996 Continental Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck
18/11/1996 Metallgesellschaft Deutsche Telekom IPO of Deutsche Telekom
22/06/1998 Bayerische Hypotheken- Adidas Merger
und Wechselbank
Bayerische Vereinsbank HypoVereinsbank
21/12/1998 Daimler-Benz Daimler Merger
22/03/1999 Degussa Degussa-Hu¨ls Take-over
25/03/1999 Thyssen ThyssenKrupp Merger
20/09/1999 Hoechst Fresenius Medical Care Merger
14/02/2000 Mannesmann Epcos Take-over
19/06/2000 Veba E.ON Merger
VIAG Infineon
18/12/2000 Degussa-Hu¨ls Degussa Change of name
19/03/2001 KarstadtQuelle Deutsche Post IPO of Deutsche Post
23/07/2001 Dresdner Bank MLP Vz. Take-over
23/09/2002 Degussa Altana Higher market cap. of Altana
23/12/2002 Epcos Deutsche Bo¨rse
22/09/2003 MLP Vz. Continental
19/12/2005 HypoVereinsbank Hypo Real Estate Take-over
18/09/2006 Schering Postbank Take-over
18/06/2007 Altana Merck Higher market cap. of Merck
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Table 4.16: Changes in the Composition of the DJIA
This table reports the changes in the composition of the DJIA between 01/01/1991
and 31/12/2007.
Date Deletion Addition
06/05/1991 Navistar International Caterpillar
USX Walt Disney
Primerica JP Morgan
17/03/1997 Westinghouse Electric Travelers Group
Texaco Hewlett-Packard
Bethlehem Steel Johnson & Johnson
Woolworth Wal-Mart Stores
01/01/1999 Chevron Microsoft
Goodyear Intel
Union Carbide SBC Communications
Sears Roebuck Home Depot
08/04/2004 AT&T American International
Eastman Kodak Pfizer
International Paper Verizon
Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
In this thesis, we have presented three papers dealing with systemic risk. Chapter
1 has laid the foundation of the topic by introducing the concept of systemic
risk, employing a general working definition applicable to any economic system of
companies, and discussed the special situation of the banking sector.
The empirical study presented in Chapter 2 was devoted to the question of whether
systemic risk is indeed higher in the banking sector, compared with other sectors
of the economy. By using a novel approach, interpreting the multivariate tail
coefficient of stock returns as joined conditional default probability, we found
empirical evidence for a higher systemic crisis probability in the banking sector.
Furthermore, we found that the risk of experiencing a crisis significantly rises
during adverse economic conditions. When comparing the US and German
banking systems, it became apparent that the German system is less exposed
to systemic risk.
The approach taken in Chapter 2, measuring systemic risk at the outer tail of the
distribution, has the great advantage of focusing directly on the events that are
most important when dealing with systemic threats, i.e. joined extreme downward
movements of the system. The fact that it is impossible to disentangle systemic
risk in the narrow and in the broad sense can be seen as a disadvantage of this
methodology.
As the different types of systemic risk demand different policy reactions, the issue
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of narrow systemic risk is investigated in more detail in Chapter 3 by analyzing the
abnormal stock price reactions of companies upon a negative earnings surprise at
a competitor firm. The main result of this study is empirical evidence of contagion
effects in the banking sector, in contrast to non-banking sectors, which do not show
any signs of contagion. The degree of contagion increases with the importance of
both the bank experiencing a negative earnings surprise as well as the banks being
affected.
The last paper of this thesis, presented in Chapter 4, focused on a different aspect
of systemic risk. By taking the position of a stock market investor, we empirically
analyzed the consequences of neglecting the presence of systemic risk in the process
of forming optimal portfolios. Failure to take systemic threats into account yielded
significant losses in expected returns and expected utility for a German as well as
a US-based stock market investor during the last two decades. Therefore, systemic
risk should be taken into account when forming investment portfolios.
Systemic risk has become a very present theme in economic research as well as
political discussions. The currently prevailing financial crisis has conjured up this
issue in a striking way. Beside the aspects of systemic risk dealt with in this thesis,
many others must be considered.
First, in the first two studies, we have focused on the measurement of systemic risk,
without analyzing the microstructural origin of this threat. This is an important
point and should also be addressed and studied when striving towards a crises
robust economy.
Second, we have analyzed how a stock market investor should react to systemic risk
without being able to mitigate this threat. However, this task of crisis prevention
lies with policy makers and regulators, who consequently ask for measures against
systemic risk. They should be able to apply these instruments in the best possible
way, in order to receive optimal results. Thus, the issue of prevention and
abatement of systemic risk is another important topic for further research.
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